Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP carried out by the Ulkopoliittinen instituutti (Helsinki) and the Institut fur Europaische Politik (Berlin).

54 These problems are treated more broadly in chapter 7.

55 Interview with Igor Bunin at Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Oct. 2001, p.2.

56 'The relationship of the EU and Ukraine is always slightly trilateral: as a rule Russia, even when not being mentioned, is kept in mind'. Ekaterinas Grigorieva, 'Gazovaya pedagogika', Izvestia, 12 Sept. 2001, p.4.

57 'Dmitriy Kisilev s natsionalnim interesom', Subbotnik NG, October 2001 (supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Oct.2001, p.12).

58 See The Eastern policy of the European Union in the run-up to the EU's enlargement to include the countries of Central And Eastern Europe—Poland's viewpoint. Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2101, p. 18. It seems noteworthy indeed that arguments for more active involvement of the EU into the CIS space are being developed by one of the EU accession candidate countries.

59 See Natalia Airapetova, 'Malenkiy uzel v bolshoi politike', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sep. 2001, p.5.

60 As an example, it seems appropriate to quote Prime-Minister of Ukraine Anatoliy Kinakh who stated that 'the enlargement of the European structures [NATO and the EU] should not create obstacles for integration of East European countries—Ukraine, Belarus and Russia'. See interview with him in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 Nov. 2001, p.1.

61 Michael Emerson and Marius Vahl, Europe's Black Sea dimension—model European regionalism, prêt-à-porter. A paper submitted to Halki International Seminar, 31 Aug. 5 Sep. 2001.

62 Literaturnaya Gazeta, 27 Aug. 1997, p. 9.

63 'EU makes overture to Iran', International Herald Tribune, 11 Sept. 2001, p. 6.

64 See chapter 8.

65 Patrick E.Tyler, 'Putin Sees Gain in U.S.Distructions', International Herald Tribune, 7-8 April 2001, p.1, 5.

66 Suzanne Daley, 'EU to Pursue Links With North Korea', International Herald Tribune, 31 Marh 1 April 2001, p. 4.

67 For the text of the Joint Declaration in Russian, see Sovremennaya Evropa, no.4, October-December 2000, p.120-123. For the text in the EU official languages, see the EU Council documents 12779/00, 12780/00.

68 See for instance: Oleg Barabanov, 'Tendentsii razvitiya OVPB ES i ZES: neozhidanniy vizov dlya Rossii?', in: Rossiya i osnovniye instituty bezopasnosti v Yevrope: vstupaya v XXI vek. Ed. by Dmitry Trenin. Moscow: S&P, 2000; S.Yermakov and V.Terekhov, 'Formirovanie evropeyskoy politiki v oblasti oborony i bezopasnosti na sovremennom etape', in: Problemy vneshney i oboronnoy politiki Rossii, sbornik statey no.7. Ed. by V.Krivokhizha. Moscow: RISI, 2001; Vitaliy Zhurkin, 'Evropeyskaya oborona: ot mifa k realnosti', in: Sovremennaya Evropa, no.3, July-September 2001; Dmitriy Danilov, 'Obschaya vneshiaya politika i politika bezopasnosti ES', in: Evropeiskiy Soyuz na poroge XXI veka: vybor strateguii razvitiya, ed. by Yuriy Borko and Olga Baturina, Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2001. A candidate dissertation of Ekaterina Gorbatova ('Obschaya vneshniaya politika i politika bezopasnosti Yevropeyskogo Soyuza: aktualnyie problemy') addressing basic problems of the CESDP was submitted in 2001 to the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2000 2001, conferences and seminars on the CESDP or its specific aspects were held by a number of research centers of the Russian Academy of Sciences (such as IMEMO and the Institute of Europe), Council on foreign and defence policy (SVOP), MGIMO-University, Moscow Carnegie center, Foundation for military reform. CESDP was among key subjects of discussion at the 4th Annual conference of the PfP Consortium of defense academies and security studies institutes that was held in Moscow in June 2001.

69 The idea of the objective character of the integration in Western Europe was for the first time developed in the 'Theses' of IMEMO (the Institute of world economy and international relations) published in 1962. See 'Ob imperialisticheskoy integratsii v Zapadnoy Evrope' ('Obschiy rynok'), Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnoshenia, 1962, no.9 (supplement).

