Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Conclusions

Russia's intellectual and political debates on the attitudes towards the EU are inscribed into the overall picture of domestic transformations in the country and its search for accommodation with the external environment. Numerous interest groups participating in this process have various corporate identifications, different ideological backgrounds and political orientations, unequal access to resources and power. None of these parameters predetermines their positions with respect to the EU. Within the business community and officials from the state apparatus, professional military and diplomats, academia and mass media one could find the whole variety of approaches, ranging between the most 'pro-European' ones and those that are characterized by deep suspicions towards the EU.

This is reflected in the political process in Russia—on the level of political parties, in the State Duma, as well as in the official policy of the country. However, the general trend seems to point to the direction of developing a more positive and constructive attitude towards the EU. At the same time, this attitude is becoming more differentiated, focusing upon specific aspects of Russia's interaction with the EU and assessing them against the broader background of interests, concerns and prospects.

Many elements of Russia's thought patterns and political instincts with respect to the current evolution of the EU are deeply rooted in the history of the last four to five decades. Indeed, the understanding of Moscow's attitudes towards the European integration since the beginning of its developments goes far beyond the necessity to represent a genesis of Russia's attitudes. The analyses of the past provides a better sense of both the actual situation and its eventual future developments.

In particular, this concerns the extent to which Moscow perceives the EU as a political entity. Noteworthy, Moscow's initially overwhelming negativism towards integration in the western part of the continent is primarily explained by the fact that it was assessed as a purely political project hostile to the Soviet-lead 'socialist system'. In the 60s, Soviet academics started to develop a more realistic evaluation of integration pointing to its 'objective characteristics'—which was a fundamental breakthrough paving the way for overcoming political barriers in the future. In the 70s, this assessment began to affect Moscow's foreign policy; with the latter becoming more flexible and differentiated in the context of détente, the attitude towards the European Community was changing to a more cooperative one. In the 1980s, Moscow has finally come to view the EC as a political thing. In the 1990s, political aspects in the interaction with the EU are becoming of growing importance and may become predominant—as they were at the very beginning of this process. However, the unquestionable negative vector of that time has not been replaced by an unquestionable positive one nowadays.

Soviet attitudes with respect to earlier attempts of developing military-related aspects of integration in Western Europe are also worth mentioning. Negativism towards such projects as the European Defense Community went in parallel with confusion in assessing attempts to promote a 'European core' in NATO or to 'upgrade' the Western European Union. It is striking to what extent this confusion is reproduced in reactions towards the emerging CESDP nowadays.

The attitudes towards previous phases of enlargement seem less connected with what is taking place in our time. However, in earlier discussions on actual or eventual expansion of the EC the 'Soviet factor' was not insignificant; indeed, it defined the geography of enlargement and singled out zones where the latter could not take place.

Finally, when dealing with the past, it seems appropriate to consider to what extent the EC was regarded as an international actor. Alongside the development of the European Political Cooperation, Moscow was paying increasing attention to the EC's ability for a 'collective behavior'—although cautiously, with slow political repercussions and with significant reservations.

In addressing the current situation, the question arises whether the post-Soviet Russia has overlooked the most dramatic developments in the EU during the last decade. Indeed, most of them did not provoke any strong political emotion in Moscow that was preoccupied with both challenging domestic agenda and the painful adaptation to Russia's reduced international status. Later, Russia's political attitudes towards the EU turned out inscribed in Russia's broader foreign policy agenda that was following a pendulum-type trajectory, with simplistic 'pro-westernism' of the early 1990s giving place to a feverish search of a more coherent self-identification on the international scene and with opposite extremes of 'anti-westernism' sometimes viewed as an attractive alternative to humiliating submission. Russia's attitudes towards CFSP, CESDP and EU's forthcoming enlargement were developing at the crossroad of these conflicting dimensions of Russia's foreign policy.

