Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Concerns versus opportunities

There is only one way to overcome Russia's contradictory perceptions of, and attitudes towards the enlargement of the EU. It consists in developing a balanced assessment of this phenomenon, without dramatizing what could look as its eventual negative implications. Furthermore, it is essential to promote an ideology of looking at the problem in a positive way by highlighting potential mutual advantages and cooperative prospects. By and large, Russia's diplomacy and Russia's foreign policy thinking are moving along this line, taking the EU enlargement as a fact of life and focusing first of all upon its practical consequences.

Economic aspects

It is true that sometimes this could look as rather simplistic calculations of the balance of Russia's possible gains and losses. For instance, the 'costs' of the previous round of the EU enlargement for Russia (that is, Russia's 'losses') were unofficially estimated at $300 mln. However, the methodology of such kind of assessments has never been publicly revealed, and any figures in this regard are more than questionable.

This 'arithmetic approach'—that has the doubtful advantage of being countable and the disadvantage of lacking strategic vision—was most eloquently reflected in the 'List of Russia's concerns' with respect to the enlargement of the EU—an official document that was submitted to the EU Commission on 25 August 1999⁹⁰. Indeed, 12 out of 15 'concerns' were focused upon strictly economic and technical aspects of the problem.

Interestingly enough, some of these concerns are outweighed by possible gains for Russia⁹¹. For instance, Russia will profit from the lower and more flexible common tariffs of the EU when they are expanded onto the candidate countries (although there may be specific cases when the opposite effect takes place). Also, they use more extensively quantitative restrictions and will have to lower them⁹².

There are certainly other economic consequences that are predictable but less countable. The trade flows of the new member-states will be inevitably re-channeled onto the internal market of the EU—which will certainly affect Russia's trade with them. In their domestic market, the EU general system of preferences will promote competitive advantages of exporters from the developing countries. The common agriculture policy of the EU, when extended onto new member-states, will actually close their market for Russian exporters of agricultural goods and make Russia's agricultural import from there more expensive. Anti-dumping and anti-trust legislation in the EU is more rigid than in most current candidate countries, and this could also be a source of Russia's losses⁹³. Part of foreign investments that might be attracted to Russia will be oriented to the new member-states.

In a general sense, Russia's compensation for eventual losses will consist in prospects of getting access to a large market, with all its advantages related to size and homogeneity. In particular, Russia's business already implanted in East Central European countries and three Baltic states, will find itself within the EU zone by the very fact of its enlargement, thus facing new opportunities (as well as new constraints). This is certainly a very theoretical consolation; its existential character has little chances to alleviate Russia's very concrete concerns. However, the positive role of new challenges as incentives for increasing the competitiveness of Russian economy should also be taken into account.

Thus, the most serious problem for Russia will be the EU-oriented standardization in the candidate countries replacing the existing one that was partly inherited from CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) and thus compatible with Russian standards. In the longer run, this could become a formidable obstacle for Russia's export thereto. However, this touches upon the broader problem of compatibility of standards—the problem that has no easy solutions and requires focusing upon concrete issues on a case-by-case basis. Russia will certainly not feel comfortable if all comes to accepting the EU standards. But alternative approaches have to be seriously substantiated if there are cases where Russia could promote them. At the same time, the earlier it starts to accommodate its standards to those of the EU, the better it would be in terms of its own longer-term interests. After all, Russia has already committed itself to go along this line by Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU. The enlargement of the EU could become an additional incentive for actively engaging in this endeavor.

Visa regulation

A number of Russia's immediate concerns as regards the enlargement of the EU are more of a political character. The most outspoken of them concerns the issue of visa regulation.

Indeed, expanding the Schengen zone onto the future new members of the EU will inevitably have some complications for the residents of the Russian Federation. Some of former socialist countries that used to be Russia's close allies within the CMEA and Warsaw Pact had a visa-free regime with the Soviet Union—the regime that was 'inherited' by Russia. 'Schegenization' of these countries will worsen the conditions for tourism, business travel and so on. Furthermore, candidate countries have to introduce visa for citizens of non-EU countries, including Russia, even prior to their official accession to the EU.

It is true that there is nothing abnormal in such a kind of development that fits perfectly well into the logic of the EU enlargement (as well as into that of accommodating any newcomer to any multilateral structure, when the former has to accept the rules and the norms of the latter). Russia should also take into account that its 'open' frontiers with most of the CIS countries are conducive to uncontrolled migration—which is one additional reason for EU candidate countries to introduce visa regime. But what has an irreproachable logical and legal justification might turn out insufficiently legitimized in terms of some practical implications—both political and psychological ones.

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  Indeed, complicating transborder human contacts looks as a process contradicting to the overall logic of promoting them—the logic that is still recalled by many Russians as the cornerstone of the West's policy towards the East in the era of détente. In other words, the whole issue is perceived in the following way: rhetoric on the importance of human relations has turned out only an instrumental means of achieving the political goal of 'softening' and demoralizing the opponent—which testifies to the hypocrisy of the West, both in the past and nowadays.
  
