Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Russia's exclave as the EU's enclave

Thirdly, the forthcoming enlargement of both NATO and the EU will bring about a new situation for the Kaliningrad region with the accession of its direct neighbours, Poland and Lithuania, into these two structures. Russia's north-western exclave will become an enclave inside NATO and/or the EU which in itself will create a new configuration for all involved actors. In particular, this specificity will be added to all Russia's actual (or perceived) problems associated with the enlargement of the EU and treated earlier.

Thus, the introduction of visa requirements by Poland and Lithuania for Russian citizens will affect the residents of the Kaliningrad region in the most negative way, and even to a greater extent than any other Russians. Indeed, the problem is not only in the fact that Kaliningraders nowadays move frequently across the frontiers with these two countries¹⁰⁷. In addition, there will be the politically humiliating and psychologically traumatic necessity to obtain visa for traveling to Russia proper by train or by car. Whether the EU as a whole and the two neighbouring countries would be ready to introduce some special rules for this case was by no means clear; in any case, this does not correspond to the rigid Schengen logic ('either in or out'). Ideas on introducing a 'Baltic Schengen zone' (with the participation of the Kaliningrad region) are certainly unrealistic, because this would require eliminating free movement of people between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of Russia and introducing 'internal' visas for Russian citizens.

Also, all the problems of economic interaction between Russia and the EU will be multiplied and aggravated in the case of the Kaliningrad region—even if only due to the fact that it will be physically surrounded by the EU economic space. Whatever arguments there might be in favour of Russia's would be focus upon the EU, Moscow could consider such a policy line a matter of its own choice—whereas for the Kaliningrad region it is something inevitable, not to be debated, but to be accepted as a must.

In particular, the region will not suffer from the introduction of the EU tariffs that are lower than those practiced by Lithuania and Poland. But EU technological, ecological, safety and other standards will be a very serious challenge to the industry of the Kaliningrad region. In addition, all ground communication and transportation between the region and the rest of Russia will pass over the EU space. How to get accommodated to this new environment was (and still is) by no means clear.

By and large, it is expected that the EU, in order to make the accommodation of the Kaliningrad region easier and minimize eventual negative implications for the EU itself, could grant it with some kind of preferential treatment (or should be requested to do so). The proponents of such a logic also point to the fact that this will create a comfortable spring-board for Russian business to operate within the EU.

There is, however, some weakness in this approach. First, the assumption that the EU will enthusiastically promote 'special treatment' to the Kaliningrad region is still to be proved. Secondly, the type of this treatment is still to be clarified—in particular, by assessing whether the Kaliningrad region would gain or lose from a kind of free trade agreement with the EU. Thirdly, when dealing with external state-partners, the EU has not had experience of providing a certain regime to territorial parts of countries in question; also, a broader political problem for the EU would be to enter into agreement with a non-sovereign entity. Finally, the logic of establishing 'special relations' with the Kaliningrad region, as pointed earlier, may lead to granting it 'special status' within the EU and, in extremis, to its absorption by the latter. Making even a modest step along this path may turn out both politically unacceptable to Russia and politically undesirable to the EU.

There is one more aspect of the forthcoming 'encirclement' of the Kaliningrad region by the EU—the one concerning the military transit to and from mainland Russia. This was a contentious issue in Russia's relation with Lithuania, and the accession of the latter into the EU will bring this problem to the agenda of Russia—EU relations¹⁰⁸.

Assessing the EU role

By and large, the EU factor will soon become a crucial one in the developments of the Kaliningrad region. There are various views in Russia on the eventual implications of the EU involvement.

Alarmist assessments tend to warn that the EU-driven effective 'Europeanization' of the region will promote its disengagement from Russia. An article authored by a military analyst (having a rank of colonel) and entitled 'Creeping annexation of the Kaliningrad enclave' enumerated patterns that might undermine Russia's sovereignty, such as (i) the establishment of a condominium of Russia, Germany, Poland and Lithuania over the region; (ii) its integration into a Baltic 'Hansa Union'; (iii) its transformation into a 'Euroregion Königsberg' or a 'Luxemburg on the Baltic Sea', (iv) promoting the migration of 'Russian Germans' (i.e., ethnic Germans living in Russia since the 18^th century) to the Kaliningrad region and establishing a 'Russian-German republic of Königsberg' there; (v) free settlement, property rights and participation in the local government provided to Germany's citizens in the region; (vi) the demilitarization of the latter. Noteworthy, this impressive, although rather traditional list of actual or anticipated 'subversive actions' (that Russia has to be concerned about) also included 'the involvement of the EU in the development of conceptual approaches' towards the evolution of the region¹⁰⁹.

Looked from a different perspective, the EU is considered to be the most appropriate external partner for preventing the degradation of the Kaliningrad region and ensuring its survival. The EU is economically powerful and politically unchallenging (in contrast to NATO), and its participation in the 'salvation' of the Kaliningrad region should be strongly welcomed and energetically supported by Russia. In that part of the spectrum of available options, proponents of an extremist approach would argue that the region should not only open itself to the EU, but also aim at integrating into it¹¹⁰ and even become closed to 'other Russians'¹¹¹—supposedly, because they are unable to launch reforms adequately and will only discredit them further on.

One could make an argument that the active participation of the EU in the development of the Kaliningrad region should be considered as certainly preferable in terms of Russia's concerns and interests as compared to the extensive involvement of any individual country, especially Germany. Indeed, the prominence of the EU would allow to minimize the risk of turning the region exposed to the revanshist threats, however vague these might be.

A counter-argument, however, might blame the EU for playing into the hands of its most powerful member-state. 'Germany is obviously attempting to use the pan-European integration processes in order to legitimize its right to influence the future of the Kaliningrad region'¹¹². It is clear that this argument goes back to times immemorial, when the EU was suspected to be nothing more than the tool of German revanshism or neo-nazism. It is noteworthy, however, that this type of traditional thought patterns re-emerged in the 1990s not as a general theoretical proposition but as a concrete diagnosis of a specific political situation in a specific area —diagnosis made not by disappearing old-style proponents of anti-western hysteria but by some politicians of the new generation¹¹³.

Although such conspiracy mentality still has some support in Russia's thinking about the Kaliningrad region (and, theoretically, it may re-emerge under certain circumstances), it has failed to take the upper hand in designing Moscow's policy. By and large, during the 1990s Russia has become less suspicious on the Kaliningrad issue. It is a noteworthy phenomenon, if one takes into account a visible deterioration of relations with the West in general in the second half of the decade. Indeed, in the context of this trend, and especially with NATO Kosovo military operation, there were warnings that 'the formerly widespread ideology of Kaliningrad's development as an outpost for cooperation between Russia and Europe will experience pressure from the strengthening nationalistic moods in the Russian politics'¹¹⁴. In fact, this has not happened. On the contrary, the overall cooperative attitude towards the EU that finally has become prevailing in the policy thinking of Russia pushes the latter towards positive assessments of the EU eventual role in the Kaliningrad region.

Also important was the gradual erosion of previous 'either or' attitudes in Russian thinking on, and Moscow's policy towards the Kaliningrad region ('it will be either a Russian or a European entity'; 'either Russia's sovereignty over the region or its drift in the direction of Europe', and so on). Instead, preference is given to the formula 'both and': the region may and should develop its European connections without undermining its belonging to Russia. What's more, the exposed geographical location of the region may and should promote Russia's own involvement into Europe. In other words, the issue should be treated not as an apple of discord between Russia and the EU, but as an incentive for their rapprochement.