Paradoxically, although within this model Russia is nowadays in the counter-phase towards its own policy of the early 1990s, Moscow is nevertheless actively articulating its positive attitude towards the EU. The arguments in favor of developing a kind of privileged relationship with the EU range from economic rationales to the reasoning on joint efforts of Russia and the EU for organizing the European geopolitical space. The institutionalization of political interaction between Russia and the EU has become a considerable achievement not only in terms of their bilateral relationship; indeed, this pattern has a unique character for Russia's overall foreign policy practice nowadays.

One of central issues of the developing interaction of both sides to be considered in the project touches upon the 'Atlanticist' contexts of Russia's foreign policy and the EU developments. An amazing parallelism has always existed in the attitudes of Washington and Moscow towards European integration. In the case of the USA, a support for a strong Europe was based on, and conditioned by the assumption that such a Europe should not challenge the US primacy. The Soviet attitudes represented a kind of a mirror image of this pattern: an interest in a United Europe that might be a counterweight to the American primacy went in parallel with concerns that a United Europe might be an additional element of the collective strength of the West, under the control of the USA.

Although the cold war ended more than ten years ago, this pattern is still discernible. Noteworthy, Russia's attitudes towards the growing role of the WEU in the 1990s or towards the plans of enlarging the EU have never been so suspicious and clearly negative, as that towards NATO enlargement. Moreover, this was perceived as an acceptable alternative to NATO enlargement, and at times one might even believe that Moscow was more enthusiastic about the WEU or the EU enlargement than the member-states were. In a sense, Russia's attitude towards the enlargement of the EU was a profiteer of Russia's obsession with NATO enlargement.

The context of NATO is particularly important with respect to Russia's attitudes towards CESDP. Some analysts and politicians would condition their positive assessment of the CESDP only to the extent to which the latter would be able to disengage from NATO. Otherwise, an image of NATO expanding onto the EU might prevail over the image of the EU expanding onto the area of crisis-management.

Russia's perception of, and Russia's attitudes towards CFSP, CESDP and the enlargement of the EU are developing in the context of broader vision of Russia's anticipated challenges from, and its would-be priorities in the international system.

On the one hand, the vision of the EU becoming stronger and acquiring a possibility of playing an independent role fits well into a picture of multipolar world that is so dear to many in Russia. On the other hand, there are arguments considering an economically, politically and militarily strong United Europe as a kind of existential challenge to Russia. There may be also other matters of concern for Moscow, even if hardly grounded—for instance, regarding the role of the EU in the CIS space and/or with respect to the existing or eventual conflicts on the post-Soviet territory.

Similarly, Moscow's concerns with the EU forthcoming enlargement have two dimensions. One is related to the balance of immediate gains and losses (tariffs and other means of trade regulation, the regime of visas and so on.). Another one touches upon the assessment of longer-term prospects, with the process of the EU consolidation becoming increasingly overwhelming and Russia remaining outside the 'core area' of Europe.

Notwithstanding all positive changes in Russia's attitudes towards the EU, there is an objective need for developing a strategic line that would not be only focused upon calculating the balance of immediate gains and losses. Indeed, overcoming the old-style 'idealist paradigm' was important for not seeing in the EU a political challenge, as it was the case during the Soviet times. But endorsing instead a 'realist paradigm' has brought about a paradoxical result, when the attitude towards the EU is only determined in terms of winning or losing. This is a short-sited approach, and many concerns of Russia are rooted within this superficial 'pragmatism' preventing from adequately assessing the prospects of historical development.

The terrorist assault of 11 September 2001 and world reaction thereto have opened a 'great debate' on eventual international implications of theses developments. Without being the focal point of this debate, the relationship between Russia and the EU will nevertheless constitute an important element of any scenario of future developments in the international arena. At the time when effective management of the international system have all the chances to become one of the central issues in the global agenda of the 21^st century, joint efforts of Russia and the EU, first of all through Moscow's cooperative interaction with CFSP and CESDP, might be of considerable importance for consolidating international security both in Europe and well beyond Europe.