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  If the alleged hypocrisy is not in the focus of such assessments, its place could be occupied by concerns on disappointing dynamics of the policy of the West: it is perceived as less cooperatively oriented than it used to be during the cold war—the assessment that only supports theories on non-friendly attitudes of the West towards Russia (for whatever reason).
  
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  In a sense, this may also be interpreted as one more proof of the selfish policy of the West that is only interested in Russia's natural resources and erects artificial barriers for contacts in other areas.
  

Emotionally, the disappointing aspect of this problem for Russians is related to the fact that some 'degradation' of human contacts is either predictable or already taking place in relations with countries that used to be considered as historically, culturally and psychologically 'closest friends' (or even almost 'brothers') of Russia. For instance, introducing visa regime between Russia and Bulgaria⁹⁴ is almost tantamount to doing this in relations between Russia and Belarus, which would be an unconceivable proposition for the absolute majority of Russians.

By and large, the problem seems to be excessively emotional, on the one hand, and allowing for some technical accommodations of administrative and organizational character, on the other hand. It is true that Russia would favour some kind of 'special regime' for its citizens, even if for only a transitional period—without probably taking into account the fact that introducing exceptions into the Schengen logic would undermine its consistency and effectiveness. However, accommodations seem possible at least in four directions⁹⁵.

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  First, by postponing the introduction of visa requirements until the date of accession in some cases (as Lithuania is currently planning and as Poland intends to do with respect to Ukraine).
  
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  Secondly, by improving the machinery and facilitating the whole procedure of issuing visas.
  
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  Thirdly, by promoting cross-border contacts in the frontier regions by introducing a kind of 'preferential treatment' for their residents.
  
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  Fourthly, by considering a prospect of Russia's accession to the Schengen regime, even if in the longer-term future and on a restricted bases.
  

At the same time, it seems quite probable that Russian citizens will appreciate the advantages of the extended Schengen zone allowing for their free movement within the EU in a broader scale than nowadays.

Russians in the Baltic states

The status of Russian (Russophone) minorities in the Baltic states have been one of the most disturbing factors in the relations of these countries with Moscow. It is true that Russia was suspected in using this problem for exercising political pressure against post-Soviet Baltic states. It also true, however, that these allegations do not eliminate the problem itself⁹⁶. The enlargement will bring it into the EU, unless a satisfactory solution is found. All Russia's claims addressed nowadays to the Baltic states will be automatically re-channeled onto the EU.

However, eventual complications do not represent the only aspect of this political problem. There are at least three more dimensions in it, not necessarily with a negative context both for Russia and for the EU—Russia relations.

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  First, the goal of accession to the EU has already become instrumental in promoting changes in the policy of the governments in the Baltic states as regards Russophones. The very perspective of joining the EU makes them more cautious, tolerant and flexible with respect to the issue of minorities' rights. Otherwise, the Baltic states would have not been qualified for membership.
  
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  Secondly, the membership of the Baltic states in the EU will in itself ensure better protection of the rights of Russophones, extending to them higher standards than those that are applied nowadays.
  
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  Thirdly, with the accession of the Baltic states into the EU, the latter will absorb, for the first time in its history, a non-negligible Russian (Russophone) ethnic community.
  

Russia seems to underestimate the importance of these factors. Many in Russia believe that the EU should have exercised a stronger pressure on the Baltic states on the issue of civic rights; failure to do this testifies to politically motivated calculations. Noteworthy in this respect are observations of one of the most thoughtful analysts of the European integration who by no means could be suspected in professing retrograde values. He believes that 'the historic past [of three Baltic states] and not so remote episodes of Soviet leadership's repression against their search for independence have generated in the West a particular sympathy and non-indifference towards their future. Their strategic position also has significance: these countries considerably undermine Russia's military and economic presence in the Baltic Sea area. Perhaps, this explains why West European leaders look through their fingers at the discrimination of Russophone population in Latvia and Estonia and are ready to do the maximum for accelerating the accession of three former Soviet republics to the EU'⁹⁷.

By and large, there is always a possibility of blaming rhetorically either these states (for ignoring civic rights requirements established by the EU), or the EU itself (for inappropriate indulgence towards the Baltic states or even deliberate reluctance to pressurize them), or both⁹⁸. There could be practical implications as well; Russia has threatened not to extend the PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994 with the EU) to the new member-states if concerns vis-à-vis the Russian minorities are not properly addressed. However, in terms of political relevance of this issue, its destabilizing potential for relations between Russia and the EU as a whole should not be overestimated.

Anti-Russian zeal of newcomers?

Over more than a decade Russia's relations with some of the candidate countries have developed unevenly and are still overburdened by unpleasant memories, mutual assertions and persisting problems. It is apprehended in Russia that this heritage will affect the policy of the EU when today's candidates become its full-fledged participants. Furthermore, the forthcoming institutional reform of the EU will, according to some views in Russia, provide them with disproportionate representation allowing to the newcomers to promote their residual anti-Russian rhetoric and, in particular, to block prospects of further cooperation between the EU and Russia.

