Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

9. After September 11: a new context for Russia EU relations?

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 when New York and Washington became targets of unprecedented terrorist attack with a few thousands of victims generated a world-broad wave of sympathy towards, and solidarity with the USA. The EU and Russia were among those who expressed resolute condemnation of the terrorist assault and political support to the United States. At the same time, it is worth pointing to some specific nuances of their attitudes towards Washington's reaction thereto—nuances that also reveal certain similarities between Russia and the EU. Indeed, several themes that were invoked by both seemed to be in a closer resonance with each other rather than with what originated initially from the United States.

First of all, while agreeing that military response was necessary, they seemed to have similar concerns about its character. The logic that apparently was followed both by Moscow and by the EU countries proceeded from the assumption that determination and resoluteness should be accompanied by sober analyses, clear definition of objectives and appropriate selection of targets. Both appeared anxious that Washington might resort to indiscriminate retaliation rather than to legitimate response against terrorists¹²¹.

In the case of Moscow, this reaction was probably linked to the apprehension that a large-scale war in Afghanistan might either spill over into Russia's immediate southern neighborhood or challenge its influence there. Although none of these two scenarios looked particularly challenging to the EU, it was certainly interested in preventing the overall destabilization in the region and uncertainty that might follow¹²². By and large, there seemed to be a shared fear about the possibility of an excessive US reaction that would create more problems than it resolved.

Secondly, both the EU and Russia stressed specifically that the war against terrorism should not turn into a war against Islam. For them, history, demography and geography reduce temptation of accepting superficial and simplistic prejudices as foundation for policy line. Also, both may feel vulnerable in case the Taliban regime would respond by declaring jihad, a holy war (as it threatened to do indeed). Here again, Russia may believe having more urgent reasons for preventing the 'clash of civilization' at least due to three factors: because of a considerable share of Moslems in its population, because this could stir up Islamic extremists in Central Asia and in Chechnya, and because Moscow would not like to undermine its links with some Islamic regimes¹²³.

Of these three factors, the first and the last ones are of a certain relevance to the EU as well. Indeed, although in Europe the share of Moslem population is lower than in Russia, it is considerably higher than in the USA; in this respect, some EU countries could be considered belonging to the same category as Russia rather than the USA¹²⁴.

At the same time, it is worth mentioning the diplomatic activities of the EU with respect to some of the Moslem countries in order to try to make them more cooperative and unambiguous in supporting the anti-terrorist operation planned by the USA. In particular, these activities were focused upon Iran and Syria¹²⁵. In fact, this turned into a kind of diplomatic 'division of labour' between the Atlantic allies, with Washington exercising direct pressure upon its clients and loyal regimes, and the EU operating in countries where the USA had only limited direct access to political leaders and means of influencing them.

Since Russia's political links with regimes that are characterized by the lack of excessive sympathy towards the USA are even more developed, Moscow could only blame itself for not engaging in such diplomatic operation; the latter, if carried out actively and with the sense of urgency, might have raised Russia's role in the whole post-terrorist attack developments. Anyhow, in this particular aspect of the crisis, the EU and Russia had similar political resources; the difference is that the EU used them whereas Russia did not, but in principle their joint action would have been possible, responding to interests of each side and opening better prospects for practical results.

Thirdly, both Russia and the EU were concerned with the initial US determination to react without legitimizing its retaliation—the mood that looked prevailing in Washington in the first days after the terrorist attack. Indeed, Washington made it clear that it would not look for UN approval of its military response that is based on the right of self-defence. It is true that both the EU and Russia recognized this right. President Putin went much further than that by ordering active support of the military operation in Afghanistan, which made Russia and the USA de facto military allies, for the first time since the end of World War II. However, Russia's general approach that was clearly manifested during the Kosovo crisis considers the mandate of the UN Security Council sine qua non of any military intervention. In principle, this logic is shared by the EU, although in a milder form (and without referring to the case of Kosovo). Taking into account the circumstances, neither Russia nor the EU were particularly vocal in articulating their reservations on this issue, but these reservations do exist and look rather similar.