* Published as: Russia's Attitudes Towards the EU: Political Aspects. Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti—Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2002.

1 Suffice it to mention the times of Gorbachev when 'new thinking' was recommended 'for our country and the whole world', whereas the international security system had to be not less than 'comprehensive' and 'all-embracing'. See his book Perestroika i novoye myshlenie dlia nashei strany in dlia vsego mira, Moscow: Politizdat, 1987.

2 At that time, the European Community had twelve member-states. The EU Treaty came only into force in November 1993. From 1995 onwards the EU has 15 members.

3 For the text, see Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, 1993, no.1-2 (special issue).

4 See more on this in: Vladimir Baranovsky, 'Russia: a part of Europe or apart from Europe?', International Affairs (London), 2000, July, vol.76, no.3. Also published in: Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader. Edited by A.Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

5 Yuriy Shishkov, Integratsionniye protsessy na poroge XXI veka. Pochemy ne integriruyutsa strany SNG. Moscow: NP 'III tisiacheletiye', 2001.

6 Zagliadivaya v XXI vek: Yevropeyskiy Soyuz i Sodruzhectvo Nezavisimikh Gosudarstv. Ed. by Yu.Borko, V.Zhurkin and V.Shemiatenkov. M.: Interdialekt+, 1998.

7 Marina Strezhneva, Doctoral dissertation…, IMEMO 2000.

8 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirguizstan and Tajikistan.

9 The majority of two thirds is required for taking decisions, with Russia possessing 40%per cent of the total vote, Belarus and Kazakhstan—20% each, and the remaining two states—10% each.

10 As quoted by Noviye Izvestia, 26 June 2001, p.1.

11 Nikolai Gudskov, 'Yazikoviy barier i neytralniy mezhdunarodniy yazyk', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 Oct. 2001, p.16. The author is the proponent of Esperanto as the means that could have prevented the fatal destabilization of the USSR in the past and might minimize the disintegration potential of the EU in the future. However, the similarities between the EU and the defunct USSR could be also traced in a broader and perhaps more substantive sense; although certainly outweighed by the divergence and disparity of two patterns, they nevertheless deserve some analytical and political attention.

12 See, for instance, the account from an international conference on the relevance of the European federalism for Russia ('Yevropeyskiy federalism i Rossiya: opyt nastoyaschego i buduschego', Sovremennaya Evropa, no.1, January-March 2001, p.32-89).

13 A candidate dissertation on the role of local self-government that was presented at IMEMO in 2001 reveals both extensive use of the notion of 'subsidiarity' and striking misunderstanding in this regard.

14 Vladimir Shenayev, Nikolay Shmelev, 'Rossiya i Yevrosoyuz—problemy ekonomicheskogo partniorstva', Sovremennaya Evropa, no.1, January-March 2000, p.19-31.

15 Maxim Medvedkov, 'Rossiya i Vsemirnaya torgovaya organizatsiya: dialog s ES', Sovremennaya Evropa, no.3, July-September 2001, p.87 97.

16 Viktoria Sokolova, 'Priglashenie v ES', Izvestia, 23 Mar. 2001, p.3. It is true that the methodology of such assessments could be questioned as well as their relevance in general. In any case, figures are only presented here to illustrate the character of Russia's perceptions associated with the EU.

17 Igor Leshukov, 'Rossiya i Evropeyskiy Soyuz: strateguiya vzaimootnosheniy', in: Rossiya i osnovniye instituty bezopasnosti v Yevrope: vstupaya v XXI vek. Ed. by Dmitry Trenin. Moscow: S&P, 2000, p.26.

18 As was confirmed again by the European Council in Madrid in December 1995, in addition to the three 'Copenhagen criteria' of June 1993.

19 Yu.Borko, 'Otnoshenia Rossii s Yevropeiskim Soyuzom: tekuschie problemy i dalnie gorizonty', in: Evropeiskiy Soyuz na poroge XXI veka: vybor strateguii razvitiya, ed. by Yuriy Borko and Olga Baturina, Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2001, p.388.

