Jaap Mansfeld et al. Ja ap m a n sf

Melissus between Miletus and Elea I

 

 

77

 

I.3 

The attributes of Being deduced one after the other by Melissus are partly of 

direct Parmenidean descent, but there are also some to some extent new or at 

least revised ones. Parmenides called these attributes σήματα,

18

 but Melissus has 

no name for them. The arguments in favour often present an emphasis that dif-

fers from that of the Master.  

That non-Being cannot come to be is argued in fr. 30 B1: ‘what was, was 

always, and it will always be,

19

 for if it came into being it necessarily was noth-

ing before coming into being; now if it were nothing, it would in no way come 

to be anything from nothing’. Melissus here argues from a to b and then chiasti-

cally and counterfactually from b back to a: if it did come to be it was nothing, 

and nothing cannot come to be. Being’s eternal existence is again formulated in 

fr. 30 B2: ‘since it did not come into being, it is always and was always and will 

always be’ (ὅτε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐγένετο, ἔστι τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται). It has often 

been argued that the meaning of this formula is significantly different from that 

of Parmenides’ phrase ‘it [sc. Being] was not and will not be, because it is now 

(νῦν), together, complete, one, continuous’.

20

 This phrase as well as Parmenides’ 

subsequent long argument have been interpreted in different ways, a number of 

scholars believing that Parmenides has invented eternity (an eternal present), or 

timelessness,

21

 a notion with a great future, while others argue that he intends to 

exclude Being’s having-come-to-be at an earlier and coming-to-be at a future 

moment.

22

 However this may be, it is far from clear what exactly the ‘now’ at 

the beginning of the exposition of the ontology means, especially as also things 

in the world of the Doxa are said to ‘be now’ (νυν ἔασι) but to disappear ‘after 

this’ (ἀπὸ τοῦδε).

23

 I believe that it is clear that Melissus is in favour, here as 

elsewhere, of disambiguation, and so avoids using ‘now’ in relation to Being. 

He replaces it with one of the possible interpretations of Parmenides’ intention, 

viz. the more readily comprehensible aggregate of past,

24

 present and future, that 

                                                            

18

 See above, I.2, text to n. 12. 

19

 No ἔστιν here; I do not know whether this is significant. 

20

 Fr. 28 B8.4–5, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, / ἕν, συνεχές. 

21

 E.g., Guthrie (1965), 29–30, Owen (1966), Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983), 250 n. 1, Mourelatos 

(

2

2008), 105–107, Coxon (

2

2009), 315–316. 

22

 E.g., Schofield (1970), Gallop (1984), 13–14, O’Brien (1987a), 35, and (1987b). Whittaker (1971) 

argues that the text of fr. 28 B8.5 is insecure and (p. 24) that one may conclude with confidence that ‘the 

doctrine of non-durational eternity, which Neoplatonists associated with both versions of the line, was 

not taught by the historical Parmenides’. 

23

 Fr. B19.2–3, οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε καί νυν ἔασι / καὶ μετέπειτ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι 

τραφέντα. 

24

 Cf. the past of Being in fr. 30 B7(2), τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, and B7(3), ὁ κόσμος ὁ πρόσθεν ἐών. 

---

78

 

Jaap Mansfeld

 

 

is, with all time in the sense of everlastingness, an idea already found with Her-

aclitus.

25

 For what has not come into being and will not perish (as Parmenides 

argued is the case with Being) can also be imagined as always existing. That 

Melissus really means ‘all time’ is proved by fr. 30 B7(2), the words ἐν τῷ πάντι 

χρόνῳ,

26

 by the denotation of the word ἀίδιον in fr. B4 and B7(1),

27

 and by the 

expression ἀεὶ εἶναι at B7(4) and B8(2). He only uses νῦν at fr. 30 B8(3) in its 

commonplace sense in relation to the phenomena of experience: ‘what was and 

what (is) now (ὅ τι ἦν καὶ ὅ νῦν)’. 

Now it is precisely this closer-to-us conception of Being-at-all-time that en-

tails other revisionary interpretations of Parmenides’ ontological arguments, or 

at least allows for them. For from the fact that Being has not come into being 

and so is present at all time Melissus derives the conclusion that it has ‘neither a 

beginning nor an end’ (ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτήν), a formula that occurs 

twice in fr. 30 B2 and is repeated in a slightly different version in fr. 30 B4 as 

ἀρχήν τε καὶ τέλος. In fr. 30 B2 it is supported, twice again, by forms of the 

verbs with the same roots: ‘If it had come into being, it would have a beginning 

(since it would then have begun, ἤρξατο) and an end (for what comes to be must 

end, ἐτελεύτησε(ν) ἄν)’. Reiterations such as these are a staple ingredient of ar-

chaic prose and poetry. 

Parmenides uses the triplet ἔφυ (equivalent, I believe, to Melissus’ ἤρξατο) 

/ ἔασι / τελευτήσουσι (the same verbs as in Melissus) for past, present and fu-

ture.

28

 He connects these three verbs with the generated and perishable things of 

the world of the Doxa, and on this occasion applies the idea of the fullness of 

time to a limited period only. 

The formula closest to Melissus’ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτήν is Parmeni-

des’ phrase ‘it [sc. Being] is beginningless and ceaseless’ (ἔστιν  ἄναρχον 

                                                            

25

 For Heraclitus see fr. 22 B30, κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων 

ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται (‘was always and is and will be’) πῦρ ἀείζωον κτλ. Also see 

Anaxagoras fr. 59 B12 καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν, ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἐστι καὶ 

ὁποῖα ἔσται κτλ. (‘how it was to be and how was what is not now, as well as what is now and how it will 

be’). For ‘all time’ cf. also Emp. fr. 31 B16 (reading at the beginning uncertain) ἦ γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἦν τε καὶ 

ἔσσεται (‘they were in the past and will be as well’), οὐδέ ποτ᾽, οἴω, / τούτων ἀμφοτέρων κενεώσεται 

ἄσπετος αἰών (‘endless time’), and B21.13, ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. The 

first of the five reasons in favour of infinity summarized by Aristotle at Phys. 3.4.203b15–30 is infinity 

of time, ἔκ ... τοῦ χρόνου (οὗτος γὰρ ἄπειρος). 

26

 This is the only occurrence of the substantive χρόνος in Melissus. It is not found in Parmenides 

(unless one accepts χρόνος at fr. 28 B8.36, defended by Coxon (

2

2009) ad loc. and 210–211, followed by 

Sedley (1999), 120), Anaxagoras, or Diogenes of Apollonia, but occurs twice in Empedocles: frr. 31 

B110.8, περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο, and 115.7, διὰ χρόνου. The locution is paralleled at Thuc. 1.33.2, Plu. 

Def. 433F, CN 1077C. 

27

 The third occurrence, ἀίδια in fr. 30 B8(4) was doubted by Gomperz, followed by DK; accepted by, 

e.g., Reale and Vitali. ἀίδιον occurs at Emp. fr. 31 B115, Diog. Ap. frr. 64 B7 and B8. 

28

 At fr. 28 B19.1–2 the Goddess says ‘thus these things came to be and are now and will cease after 

this’ (οὕτω ... ἔφυ τάδε καί νυν ἔασι / καὶ μετέπειτ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι). 

---