Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Developing interaction

For the EU, the Kaliningrad issue is a peripheral one, a 'sub-issue' of two dossiers: the enlargement of the EU and the development of its Northern Dimension¹¹⁵. For obvious reasons, Russia's sensitivity towards the Kaliningrad issue is higher. Not surprisingly that Russia takes initiative in this area more actively than the EU that sometimes even looked hesitant and reluctant.

Indeed, the EU, until recently, did not manifest any special attention to the Kaliningrad region and the awareness of its specific status, problems and requirements¹¹⁶. Meanwhile, Russia's medium-term strategy for developing relations with the EU (October 1999) contained a special clause on the Kaliningrad region. An idea of 'special arrangement' between Russia and the EU over the Kaliningrad region was put forward, with the intention of turning it into a 'pilot region' that would promote the overall cooperative interaction between both sides.

This orientation was promoted further on by the so-called Nida initiative (February 2000), a joint Lithuanian-Russian proposal for collaborative projects in the region¹¹⁷. A noteworthy aspect of this initiative (suggesting over a dozen of various cooperation endeavors in and around the Kaliningrad region) consists in the fact that it was jointly developed by Russia and by a candidate country and then addressed to the EU Commission for being considered in the framework of the Northern Dimension.

The EU reciprocated by the decision of the European Council in Feira (June 2000) that adopted the Northern Dimension Action Plan in which a prominent place was reserved to the Kaliningrad region. The EU Commission was requested to prepare a study on the Kaliningrad region as a potential 'pilot region' for cooperation with Russia. Without analyzing here the substance of the Commission study (that was completed in January 2001 and well received on the Russian side¹¹⁸), it should be noted that this certainly helped to promote the issue of the Kaliningrad region and to put it on the EU-Russia agenda.

It is true that depending on the practical developments, the very notion of 'pilot region' may turn out either a revolutionary breakthrough in relations between Russia and the EU, or a pure slogan without practical substance. The balance of these two elements seems fluid—which prevents from making hasty conclusions. Enhanced cooperation is certainly impeded by significant obstacles related to the lack of both experience and essential infrastructure. Also, most of previous projects on the Kaliningrad region have been rather modest and involved other Russia's partners than the EU, mainly through bilateral contacts or the Council of Baltic Sea States.

The role of local administration will certainly have some relevance for interaction between Russia and the EU on the Kaliningrad region. Its new governor, the former Commander of the Baltic Fleet Vladimir Yegorov, was elected in 2000 with a proclaimed programme of promoting permanent cooperation with the EU. The fact that he was strongly supported by the Kremlin in the election campaign is telling. However, the actual readiness and (most importantly) the ability of the regional authorities to engage in cooperative interaction with the EU are still to be tested.

Russia might also be somehow disappointed by the cautiousness of the EU with respect to providing special benefits to the Kaliningrad region. The EU Commission, in the above-mentioned study, argues against introducing a special trade regime with, and establishing a special development fund for the Kaliningrad region.

However, what has happened by the turn of the century is even more than just 'the involvement of the EU in the development of conceptual approaches'. Indeed, the issue of Russia's exclave on the Baltic Sea shore has become one of the focal points of the EU Northern Dimension programme (insofar as it is addressed to Russia). Furthermore, it is the most developed part of this programme. Beginning from 1999, the issue of the Kaliningrad region is on the official agenda of practically all Russia-EU summits and sessions of Russia-EU Cooperation council. Constructively oriented comments of the EU officials on the Kaliningrad region and prospects of cooperating with Russia therein have become a routine practice during the last two years¹¹⁹. By and large, Moscow has reasons to inscribe this growing attention to the Kaliningrad region into the positive record of Russia's foreign policy.

The presidency of Sweden (in the first half of 2001) was particularly instrumental in promoting the prominence of cooperation between the EU and Russia on various aspects concerning the Kaliningrad region. There are reasons to believe that this did make the issue 'more acceptable' to Russia in political terms, and not only because this line fits into the logic of encouraging 'soft security' in the Baltic Sea area which is traditionally (and at the same time delicately) advanced by Stockholm. Keeping in mind the above-mentioned Russian anxieties about eventual German paternalism in (and towards) the Kaliningrad region, any initiative in this regard originated from or even only strongly endorsed by Berlin would have promoted a vivid reaction in Moscow. This might be seen not only as the first sign of reconsidering Germany's deliberate low profile policy with respect to the Kaliningrad region, but also as something discrediting the EU policy and subordinating it to a certain national strategy, the one which damages Russia's interests. In contrast to such eventuality, Sweden is not suspected neither in revanshist inclinations (since the era when it controlled the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea is separated from nowadays by centuries rather than by decades) nor in any 'anti-Russian' long-term policy designs. Against this background, its initiative line of making the EU endorse the Kaliningrad issue looked absolutely legitimate, non-provocative and even positively-oriented towards Moscow.

Moscow's 'green light' to the region's international connections allowed to open there a number of diplomatic offices of foreign countries (including some of the EU member-states). The Kaliningrad region has become one of the leading administrative entities of Russian Federation in developing links with counter-parts on the regional and sub-regional level in other countries. It was also the first in Russia to test the system of 'Euroregions' actively endorsed by the EU.

In relations between Russia and the EU with respect to the Kaliningrad region there are still numerous problems requiring concrete decisions and mutual accommodation. But most of them seem to have technical character. What matters for Moscow politically is the fact that it seems to have successfully got rid of its own phobia and sensitivities—which is paid off by better prospects for Russia in many respects:

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  First, because of implications for the region itself. The very fact of overcoming the EU's initial inclination to consider it as Europe's meaningless periphery could promote similar evolution on Russia's part, making the Kaliningrad region something more than Russia's distant and isolated backyard, even if exposed to the West.
  
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  Secondly, because this development has made the EU reconfirm more than once Russia's uncontestable sovereignty over the region. This does not provide Moscow with ultimate guarantees, but clearly and unambiguously stated official recognition of the Kaliningrad status is certainly better than avoiding to touch the issue thus promoting Russia's uncertainty and nervousness.
  
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  Thirdly, because the issue is complex and brings together economic, political, military and other aspects. As it was mentioned earlier, Russia tends to broaden the agenda of its political interaction with the EU rather than to focus upon 'narrow issues'. The case of the Kaliningrad region does allow for such broader approach, and successfully dealing with the issue might be considered a good model for organizing overall relations between Russia and the EU.
  
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  Fourthly, because the Kaliningrad problem touches upon various international actors. Promoting their interaction, with Russia and the EU playing a central role therein, may contribute to the development of cooperative security system in the Baltic Sea area along the lines that Russia would have all the reasons to support. Moscow would hardly have any objections against making the Kaliningrad region one of central components of such system.
  
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  Finally, because Russia's attempts to use the EU as a leverage in relations with its external partners may have some relevance to the problems of the Kaliningrad region. Thus, when raising the issue of unimpeded transit of goods between the Kaliningrad region and the 'mainland', Russia was reported to have better understanding on the part of the EU 'old' members rather than on the part of the 'new' EU candidates, i.e. Lithuania and Poland¹²⁰. This also means that negotiating and then agreeing with the EU on the 'Kaliningrad matters' (such as transit, visas and so on) may turn out easier and more effective—both as a process and in terms of results.