20 In October 1996 President Boris Yeltsin mentioned publicly a possibility of Russia's membership in the EU. Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin also elaborated on this theme during his visit to Brussels in July 1997.

21 'Strategiya razvitiya otnosheniy Rossiyskoy Federatsii s Evropeyskim soyuzom na srednesrochnuyu perspective (2000 2010 gg.)'. Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, 1999, no.11, p.20-28.

22 The statement of the first deputy foreign minister Alexander Avdeev at the conference on relations between Russia and the EU (Moscow, 15 Feb. 2001, with the participation of the EU High representative on CFSP Javier Solana, the EU Commissioner Chris Patten, and Anna Lindh, the minister for foreign affairs of Sweden, that was holding the rotating presidency). For the short report from the conference, see Gueorgy Bovt, 'Filosophia pridatkov NATO' Izvestia, 16 Feb. 2001, p.3.

23 The thesis on multipolarity was actively promoted by Yevgeniy Primakov when he hold posts of Minister of foreign affairs and then Prime-minister. His 'Gorchakov lecture' in 1998 represented a coherent presentation of this argument. See also the candidate dissertation of Russian minister of foreign affairs Igor Ivanov defended at MGIMO-University (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) in 2001.

24 V.V.Zhurkin, I.E.Maximychev, V.G.Mashlykin, Yu.V.Shishkov. Evropa v mnogopoliarnom mire. Moscow: Exlibris-press, 2000, p.46.

25 Javier Solana, 'Réussir l'Europe: une nécessité permanente', Politique étrangère (Paris), 1999, no.4 (hiver), p.887-888; idem, 'ES vidit v Rossii partniora', Kommersant (Moscow), 14 Jan. 2000.

26 Dmitriy Danilov, 'Obschaya vneshiaya politika i politika bezopasnosti ES', in: Evropeiskiy Soyuz na poroge XXI veka: vybor strateguii razvitiya, ed. by Yuriy Borko and Olga Baturina, Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2001, p.191.

27 On Russia and CESDP, see chapter 6.

28 Igor Leshukov, 'Rossiya i Evropeyskiy Soyuz: strateguiya vzaimootnosheniy', in: Rossiya i osnovniye instituty bezopasnosti v Yevrope: vstupaya v XXI vek. Ed. by Dmitry Trenin. Moscow: S&P, 2000, p.39.

29 See Vitaliy Zhurkin, Evropeiskiy Soyuz: vneshniaya politika, bezopasnozt, oborona, Moscow: Institute of Europe, 1998, p.53-57.

30 At the time of writing, Viktor Khristenko was Deputy Prime Minister of Russia with responsibility for coordinating policies of various agencies involved in relations with the EU.

31 See in this context Hiski Haukkala and Sergei Medvedev (eds.), The EU Common Strategy on Russia. (Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, no.11). Helsinki Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut fur Europaische Politik, 2001.

32 'Strategiya razvitiya otnosheniy Rossiyskoy Federatsii s Evropeyskim soyuzom na srednesrochnuyu perspectivu (2000 2010 gg.)'. Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, 1999, no.11, p.20-28.

33 Marius Vahl, Just Good Friends? The EU—Russian 'Strategic Partnership' and the Northern Dimension, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001, p. 8-17.

34 See the evaluation report on the EU Common Strategies (Council of EU document 14871/00, 21 Dec. 2000.

35 'Solana hits at EU strategies', Financial Times, 23 Jan. 2001. See also Marius Vahl, Just Good Friends? The EU—Russian 'Strategic Partnership' and the Northern Dimension, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001, p. 11.

36 As it was stressed in the analysis of one of Russian academic institutes, the Common strategy is characterized by the 'almost complete absence of concrete aspects'; nevertheless, 'it would be very important to use the possibilities it opens'. V.V.Zhurkin, I.E.Maximychev, V.G.Mashlykin, Yu.V.Shishkov. Evropa v mnogopoliarnom mire. Moscow: Exlibris-press, 2000, p.48.

