Introduction to Behavioral
Yüklə 0,66 Mb. Pdf görüntüsü
|
- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- Document Outline
568 N Naïve discounters 296–9, 316–17, 320–1, 322, 326–7 Nalebuff, B. 353 Narrow bracketing 238, 255 Narrow framing 230, 238 Nash, J. 337, 358–9 Nash equilibrium 342–5, 352, 357–8, 415–6, 427 428, 435, 493 Natural selection 15, 52, 72–3, 138, 152, 182, 407, 417, 480 Need for cognition (NC) 471 Neo-Darwinian synthesis (NDS) 15 Neural imaging See neuroeconomics Neurobiology See neuroeconomics Neuroeconomics 27, 34–6, 41–5, 48, 53–6, 71, 113, 128, 137–40, 148, 160, 165, 169, 174, 183, 309, 314–15, 438–41, 467, 477, 494, 495–7 Altruism 26–7, 421–2 Discounting 314–5 Fairness 438–41 Mental accounting 224, 236 Neuroscience See neuroeconomics Nodes 338, 344–5 ‘Non-betweenness’ models 157 ‘Non-conventional’ theories 155 Noncooperative games 339 Nondepletion 402 Nonexclusivity 402 Normal-form representation 338 Normative models 4, 69, 151, 188–9, 207, 465, 480
Normative statements 4 Normative status See normative model Normative theory See normative model Nucleus accumbens (NAcc) 160, 169, 224, 440 Nudge 44, 49, 80, 246–9, 324, 332 O Occam’s razor 32, 201 Ochs, J. 357, 362 Ockenfels, A. 424–5 Odean, T. 170, 233 O’Doherty 95, 438 O’Donoghue, T. 129, 265–7, 279–82, 288, 290, 303, 305, 307, 317 Oehler, A. 233 Okada, E.M. 232, 235 Opponent process theory 104–5 Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 95, 165 Ordinal independence 159 Ordinization 477–9 Ortmann, A. 201 Oswald, A.J. 422, 479–80 Out-of-sample prediction 381 Overconfi dence 124–5, 143, 316, 500 Overestimation 124–5 Overplacement 125 Overprecision 125 Oxytocin 27, 440–1 P Palfrey, T.R. 367 Paradox of choice 81 Parasites 468 Pareto dominance 343, 375, 493 Pareto effi ciency 76, 416, 434–5 Parietal cortex 314 Parks, C.D. 435, 457 Parsimony 32, 417, 422 Partitioned price 223 Pavlovian withdrawal 127 Payment decoupling 235–7, 306 P-bets 198–9, 202 Peacock’s tail syndrome See handicap principle Peak-End rule 77, 89, 100–1, 275 Pearce, D. 418–21, 428 Pensions 330–1, 488–9 Permanent income hypothesis (PIH) 228, 257, 303, 323 569 I N D E X Per-period discount factor 293–4, 296
Pesendorfer, W. 30–1, 43–4, 48, 55 PET
See positron emission tomography Phelan, J. 16, 316 Phelps, E.S. 293–4 Phineas Gage 495–7 Piecewise linear pattern 363–4 Pinker, S. 75–6, 121, 127–8, 134, 135, 168, 438, 449, 478, 484 Placebo effect 77–8 Planner-doer model 50, 307–9, 314 Plott, C.R. 79, 194–6, 211–12, 471, 474, 475 Poldrack, R.A. 45, 90, 166 Pollak, R.A. 293–4 Pooling equilibrium 376, 389–90 Pope, D.G. 170, 215–17 Positive time preference 267 Positron emission tomography (PET) 18, 42, 93–5, 438, 477, 494 Post-contract opportunism
Posterior probability 118 Potlatch syndrome 414 Precision, of theories 33 Preference 71, 74, 79–86, 87, 462–3 Preference reversal 79, 98, 198–9, 201–202, 291–1, 295–9, 315–16, 471