70 See Sven Arnswald, Implications of Baltic states' membership for EU, Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2001.

71 Andrei Fedorov, 'Ugotovano li Finliandii mesto v NATO', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 31 Aug. 2001, p.1, 6.

72 As reported in Dmitry Danilov, The EU’s Rapid Reaction Capabilities: A Russian Perspective. Paper submitted to the European Security Forum in Brussels, 11 Sep. 2001.

73 The Speaker of the State Duma Gennadyi Seleznev writes: 'With the collapse of the USSR the world has actually become unipolar and the balance of power and influence on our planet has shifted to one single point—which is not only unfair but just plain dangerous for mankind. Under these circumstances one can understand the search by many states for some counterbalances. The EU’s ambitious desire to create another pole of global importance which would stand out not only by its economic clout but by having global and regional components of influence is understandable and justified.' See Guennadiy Seleznev, 'Zolushka v Yevrope. Skolko escho Rossii ostavatsa v etoy roli?', Evropa (Moscow), no. 5, 2000, p.9.

74 This is indirect quotation of remarks made publicly by Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, then deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, at the conference on the EU and Russia held in Moscow in February 2001. See Gueorgiy Bovt, 'Filosofiya pridatkov NATO', Izvestia, 16 Feb. 2001, p.3.

75 A befitting comparison could be made with the criticism by some Russian analysts of Moscow’s offer with regard to European non-strategic anti-missile system. They view this initiative as resulting from the deliberate intention of 'hawks' to lead the whole discussion to a deadlock by creating an illusion that it would be possible to solve the problem without reaching agreements with the United States on BMD. The critics of the idea of Russian interaction with the CESDP proceed from similar logic.

76 Ekaterina Gorchakova-Esmont and Ivan Troekurov, 'Rossiyskiy derzhavniy smysl trebuyet adaptatsii k novim usloviyam', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 Feb. 2001, p. 13 (Dipkurier no.3, 2001, p.5).

77 S.Yermakov and V.Terekhov, 'Formirovanie evropeyskoy politiki v oblasti oborony i bezopasnosti na sovremennom etape', in: Problemy vneshney i oboronnoy politiki Rossii, sbornik statey no.7. Ed. by V.Krivokhizha. Moscow: RISI, 2001, p.55-56.

78 Vitaliy Zhurkin, 'Evropeyskaya oborona: ot mifa k realnosti', Sovremennaya Evropa, no.3, July-September 2001, p.65.

79 This perspective may be a matter of concern for those who believe that both sides have to retain and to promote capabilities to compliment each other rather than to engage on 'divergent defense paths'. See Hans Binnendijk, 'A Trans-Atlantic Division of Labor Could Undermine NATO', International Herald Tribune, 7-8 Apr. 2001, p.8.

80 US Secretary of Defense Donald Ramsfeld was reported to reject the demand of NATO General Secretary Georges Robertson to send additional forces to the Balkans. See Vladislav Doronin, 'Nesostoyavsheesia peremiree', Izvestia, 23 Mar. 2001, p.7.

81 In September 2001 the idea was put forward was made about sending a 1500-strong EU multinational force to Macedonia to help keep peace in the Balkans after the end of the 30-day NATO mission. If accepted, it would be the first demonstration by the EU to deploy military force independently of the USA in the Balkans (although it would still need US logistics and intelligence). See Andrew Jack a.o., 'EU envoy proposes Macedonia peace force', Financial Times, 6 Sep. 2001, p.1.

82 See the chapter of Dmitry Danilov in Evropeiskiy Soyuz na poroge XXI veka. Vybor strategii razvitiya. Ed. by Yu.Borko and O.Butorina. Moscow: URSS, 2001, especially p.184-191.

83 For instance, at the eve of Russia—EU summit in Moscow in May 2001, Javier Solana was reported to state that 'strategic partnership' was being shaped with Russia 'in a very rapid manner and a very profound manner', most notably in the area of crisis management. See Patrick E.Tyler, 'Putin Sees Gain in U.S.Distructions', International Herald Tribune, 7-8 Apr. 2001, p.1, 5.