In a broader sense, the problem consists in what is perceived as the US inclination towards unilateralism in the international arena. In the eyes of many Russians, Washington's reluctance to look for inscribing its actions into the international law or to make them dependent on vast international support was only one more manifestation of unacceptable hegemonism. The very fact that the USA was in a dramatic and extraordinary situation, while Russia decided to provide it with political and military support, excluded any official 'anti-hegemonistic' comments on the part of Moscow. It is noteworthy, however, that this theme was more than discernible in unofficial discussions.

On the EU side, any reference to this matter became almost impossible in the overall context of the terrorist attack; furthermore, the focus was made upon consolidating and promoting the US leadership in fighting terrorism with a global reach. However, this was accompanied by the idea of building a broad coalition against terrorism¹²⁶—which means a commitment to consult with partners rather than operating unilaterally. President Vladimir Putin also appealed for 'joint approaches and effective mechanisms of cooperation' in fighting against international terrorism¹²⁷; whereas analysts and commentators were unanimous in underlining that this would require involving Russia in decision-making process¹²⁸. In any case, supporting the USA does not and should not mean providing it with a carte blanche for any use of force in the international arena—a reservation that seems common to the EU and Russia, even if expressed delicately or, for the time being, not articulated at all.

One should perhaps refrain from drawing too far-reaching conclusions from what appears from the above analysis. If exchange of opinions of a very general character is put aside, interaction between the EU and Russia did not occur. Similarities in perceptions, assessments, reservations, concerns and eventual recommendations did exist but they were not translated into practical cooperation. In other words, cooperative interaction between Russia and the EU with respect to the terrorist attack on the USA and its implications seemed to have a very considerable potential. The degree of translating this potential into practice was disappointing indeed.

Perhaps, this was even impossible in principle, though not due to any substantive incompatibilities between Russia and the EU. The reason seems to be twofold.

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  On the one hand, although the EU in this particular case appeared to operate as a real actor¹²⁹, the relative weight of individual approaches of major member-states was considerably higher¹³⁰—which may be explained by the urgency and sensitivity of the issue, its complexity and uniqueness. Indeed, all the above considerations with respect to the EU approach relate to some (or even all) member-states rather than to the EU itself.
  
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  On the other hand, the situation itself pushed Moscow, when discussing its own reaction to the terrorist challenge, to focus upon Washington rather than the EU. Indeed, after a period of hesitations and uncertainty on the course to be followed under new circumstances, Moscow opted in favour of supporting anti-terrorist operation and this support was predictably addressed to the USA, both politically and militarily.
  

It is noteworthy, however, that in some Russia's domestic comments the government was reproached for associating its stakes with the USA solely. This was perceived as provoking suspicions on the part of the EU and damaging the prospects of Russian-European relations¹³¹.

This criticism notwithstanding, it is obvious that Russia's involvement in joint struggle against international terrorism should be inscribed into a longer-term perspective. If the terrorist assault of 11 September 2001 and world reaction thereto do open a new era in international relations (as many observers believe—or, at least, seemed to believe at the early stages of this development), the very character of Russia's relations with the West could significantly change. In an 'optimistic' vision, joint struggle against international terrorism represents a new chance both for Russia and for the West to engage in a fundamental rapprochement—indeed, a second chance after the first one was missed in the beginning of 1990s¹³².

Such a radical transformation in the broader framework of the international system would come to a formation of a Euro-Atlantic pattern with Russia's full-fledged participation therein¹³³. This might be expected to alter Russia's past, current and future-oriented perceptions of, and attitudes towards the EU in general and CFSP in particular. Furthermore, there may be an intellectual and politically-relevant temptation to design a new perspective that would be free of all burdensome and complicating contexts of interaction between Russia and the CFSP, while inscribing it into a scenario of 'cooperativeness without limits'.