37 European Commission, External Relations. Background note on the EU—Russia summit. MEMO/01/178. Brussels, 15 May 2001.

38 A series of legal investigations of media enterprises, most notably those connected to the sale of Vladimir Gusinsky's Media-MOST to the state-controlled 'Gazprom' (in particular, providing it with ownership on popular private NTV ('Independent TV') channel), as well as a number of violent attacks on journalists were perceived as giving grounds to concern about the future of the independent media in Russia.

39 Noteworthy, an article on the Stockholm summit in one of the most respectable newspaper was entitled 'Europe has agreed to consider Russia as a partner'. According to this article, the fact that Vladimir Putin was invited to the EU summit became a matter of special pride for the Russian delegation. A representative of the President's administration was reported to describe with unhidden satisfaction the scenario of the session: 'Heads of states enter the hall where the meeting takes place; Vladimir Putin takes the seat on the right hand of the chairperson…' (Kommersant, 24 May 2001, p.1).

40 Viktoria Sokolova, 'Priglashenie v ES', Izvestia, 23 Mar. 2001, p.3

41 Actually, this happened three months later, in June 2001, but in any case after the visit of Putin to attend the EU summit in Stockholm.

42See Michael Emerson a.o., The Elephant and the Bear. European Union, Russia and their Near Abroad. Brussels: CEPS, 2001.

43According to Nikolai Mikhailov, then State Secretary in the Russian Ministry of Defense, the strategic goal of the USA in Kosovo consisted in creating a long-term pole of instability for Europe as the main American competitor. See 'Yugoslavia: god spustia posle agressii NATO v Kosovo', Kompas (ITAR-TASS), 7 Mar. 2000. See also Dmitri Danilov, 'Eroziya structur evropeyskoy bezopasnosti', in Konflikt v Kosovo: noviy kontext formirovaniya rossiyskikh natsionalnykh interesov, Moscow: East-West Institute (Moscow center)—IMEMO, June 1999, p. 18-21.

44Comments substantiating this view include critical assessments of the US role in Kosovo made by some European political and military officials. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 Mar. 2000, p. 6.

45 In particular, in Autumn 1997 during his visit to Stockholm and at the summit of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

46 Dmitriy Danilov, 'Obschaya vneshniaya politika I politika bezopasnosti ES', in: Evropeiskiy Soyuz na poroge XXI veka. Vybor strategii razvitiya. Ed. by Yu.Borko and O.Butorina. Moscow: URSS, 2001, p.189.

47 Ibid., p.186.

48 Oleg Barabanov, 'Tendentsii razvitiya OVPB ES i ZES: neozhidanniy vizov dlya Rossii?', in: Rossiya i osnovniye instituty bezopasnosti v Yevrope: vstupaya v XXI vek. Ed. by Dmitry Trenin. Moscow: S&P, 2000, p.98.

49 As formulated, at the eve of the European Council session in Portschach in October 1998, by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter Schussel in his capacity of chairman of the EU Council.

50 Thus, Russia's 'losses' because of the worsened tariff regime were estimated at $27 mln. The scale of military-technical cooperation significantly decreased—from the level $98 mln. before Finland's accession to the EU to the level of $7 mln. afterwards. Sovremennaya Evropa, no.3, July-September 2001, p.81. However, Russia's decision, at the beginning of the 1990s, to discontinue the clearing sale with Finland had considerably heavier implications for bilateral trade.

51 Not surprisingly, Moscow's initial reaction at the official level was rather restrained: it was stated that Russia is ready to see in the Northern Dimension initiative no more than an additional instrument of developing Russia's North-West.

52 See Yuriy Deriabin, 'Severnoye izmereniye i interesy Rossii', Sovremennaya Evropa, no.2, April-June 2000, p.62-71.

53 See, for instance, the series published in 1998 2001 in the framework of the