84 See, for instance, the interview with Richard Right, Head of the Permanent Delegation of the EU Commission in Russia, in Sovremennaya Evropa, no.3, July-September 2001, p.73-75.

85 These theses are extensively developed by Dmitry Danilov in his paper The EU’s Rapid Reaction Capabilities: A Russian Perspective presented at the European Security Forum in Brussels on 11 Sep. 2001.

86 As defined by the Headline goal set at Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999.

87 See, for instance, some recent publications on this matter: Ivan Ivanov, 'Rasshirenie Evrosoyuza i interesy Rossii', in: Sovremennaya Evropa, no.3, July-September 2001, p.76 86; Yuri Borko, 'Evropeiskiy Soyuz na puti k rasshireniyu', in: God Planety: Vipusk 2001 goda. Moscow: Respublika, 2001, p.399 405.

88 See Yuriy Shishkov, Integratsionniye protsessy na poroge XXI veka. Pochemy ne integriruyutsa strany SNG. Moscow: NP "III tysiacheletiye", 2001, p.265.

89 It is noteworthy that the terminology that was used recently for blaming NATO is now applied to the EU, even if in a less emotional tone. When analyzing the enlargement of the EU, writes a specialist on integration from a well known research institute in Moscow, 'there all grounds now to speak about preconditions for the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe'. Olga Potemkina, 'Stanovlenie obnovlennoy Evropy', Sovremennaya Evropa, no.3, July-September 2001, p.36.

90 In Russian, this document is published in Vremia novostey, 29 Aug. 1999.

91 Figures in the subsequent sections are drawn from publications and statements of Academician Ivan Ivanov, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

92 However, there could be negative effects for Russia because of the EU practice to limit the export of nuclear fuel from Russia at the level of 20% per cent of member-states' requirements. For the candidate countries, this share is about 90%, and its diminishing to the EU level might have negative implications for Russia. In a different way, this might also be the case of quotas on steel export from Russia to the EU that were used as a tool of pressure against Russia in the context of developments in Chechnya; if this happens again, the new member-states will also have to adopt this approach.

93 According to some estimates in Russia, its losses resulting from export quotas on metals and chemical productions during the 12-months period of EU's 'anti-dumping measures' have amounted to $2,5 bln. (Viktoria Sokolova, 'Priglashenie v ES', Izvestia, 23 March 2001, p.3). These figures, however, require further verification. Another estimate relates to the previous phase of the EU enlargement and concerns Finland: when the anti-trust and anti-dumping legislation of the EU was extended onto this country, Russia's lost were assessed at $27 mln.

94 See Olga Nikushkina, 'Bolgaria vvedet vizy dlia rossiiskykh grazhdan', Kommersant, 20 Sep. 2001, p.3.

95 See Lindel Fairlie and Alexander Sergounin, (Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, no.12). Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2001.

96 Three Baltic states are lagging behind with the ratification of some of basic human rights conventions. They have not ratified the European social charter and its protocols. The Framework convention on national minorities protection awaits ratification by Latvia.

97 Yuriy Shishkov, Integratsionniye protsessy na poroge XXI veka. Pochemy ne integriruyutsa strany SNG. Moscow: NP "III tysiacheletiye", 2001, p.268.

98 See Arkady Moshes, Overcoming Unfriendly Stability: Russian-Latvian Relations at the end of 1990s. (Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, no.4). Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut fur Europaische Politik, 1999.

99 Svetlana Babayeva, 'Strakhi i vygody', Izvestia, 23 March 2001, p.3

100 Nadezhda Kozhukhova, Petr Akopov, 'Perviy shag k potere Kaliningrada', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 Nov. 1998, p. 1.

101 This opinion is expressed by Valery Seleznev, a representative of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal-democratic party (LDPR) in the regional Duma. See Oleg Odnokolenko, 'Oborona Kaliningrada', Itogi, 22 May 2001, p. 27.

102 See Alexander Sergounin, in Lindel Fairlie and Alexander Sergounin, (Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, no.12). Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2001.

