Jaap Mansfeld et al. Ja ap m a n sf

 

 

 

 

Le lezioni 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Melissus between Miletus and Elea 

 

 

 

Jaap Mansfeld 

 

 

I 

Eleatic philosophy without tears 

Abstract  

Melissus presents us with an efficacious and comprehensible revision of the 

ontological arguments of Parmenides, but this version nouvelle cuisine succeeds 

at the cost of a loss of semantic richness, of productive problematisation, and of 

what we may call ‘mystery’. 

I.1 

Melissus of Samos is often mentioned and discussed together with Parmeni-

des of Elea both in our ancient sources and in the modern professional literature, 

and with good reason. Even a cursory look at the verbatim remains of both these 

philosophers reveals that the core doctrine and argument of Melissus’ prose trea-

tise are dependent on the ontology of the first part of the poem. In his own pe-

culiar way Melissus belongs with the early reception of Parmenides. Several an-

cient sources moreover tell us that Melissus was Parmenides’ pupil. We do not 

know whether he ever met and listened to Parmenides the way Socrates is 

claimed to have done in one of Plato’s novelettes, and it is of course idle to 

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Jaap Mansfeld

 

 

speculate.

1

 But it cannot be denied that he is a pupil of Parmenides in the spiritual 

sense of the term, even if Parmenides’ thought is not the only influence upon his 

work. According to the practice of what (with some latitude) we may call ancient 

historians of philosophy, doctrinal allegiance and affinity are presented as vari-

eties of a personal relationship, schools of thought in the process turning into 

schools tout court. 

This closeness to Parmenides has proved to be handicap. In ancient sources, 

beginning with Aristotle (Plato is less severe), and also in our modern literature 

one encounters the verdict that Melissus is a sort of Parmenides dimidiatus, that 

is, that he to some extent debased the master’s thought and even made elemen-

tary logical mistakes. In recent years Richard McKirahan and Edward Hussey 

have been quite critical.

2

 But Simplicius, to whom we owe the fragments quoted 

ad litteram, says that Melissus, ‘writing in prose, throughout his discourse dis-

closed his view’ of the intelligible and sensible realm ‘even more clearly than 

Parmenides’.

3

 In our own time various well-argued attempts have been made by 

among others John Earle Raven, Giovanni Reale, Renzo Vitali, Jonathan Barnes, 

Brian Merrill (in his important dissertation, which unfortunately has not been 

published), and John Palmer to prove that Melissus’ metaphysical arguments are 

quite good, and that in his own right he is a much more interesting thinker than 

has sometimes been believed.

4

 But perhaps it is not such a good sign that ever 

so often he is believed to be in need of rehabilitation. 

However this may be, it still seems worthwhile to look without prejudice at 

his presentation of the case for the assumption of a single Being that is infinite 

in both time and space, and to compare what he attributes or refuses to attribute 

to this Entity with Parmenides’ conceptions.

5

 So I shall attempt to look at Par-

menides with the eyes of Melissus. 

To summarize briefly without entering into differences of opinion regarding 

the relative position of fragments or listing the difficulties caused by gaps in our 

                                                            

1

 According to the Apollodoran dates, the best we have, Melissus (flor. 444–441, Diog. Laert. 9.24 = 

Apollod. fr. 72 Jacoby) is sixty years younger than Parmenides (flor. 504–501, Diog. Laert. 9.23 = Apol-

lod. fr. 341 Jacoby), which renders an apprenticeship most unlikely. The novelette is at Parm. 127a ff., 

see Mansfeld (1986), 41–45. Ath. 11.113.505f argues that ‘making Plato’s Socrates converse (ἐλθεῖν εἰς 

λόγους) with Parmenides does not fit Socrates’ youth, let alone his formulating, or listening to, such 

complicated arguments’. A similar story, of which Serge Mouraviev reminded me, has Melissus converse 

(εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν) with Heraclitus, Diog. Laert. loc. cit. (cf. below, III.3, n. 50 and text thereto). 

2

 McKirahan (1994), 295–298, Hussey (1997), 161–163. 

3

 Simp. in Cael. 558.17–18 Μέλισσος ὡς καταλογάδην γράψας σαφέστερον ἔτι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τούτων 

γνώμην ἐξέφηνε δι’ ὅλου μὲν τοῦ λόγου κτλ. For the fragments see below, n. 5. 

4

 Raven (1948), 79–92, Reale (1970) passim, Vitali (1973) passim, Barnes (1979), 180–184, 214–217, 

228–230, 298–302, Merrill (1998) passim, Palmer (2004) and (2009a), 48–49, 204–205. 

5

 The numeration of verbatim fragments will of course be that of Diels and Kranz. Aristocles’ version 

of fr. 30 B8(2)–(3) DK (see below, II.3, n. 18) is inferior to Simplicius’ text. The chapter on Melissus in 

Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983), 390–401 is most useful. For a useful brief account of Melissus in 

Italian see Ferrari (2005). 

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