Prefrontal cortex (PFC) 27, 89, 94–5, 101, 169, 184, 224, 314, 439 Prelec, D. 43–4, 80, 94, 105–8, 229, 234, 235, 236, 276, 295, 303, 306 Prescott, E.C. 239, 244–5 Prescriptive statements 4 Present bias 293 Prevention focus 168, 183 Price, J. 502–3 Pricing tasks 270 Primate behavior 438 Principal-agent theory 444–5, 455–6, 480 Prior outcome effect 237 Prior probability 118, 376 Priority heuristic 201 Prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
Probabilistic insurance 175, 186 Probabilistic mental models 199 Probability theory See Bayesian probability estimation Probability weighting 176–87, 198–9 Procedural approach 309–10, 491 Procedural theories 161 Process models 30, 201, 205 Procrastination 291–2, 296, 312, 315–19, 322–3 Product bundle 223, 235, 236 Projection bias 266, 305–6 Prominence effect 88 Promotion focus 168, 183 Property rights 446–7, 453–4 Proposer competition 408–9 Prospect, nature 149–50 Cancellation 161–2 Combination 161 Evaluation 162–164 Regular 162 Segregation 161 Simplifi cation 162 Strictly negative 162 Strictly positive 162 Prospect theory (PT) 160–187, 397–8, 469, 484 Criticisms 188–197 Models in discounting 302–3 Third generation 197–9 Psychological forward induction 429 Psychological game theory (PGT) 393, 418–21, 428–9, 430 Psychological plausibility 33, 462 Psychological regularity 466–7 Public goods 339, 436, 441–3, 446–7, 453–4, 490 Public goods games
570 Punishment 399, 405, 410, 411, 418, 422–3, 432–4, 436, 438–9, 446, 453–4 Anti-social 405, 414, 435 Pure strategies 350 Strategic 399 Q Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) 357, 369, 462 Quasi-hyperbolic function See discount function Quiggin, J. 158, 162, 207 R Rabin, M. 10, 129, 196, 303, 305, 309, 317, 410, 425, 463 Rabin model 425–8 Racetrack betting 170, 175–6, 187, 237 Radiohead 393 Rae, J. 262 Rajagopal, P. 225, 232 Randomization 352–6, 492 Random preference model 202 Rangel, A. 35, 51, 95 Rank-affected multiplicative weights (RAM) models 203 Rank-dependent EUT (RDU) 158 Ratchet effect 91, 215 Rating tasks 270 Rational expectations 75, 305 Rationality 3, 22, 25, 74–86, 470–5 See also irrationality Read, D. 238, 266–7, 270, 275, 277, 301 Reciprocity 393, 398–9, 402, 410, 411, 412, 414, 424, 425–7, 432–4, 438, 444, 453–4, 455–6, 492 Models 418, 425–429, 430–433, 462 Negative 399, 410, 414, 425–7, 453–4, 455–6
Positive 399, 402, 414, 425–7, 453–4, 455–6
Strong 399 Recreational drugs 324, 489 Redelmeier, D.A. 76–7, 89, 231, 273, 275, 471
Reductionism 33–6, 49, 311, 313, 466–7 Reference agents 396, 418 Reference-dependent subjective expected utility (RDSEU) 198 Reference point 76, 94, 161, 163, 164–7, 198, 205, 214, 215–17, 234, 258, 487 Reference price 220, 445–6 Reference standard 418, 431–2 Reference transactions 397 Refl ection effect 173, 196–197, 215 Refl exivity 68 Regret theory 156, 202 Regulatory focus 168 Reinforcement learning See learning effects Religion 478, 497–9, 501 Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (RTMS) 439 See also transcranial magnetic stimulation Replicas 132, 144–5 Representativeness heuristic 70, 119, 121, 463, 472 Reputation effect 134, 359 Responder competition 408–9 Response curve See best response function Retaliation 134, 336, 405, 410, 414, 435 Retrospective durability bias 479 Retrospective hedonic editing 89 Revealed preference 65, 68, 84 Reverse inference 45, 101 Reward prediction error (RPE) See dopamine reward prediction error Reverse time inconsistency 291 Rha, J.