103 In July 2001, at a special meeting of Russia's Security Council on the Kaliningrad region, its living standards and capital investments were assessed as 1,4 and 2 times lower than Russia's average figures. See Yuriy Buyda, 'Kak vygodneye prodat Kalinningrad', Novoye vremia, no.32, 12 Aug. 2001, p.9.

104 Dimitriy Danilov, 'Kaliningradskaya dilemma', NG-regiony (supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta), 23 Feb. 1999, p.6.

105 At the beginning of the 1990s, a 'special' status was given to many administrative territories in Russia, some of them bigger than average European countries. The 'special' regime in the Kaliningrad region was introduced, modified, eliminated and re-introduced several times during the decade, with various ministries and agencies in Moscow clearly lacking a coordinated policy on this issue. See Alexander Yershov, 'Special economic zone (the SEZ) in Kaliningrad: Pro and con', in: Kaliningrad and the Future of Russia—EU Relations, Moscow: EastWest Institute, September 1999, p. 7-13.

106 It is widely believed that this may produce the most negative effect over the country's territorial integrity. 'The autonomization of the Kaliningrad region is not only fraught with the risk of its alienation from Russia, but also threatens to set a precedent thus becoming the strongest disinyegration factor for Russia as a whole'. Dimitriy Danilov, 'Kaliningradskaya dilemma', NG-regiony (supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta), 23 Feb. 1999, p.6.

107 Each year the external frontiers between the Kaliningrad region and its neighbours (Poland and Lithuania) are crossed by 8 mln people and 3 mln cars. For the region with total population below 1 mln these are impressive figures indeed.

108 See Lindel Fairlie, 'Kaliningrad in a regional context', in: Lindel Fairlie and Alexander Sergounin, (Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, no.12). Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2001.

109 Yevgeniy Skokov, 'Polzuchaya anneksiya Kaliningradskogo anklava', Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 1 Mar. 1997, p. 2.

110 It is suggested, for instance, that the Kaliningrad region proclaims its 'associate membership' in Russia and simultaneously integrates with the EU as a 'subject of international law'—in particular, by providing its inhabitants with a double Russian/EU citizenship. See interview with Sergei , chairman of the region's 'Baltic Republican Party' and president of the region's Union of entrepreneurs, in Alexander Riabushev, 'Stanet li Kaliningrad respublikoi Baltiei', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Dec. 2001, p.4.

111 As suggested by Valery Ustiugov, member of the Federation Coincil, the upper house of the Russian parliament. See Oleg Odnokolenko, 'Oborona Kaliningrada', Itogi, 22 May 2001, p. 27.

112 Yevgeniy Skokov, 'Polzuchaya anneksiya Kaliningradskogo anklava', Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 1 Mar. 1997, p. 2.

113 See, for instance, Sergei Shakhrai, 'Kaliningrad—Kenigsberg—Krulevets…', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 July 1994.

114 See Alexander Yershov, 'Special economic zone (the SEZ) in Kaliningrad: Pro and con', in: Kaliningrad and the Future of Russia—EU Relations, Moscow: EastWest Institute, September 1999, p.13.

115 See Hanna Ojanen (ed.), The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU. (Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, no.12). Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2001.

116 See Stephen Dewar, Kaliningrad—an opportunity or a barrier for Rusian—EU cooperation? In: Kaliningrad and the Future of Russia—EU Relations, Moscow: EastWest Institute, September 1999, p.14-18.

117 Litva i Rossia v severnom izmerenii: Nidskaya initsiativa. ITAR-TASS, Puls planety, 11 Feb. 2000.

118 For some details, see Marius Vahl, Just Good Friends? The EU—Russian 'Strategic Partnership' and the Northern Dimension, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001, p. 35-41; idem, A Northern Dimension Model for Relations between the European Union and its 'Near Abroad' (draft), Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 15 May 2001, p.5.

119 See Alexei Kachalin, 'Christoph Patten o Kaliningrade', ITAR-TASS, Mir i my, 9 Apr. 2001.

120 Svetlana Babayeva, 'Strakhi i vygody', Izvestia, 23 Mar. 2001, p.3.

121 See Charles Fleming, 'Bush could need to alter rhetoric for European ears', Wall Street Journal Europe, 21-22 Sep. 2001, p.4.