However, intellectual cautiousness should prevent from excessively far-reaching conclusions and expectations. If the alteration of the existing parameters defining the interaction between Russia and the West seems by and large probable, how deep it could be and in what direction it could be oriented is perhaps too early to hypothesize. Furthermore, even the irreversibility of the choice made by President Putin could be a matter of doubts. This choice was enthusiastically supported by liberal-oriented and pro-western forces in Russia, but there were also warnings on the part of their opponents. They argue that the proclaimed intention to join efforts in fighting terrorism is only a superficial aspect of the ongoing geopolitical transformation, whereas its substance consists in the accelerated search for dominance by the USA and NATO.

It is anticipated that inevitable complications would emerge on this ground¹³⁴. Thus, the efforts of building a broad international coalition prompted by terrorist attacks against the USA in September 2001 were commented by some Russian observers through the prism of eventual implications for Russia's positions in the CIS. Russia's prospects in Central Asia have immediately become a serious matter of concern in the light of the intention of the USA, while preparing a retaliation against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, to deploy its forces in Uzbekistan and some other new independent states of the region. There also appeared warnings going beyond Central Asia; the USA and NATO were blamed to aim, under the pretext of building a coalition against the international terrorism, at accelerating their expansion onto the CIS area and initiating a 'Big Game' therein¹³⁵. These conspiracy-oriented perceptions seem indicative, even if not directly addressed to the EU.

Or, another case in point might be Russia's decision to discontinue its military outpost in Lurdes (Cuba) that used to be a key asset of Moscow in terms of its radio-electronic intelligence covering the whole Western hemisphere. This decision, taken only one month after the terrorist attacks, was quasi-officially presented as Russia's contribution to building a new relationship with the USA. But in Russia, there were also other interpretations of this move—extremely critical and explicitly blaming the Kremlin for unacceptable acquiescence with respect to the USA. Thus, Russia's former minister of defence Igor Radionov assessed this as an erroneous concession 'to our main strategic enemy'¹³⁶; another comment characterized this event as a final act of Russia's strategic retreat 'inscribed into the concept [developed by some alien forces] of turning a military superpower into a regional state with aspirations limited only by its own official frontier'¹³⁷. In a broader sense, there are considerable parts of elites and public opinion that are reluctant to support President Putin's move towards building a new relationship with the West, which might be a source of possible alteration of Russia's policy.

On the other hand, if a radical transformation of the international system does take place, this could modify old coalitions and bring about new realignments, with challenging options to be decided upon both by Russia and the EU. This might open a prospect for getting rid of Russia's traditional inclination to correlate its EU-related policy with the 'American factor'. However, Russia could also face a temptation for 'privileged' relations with the USA¹³⁸—which might implicitly make its interaction with the EU less prominent. If so, a paradoxical consequence of possible rapprochement between Russia and the West would be reduced political salience of Russia's links with the EU, even if only in relative terms. Furthermore, this scenario could be promoted by the consolidation of the US leadership role in the context of 'joint struggle' against new security threats. Indeed, if the allies of Washington and most of its partners accept such a role, either enthusiastically or even reluctantly—then Russia might find it necessary (or, at least, rational) to follow this pattern, by focusing itself upon the USA and without paying much attention to other options.

An alternative approach would argue that in discussions on the 'post-war' (i.e., post-Afghan war) re-organization of the world, treating the USA as Russia's interlocutor par excellence and the only would-be partner does not necessarily represent the best strategy. For instance, building a trilateral coalition USA—EU—Russia may be preferable to an eventual bilateral (and perhaps submissive) alliance with Washington. Also, it is worth mentioning one more alternative scenario, that of a new American isolationism that might promote the EU interest towards Russia and encourage Russia's European connection¹³⁹.

By and large, even if there is no clear-cut answer to the question whether 11 September 2001 has marked a turning point in the development of the international system, Russia's debate on the basic foundations and orientations of its foreign policy have restarted anew. Russia's political attitudes towards the EU will inevitably be a part of this debate.