These allegations may be psychologically understandable and not deprived of real substance. However, they are politically doubtful, administratively unverifiable and inconclusive in practical terms. Indeed, even if they do not proceed from excessive inclination to conspiracy mentality and do reflect the real situation, it would be hardly possible to design an institutional reaction thereto, and even less so a political one. In principle, a proposition that the new members will be able to impose their psychologically motivated line upon the old ones seems exaggerated.

In a broader sense, one might develop an argument that would point in the opposite direction. The candidate countries have had certain traditions in developing economic and other relations with Russia, and they might bring this experience as their asset into the EU. In this respect, the example of Finland is telling: its interest in trade with Russia contributed to promoting the 'Russian orientation' within the EU (with the Northern Dimension initiated by Finland being the most notorious example). There are no reasons why this pattern could not be applied to the future new members of the EU as well.

Also, there may be grounds for turning the problem the other way around and assuming that the authority and established practices of the EU could neutralize eventual 'extremism' of its newly joined participants. In some cases, this might respond to Russia's interests rather than contradict them. For instance, when Moscow started to consider a construction of a new gas-pipeline to Western Europe that would circumvent Ukraine (for overcoming both its monopoly over Russia's gas transit and its kleptomania with respect to Russia's gas proper), Poland was long reluctant to endorse this project under the motives of political solidarity with Kiev. Warsaw's resistance was reported to be overcome only under the pressure of the EU, in particular Germany⁹⁹.

Post-enlargement prospects

For Russia, the prospect of the EU enlargement in the not so distant future seems more or less clear. It is less clear what will happen afterwards. Three Russian concerns are worth mentioning in this regard.

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  First, the question arises about the limits of possible further enlargements: how far will the EU expand eastwards? If the question of Russia's eventual participation in the EU is put aside, this concerns Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. For each of these, the prospects of membership in the EU have a very individual character, and for all of them they are nowadays very vague and uncertain. But even as a theoretical proposition this might be perceived by Russia with the most serious concerns. However remote such prospect might seem nowadays, Russia could view the EU enlargement eastwards as the first step in this direction.
  
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  Secondly, when coming back to the forthcoming accession of the Baltic states to the EU, Russia could see it as a factor facilitating their membership in NATO. If the two enlargements are interlinked, nothing would prevent Russia from making such kind of conclusions. As it was already argued above, Russia's attitudes seem to have made a 180 degrees turnaround: if the participation of the Baltic states in the EU was initially regarded as a way of substituting to, and preventing their membership in NATO, nowadays the former could become a factor promoting the latter.
  
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  Thirdly, the EU enlargement introduces some specific undertones into the prospects of the CESDP. Insofar as the latter is regarded as developing certain preconditions for transforming the EU from a civilian power into one that possess a military potential, the expansion of the EU in the eastern direction brings this potential closer to Russia. With all uncertainties associated with the CESDP and as discussed earlier, the very fact that this process is developed within the expanding territorial space might be a matter of additional concerns for Russia.
  

Dialogue on the enlargement

Russia's officially formulated concerns have become a matter of its discussions with the EU. The very fact of engaging in such kind of dialogue is assessed by Moscow as encouraging. However, it seems to be dissatisfied with the format, status and possible implications of this dialogue. Russia would prefer to turn it into full-size negotiations, aimed at adopting formal and binding decisions. Ideally, Russia would like to have a voice in negotiations on the EU enlargement, in order to raise therein its concerns and to influence their outcome.

The approach of the EU, as seen by Russia, comes to a formula: discussing but not taking decisions—because as far as they concern candidate countries, deciding on behalf of them is politically impossible, whereas involving them is legally impossible since they are not yet member-states. Russia appeals to a common sense rather than to formal logic: it is better to address the problems in advance and alleviate them before they start to produce negative implications. Failure to accept this approach is also regarded as an additional political obstacle for accommodating Russia's concerns in the context of EU enlargement.

In a sense, there could be a noteworthy parallel with Russia's logic in the earlier period, when Moscow was trying to prevent the enlargement of NATO. Its preferential interlocutors at that time were Washington, Brussels and other capitals of western countries rather Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. The international personality of the candidate countries was ignored, whereas the power to decide was actually acknowledged only to NATO and its major participants. The results of Russia's anti-NATO campaign notwithstanding, such kind of disregard towards junior international actors could not but promote the erosion of their relations with Russia further on. Similar attitudes seem to prevail nowadays, in the context of the problem of the EU enlargement, and this risks bringing about similar results as well.

At the same time, pretensions to get involved into the official negotiations on the enlargement of the EU are as groundless as they were in the case of NATO enlargement. It is true that the history of diplomacy knows situations when a third party is provided with a status of a full-fledged participant in the negotiations. But these were exceptional cases indeed, and the involvement of a third party was usually motivated either by its exceptional might or by the desire to grant it with special responsibility or mediatory functions. None of these conditions are present nowadays.

To sum up, the forthcoming enlargement of the EU introduces a very important dimension in its relations with Russia. The latter might associate with the EU enlargement both new challenges and new opportunities. While the inertia of traditional considerations promotes Russia's 'defensive instincts' with regard to the enlargement of the EU, there also seems to be an expanding space for cooperative interaction between them for addressing the emerging issues.