122 See Jim Hoagland, 'A surgical strike, or a mass attack?', International Herald Tribune, 20 Sep. 2001, p.8.

123 See 'I protiv terrorizma, i protiv voiny s islamskim mirom', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Sep. 2001, p.7

124 Statistics lack appropriate figures, but assessments (even if varying within rather broad spectrum) are by and large indicative: Moslems account for approximately 1,4% of the population in the USA, 4,3% in France, 3,7% in Germany, 9% in Russia and 18,5% in the CIS as a whole. Mikhail Tulskiy, 'Islam v neislamskom mire', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sep. 2001, p.7.

125 Judy Dempsey, Stephen Folder, 'EU to reach out to Iran and Syria', Financial Times, 23 Sep.2001, p.5.

126 See Judy Dempsey, 'EU urges US to build broad coalition', Financial Times, 20 Sep.2001, p.6.

127 As reported by Liudmila Romanova, 'Moskva prizyvauet k sovmestnym deystviyam', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 Sep. 2001, p.2.

128 See Lidiya Andrusenko, 'Poydiot li Rossiya v soyuzniki k SshA', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 Sep. 2001, p.2.

129 In particular, the extraordinary EU summit on 21 Sept. 2001 was devoted to the issue of terrorism; prior to this the CFSP 'troika' (Javier Solana as High Representative for CFSP, Chris Patten as external affairs commissioner, and Louis Michel as the foreign affairs minister of the country holding rotating presidency) visited Washington for intensive consultations with the US leadership.

130 Afsane Basir Pour, 'M.Chirac ne montre pas d'inqiétude quant aux intentions américaines', Le Monde, 21 Sep. 2001, p.7.

131 According to one comment, 'brusque rapprochement between Russia and the USA has brought about an understandable tension on the part of the European Union. […] In struggle against international terrorism, Russia is acquiring a key role. Europe worries that Moscow, by using its influence in Central Asian states adjacent to Afghanistan, attempts to get concessions from the USA. […] This variant does not suit Europe'. See Liudmila Romanova, 'Vladimir Putin obrabatyvayet Evropu', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 Sep. 2001, p.2. However, if pursuing this line of thinking, Moscow as the partner of Washington should be considered 'competing' with the NATO allies of the USA rather than with the EU; according to another Russian comment, 'Americans made it clear that Russia, in this particular case, could be more useful than all other 18 states participating in the North Atlantic Treaty' (Svetlana Babayeva, 'Smena alyansov', Izvestia, 29 Sep. 2001, p.5).

132 Alan Sipress, 'Cooperation on terrorism deepens U.S.—Russia ties. A 'second chance' seen to bury the cold war', International Herald Tribune, 5 Oct.2001, p.1, 10

133 'Putin has made a decisive geopolitical choice by placing himself together with the western community against the emerging new pole that embraces 'rogue states', terrorists and anti-globalists—all those who challenge the new world order. [By specifying conditions of its participation in the action of retaliation,] Russia has got a unique chance of inscribing itself into a new civilization as an autonomous actor with its own priorities' (an interview with Russia's prominent political analyst Dmitriy Trenin in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sep. 2001, p.2).

134 This thesis has been extensively developed by Russian influential 'Nezavisimaya gazeta' newspaper. It pointed out, for instance, that 'the war in Afghanistan leads to the confrontation of interests between Russia and the USA'. Vladimir Gueorguiev, 'Uzbekistan prodalsia za 8 mlrd. dollarov', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 Oct. 2001, p.1.

135 See Natalia Airapetova, 'Malenkiy uzel v bolshoi politike', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sep. 2001, p.5.

136 Igor Rodionov in an interview to the NTV channel on 18 Oct. 2001.

137 Mikhail Khodarenok, 'Strateguicheskoe otstuplenie Riossii zavershaetsa', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 Oct. 2001, p.1, 7.

138 Vladimir Mukhin, 'Vashington i Moskva uzhe planiruyut poslevoyennoye ustroystvo mira', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 Sep. 2001, p.1, 7.

139 William Pfaff, 'The war on terrorism may bring on a new U.S. isolationism', International Herald Tribune, 20 Sep. 2001, p.8.