Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

7. Political challenges of enlargement

The forthcoming enlargement of the EU touches upon Russia's political interests in many respects. Apart from various concrete issues that emerge in this context, it seems important to point to global political implications in terms of Russia's international positions. The enlargement of the EU means that Russia will find itself next to the biggest market in the world, with population of 550 millions and gross domestic product of about $8 trillion. Most of Europe's territorial space, political resources, economic capacity and demographic potential will be concentrated in this entity. Geopolitically and in terms of balance of power, this means that only two important international actors will remain on the continent—the EU and Russia.

However, it is worth noting that at times Russia's assessments seemed to fail proceeding from this 'large picture'. Instead, the attention was (and sometimes still is) focused upon either immediate balance of gains and losses or upon links of the EU enlargement with other political dossiers of Russian foreign policy.

Traditional attitudes

The prominence of political considerations in Russia's attitudes towards the enlargement of the EU was inherited from the Soviet past. Indeed, as it was reminded earlier, the integration in the western part of Europe, from the very beginning of its development, was assessed in Moscow as a political project aimed at undermining its positions and therefore requiring very suspicious attitudes. This in itself would be a sufficient reason for considering any enlargement plans as being against the interests of the USSR.

However, the initial two stages of enlargement (in 1970s and then in 1980s) went in parallel with growing recognition of the 'objective character' of West European integration by Soviet academics—the attitude that was gradually finding its way within the official agencies involved in foreign policy. Straightforward arguments against the expanding territorial space of West European integration would have not fit into this emerging thought and policy patterns.

Even more importantly, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean vectors of the EC enlargement did not intersect with what Moscow considered its foreign policy priorities. Consequently, there were no significant reasons to dramatize both enlargements—insofar as they did not challenge Moscow directly. Instead, it was expected that 'intra-imperialist contradictions' would either make the enlargement impossible or, if it turns out successful, aggravate and undermine internal developments within the European Community.

By the beginning of the third phase of the EU enlargement the situation had changed in a radical way. The 'socialist commonwealth' and then the Soviet Union had ceased to exist whereas Russia as a partial substitute to the latter was just in a formative period, with only embryonic foreign policy instincts. In fact, it was this dramatic change in the international environment of the continent that made possible the next round of the EU enlargement.

Politically, its most remarkable feature consisted in involving three neutral/non-aligned countries—Austria, Sweden and Finland. Economically and in terms of social organization, they were much better qualified for joining the EC/EU than most of their predecessors from the previous enlargements. But the crucial role belonged to political circumstances. Without the erosion of the cold war and then disappearance of one of its power poles, their accession to the EU would have been impossible.

Indeed, three decades earlier they had had opted for non-participation in the EU. For each of three countries, there were specific reasons and motivations; among them, those connected with political circumstances played by no means a meaningless role. Indeed, these countries were inscribed into a delicate bipolar international balance, and to alter it might be fraught with destabilizing consequences. A possible reaction of the USSR would be predictably negative and even assertive—although the 'weight' of this factor was different in each of three cases, the EC itself could not but have it in mind. Against this background, eventual economic gains might seem less important than negative political implications undermining the overall international pattern in Europe. In fact, the configuration of the Community turned out inscribed into the configuration of the bipolar international system; changing the former was possible only insofar as it did not change the latter.

Noteworthy, this paradigm was not only imposed by the East but also tacitly accepted by the West. In a sense, it was a recognition of political personality of the EC—much earlier than the problem of transforming it into a political union became the matter of concrete discussions. Also, the decision not to expand onto the 'grey zone' between two blocs could be characterized as an act of foreign policy coordination; moreover, the latter was in fact focused upon the issue that was by no means of secondary importance—although the integration in this sphere, in the form of the EPC and then CFSP, was to develop considerably later.

The disappearance of 'the East' as a political pole of the international system in Europe made this paradigm irrelevant. In addition, two features of Russia's foreign policy of that time were crucial for defining Moscow's attitude (or, rather, the absence of the latter). On the one hand, Russia's focus upon domestic issues and the lack of strategic vision as regards its interaction with the external world was by no means conducive to considering the issue in terms of Russia's interests in the international arena. On the other hand, the honeymoon in Russia's relations with the West (or, at least, Russia's euphoria in this regard) predisposed Moscow to be supportive rather than critical. Later, when Russia started to make its foreign policy more coherent and less submissive, the third round of enlargement was already a fait accomli, whereas any post-factum arguments against it would have been absolutely irrelevant.

Nowadays Russia's attitude towards the forthcoming enlargement of the EU is being formed under the influence of other constraints:

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  First, the overall context of Russia's relations with the West has changed, with excessive enthusiasm of early post-Soviet days having become the thing of the past.
  
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  Secondly, Russia has shaped some basic 'great lines' of its foreign policy that serve as a system of coordinates allowing to assess facts of international life.
  
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  Thirdly, the EU enlargement is going to take place mainly in the Eastern direction involving countries that are adjacent to Russia.
  
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  Fourthly, the EU itself is in process of change, and some aspects of this transformation may seem particularly relevant to Russia in the context of the enlargement process.
  

Thus, there are no grounds to anticipate Russia's indifference towards the forthcoming EU enlargement, as it was the case with its previous round. Indeed, in Russia's debate on the EU this problem has a prominent place⁸⁷. Interestingly, this debate has reproduced a number of the above-mentioned patterns that were appropriate to the past. There are, however, some specific features of the discussions that are also worth noting.