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his work there, trying to ease the transition he had to make back to his old life. He did not, however, abandon his
work on chemical weaponry. In a lecture called “Chemistry in War”, presented by Haber on November 11, 1920,
he clearly demonstrates his stand on the issue of gas warfare. He firmly believed that “gas weapons [were]
definitely no more inhumane than flying bits of metal” and he advised the officers “to be as well informed as
possible about the military technological characteristics of gas weapons and about the perquisites for their
production.” Clearly he believed that his work should be continued, yet he and his colleagues would have to be
very secretive if they did not want to be discovered.
14
Haber was forced to feign complete innocence when the newly appointed controller of the British
Chemical Warfare Department, Sir Harold Hartley, was ordered to investigate Germany‟s research on prohibited
chemical weapons. In June of 1921, he visited Berlin, Breloh, Munich, and Stuttgart. Haber had to have lengthy
discussions with Hartley, as did Haber‟s former associates in the field of gas warfare. Hartley reported that
Haber greeted him with enthusiasm exclaiming, “Why haven‟t you come before? I was looking forward to going
over our records with you and only last month we had a most unfortunate fire. They were all burnt. Look at the
roof!”
15
The two spent the following couple weeks in each other‟s company, speaking cordially, as Hartley
described it: “We were soon discussing the pros and cons of gas tactics and defense much as we should have
discussed any other scientific problems…. I like to think that we parted at the end of a fortnight as friends. It was
a great experience to have enjoyed his confidence.”
16
Clearly Hartley had not been able to discern Haber‟s actual
thoughts, or he would have had a great deal to report back to Britain.
Although, he had successfully hidden his secrets from Hartley and Britain, Haber remained in the public
eye. He participated in a series of heated debates over the position of chemical warfare in international law.
There was much argument over which country had broken the agreement signed by most European nations at the
Hague conference in 1907 stating that “it is especially forbidden: (a) to employ poisons and poisonous weapons;
(b) to employ weapons, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”
17
When it was decided that the Germans were at fault, the Reichstag commissioned a committee that
would inspect Germany‟s actions with respect to international law during the war. The committee sat in October
1923 and Haber was cross-examined as a witness under oath. He tried to shift the blame from the Germans to the
French over the issue of who first used poisonous gases. He also continued to take the position that chemical
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weapons were more humane than other forms of weaponry because a less significant percentage of those
wounded died. He described gas warfare in the following way, stating that: “its physiological actions on humans
and the sensations they cause vary a thousandfold. Every change of sensation in the nose and mouth distresses
the mind, making it imagine an unknown effect, and makes a new demand on the moral resistance of the
soldier.”
18
The committee accepted much of what Haber said, and the final portion of their judgment reads:
Neither the German nor the French governments, nor as far as is known, any other power
participating in the war or a neutral one raised any prospects against the modes of action in the
gas war. From this it can be concluded that both sides viewed the Hague Conventions of 19 July
1899 and 18 October 1907 as obsolete and by silent agreement regarded it as annulled. Even
accepting this assumption, it remains a fact that the first obvious transgression of an
international agreement was on the French side, whereas Germany only followed and thereby
merely took a countermeasure as accepted in international law.
19
Hence, in Germany, Haber‟s actions during the war were considered proper and accepted by the new
democratic state. Having made it through these instances, Haber perhaps felt he had overcome the most difficult
obstacles and he continue the secretive work of preserving the knowledge and, if possible, the processes and the
materials of chemical weapons that he had been conduction for several years at this point. He would also work
on advancing chemical weaponry, whether it was legal or not.
In March 1920, several companies approached the National Trust Company, demanding that their rail
tanker cars, which stood in Breloh packed with gas cylinders and materials, be returned. A way to clean out the
cars and to safely dispose of the chemical waste had to be found. This is when the National Trust Company
requested the help of Haber, who then employed the help of his colleague Hugo Stoltzenberg. Stoltzenberg did
not readily accept the task, and was only persuaded finally by Haber. Work began in Bereloh that same year,
which Haber followed keenly, and it was reported by Johannes Jaenicke later that “Stoltzenberg had free access
to Haber.”
20
This created a stronger bond between Haber, Stoltzenberg, and the Ministry of Defense.
21
As the work in Breloh continued, Haber quite often received inquiries from other nations about the
construction of chemical plants as well as the distribution of chemical weapons. Any information that Haber
received he passed on to Hugo Stoltzenberg. Then, in the spring on 1921, “dealings were being quietly initiated