Modern times

MODERN TIMES

by Art Hobson

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Nuclear Power, Bombs, And North Korea

During the nuclear power debates of the 1970s and 1980s, a major bone of contention was whether the spread of nuclear power would facilitate the spread of nuclear weapons. It is now clear that the reactor-bomb connection is real. After the first five nuclear weapons states (USA, Russia, UK, France, China), all subsequent nuclear or near-nuclear weapons states (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq) have made substantial use of "peaceful" nuclear power programs. Especially North Korea.

Nuclear weapons make North Korea the scariest place in the world right now, and certainly a far scarier nuclear threat than the other "axis of evil" nations, Iran and Iraq. Despite years of effort, Iran and Iraq have neither nuclear weapons, nor the uranium or plutonium needed to fuel them, nor facilities that can produce these fuels. North Korea has all of these.

There are two kinds of fuel for "fission bombs," or "A-bombs," like the two that we dropped on Japan at the end of World War II: highly enriched uranium, and plutonium. The trick, if you want to produce nuclear bombs, is getting hold of one of these. Plutonium is the easiest. For this, you need a nuclear reactor. Although reactors use uranium as their fuel, this uranium is not highly enriched and so you can't use it to fuel your bomb. That's good.

But unfortunately, all reactors create, during their operation, a chemical element not found naturally on Earth. That element is plutonium. Thus, your reactor will have some plutonium in its used fuel rods, and you will be in a position to build nuclear weapons. There are complications: The fuel rods must go through high-tech "reprocessing" to extract plutonium, some reactors produce plutonium in a form that is inconvenient for weapons, and then you've got to figure out how to get this stuff to explode. All of this is difficult, but not terribly difficult.

In 1988, North Korea pursued this route to build one or two nuclear weapons. The plutonium came from their reactor at Yongbyon, completed in 1984 under the direction of a U.S.-educated nuclear physicist. It is a reactor of the so-called "magnox" type, designed in Britain to produce electricity, but particularly well-suited to producing plutonium for bombs. North Korea completed a plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon in 1987, and built two bombs. They probably have enough stored plutonium for several more bombs.

For the other route to a bomb, you've got to get some natural uranium (this is easy), and then you've got to figure out how to "enrich" at least the minimal amount (around 30 pounds) that you will need if you want it to blow up. The enrichment task lies somewhere between extremely difficult and impossible. The United States figured it out during World War II in what was probably the largest industrial effort in history up to that time. For another example, Pakistan did it using technology stolen by a Pakistani nuclear scientist while he worked in a civilian enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Uranium enrichment is a dangerous "dual-use" industry, useful for both civilian nuclear power and uranium bombs.

Pakistan and North Korea worked out a deal several years ago to exchange Pakistan's uranium enrichment know-how for North Korea's long-range missile know-how. Last October, North Korea admitted that it has a uranium-enrichment program. If and when it is in full operation, this program can produce bomb-grade uranium for one or two weapons per year. This is significant for several reasons. A uranium bomb project is easy to hide because it requires no reactor, whereas the reactor needed for a plutonium bomb is difficult to hide from satellites. A uranium bomb is absurdly easy to put together once you have the fuel, and requires no prior testing. Worst of all, if you can get yourself both plutonium and highly enriched uranium, you are in a position to build a "fusion bomb," based on "fusing" pairs of nuclei together instead of "fissioning" individual nuclei into two parts. These horrible devices are also known as "H-bombs."

These things are no laughing matter. One H-bomb can make the A-bombs that we dropped on Japan look like pikers, and can level a city of 10 million, such as Seoul. Arkansas was once home to 18 H-bombs, atop 18 missiles. Each one carried nine "megatons" (millions of tons of TNT-equivalent) of explosive power. Nine megatons is about three times the total explosive power of all the bombs and bullets, including both A-bombs, used by all sides throughout World War II.

It's a perilous can of worms. Quoting New York Times columnist William Kristof: "The administration's game plan to isolate North Korea is, as America's allies are desperately trying to tell it, potentially catastrophic. ...In the coming months, the most delicate problem in international relations will be how to negotiate an end to this crisis. If all sides play their cards wisely, the U.S. could not only defuse the confrontation, but also set North Korea on a path like the one China took, away from Stalinism. ..."

But we are neither negotiating nor defusing anything. Instead, we talk tough while North Korea embarks on foolishly dangerous paths. Despite, in fact because of, these paths, we need to suck in our pride and talk with the North Koreans. Any future U.S. attempt to solve this militarily would probably draw a nuclear response.

Returning to the reactor-bomb connection: I am not a foe of nuclear power, because nuclear can replace coal and thus reduce the truly big threat, global warming. But neither am I a supporter, because of the reactor-bomb link. Certainly, any future expansion of nuclear power must have international oversight to break this link, and keep it broken.