-Y. 225, 232 Ricardian equivalence 329 Ridley, M. 406–7, 437, 479 Riots 57–60 Risk-aversion 151–2, 174–5, 178–87, 364, 375
571 I N D E X Risk-dominant strategy 375, 434–5 Risk-free puzzle See equity premium puzzle Risk-seeking 180–7 Ritov, I. 98–100 Robson, A. 85–6, 152–3, 268, 301, 314 Robustness 424 Roelofsma, P. 270, 287, 301 Rogers, A.R. 268 Roth, A.E. 359, 362, 401, 405, 407, 408, 413 Rottenstreich, Y. 370–2, 416 rTMS See repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation Rubinstein, A. 201, 309–10, 372 Rullière, J.L. 408–9 Rustichini, A. 442 Rutherford, E. 33 Ryle, G. 18
Sales promotions 223–4, 241 Salience 119, 235, 236, 370–2 Samuelson, L. 301, 314 Samuelson, P.A. 238, 261, 263–4, 266 Sanfey, A.G. 439–40 Sarin, R. 84, 157 Satisfaction treadmill 91 Satisfi cing 8 Savings 327–332, 486, 488–9 Schelling, T. 370 Schelling salience 371 Schkade, D. 111, 112, 479 Schmidt, K.M. 41, 198–9, 411, 416, 422–4, 430–1, 444–5, 455–6, 464 Schooler, J.W. 77, 135, 480, 482, 483–4 Schwarz, N. 472, 473 Schweitzer, M.E. 170, 215–17 Sealed-bid mechanism 363 Segregation principle 161, 220 Selection process
Self-attribution bias 127 Self-control problems 136–7, 225–35, 291–2, 295–299, 303, 304–5, 308–16, 326–7, 327–332 Self-deception 126–8, 135, 438 Self-defeating behavior 132–40, 482–4, 497–9
Self-esteem 126–7, 136 Self-evaluation bias 124–132, 316 Selfi sh gene theory 138, 182, 501 Self-handicapping 136, 374 Self-harm 136, 374 Self-perception theory 481 Self-regulation
Self-serving bias 8, 124, 126, 360, 387–8, 408, 487, 491, 500 Self-signaling 78, 92–3, 105–9, 240, 308, 319 Selten, R. 375 Sen, A. K. 9, 86, 422 Separating equilibrium 376, 389–90 Sequential moves 340, 345, 347–9, 365, 367–8
Sexual selection 73 Shafi r, E. 23, 74, 470–5 Shaked, A. 32, 41, 361–3, 371, 415, 430–1, 435
Shea, J. 214–15, 300, 303 Shefrin, H.M. 169, 228–9, 314 Shirking 352, 455–6 Shiv, B. 136, 311–12 Shogren, J.F. 39, 190, 401, 408, 470 Sicherman, N. 275, 277, 289 Signaling 73, 361, 372–7, 487 Sign effect 273–4, 277 ‘Silver lining’ principle 220 Simester, D. 229, 235, 240 Simon, H.A. 14, 117, 139, 475 Simonson, I. 238 Simulational fl uency 128 Simultaneous moves 337, 338, 340, 352 Single-task individual-choice design 196, 471–2 572 Singleton node 344 Slovic, P. 79, 88, 119, 177, 181, 471, 473 Smith. A. 13, 72, 134, 261–2 Smith, V.L. 14, 400–1, 407, 412, 474, 475 Social capital 401 Social contracts 449–52, 474 Social norms 357–8, 371, 415–17, 434–6, 438, 441–3, 445, 446, 476, 492, 503 Social ostracism 443–4, 446–7 Social preferences 362–3, 381, 393–457 Modeling 417–21 Social time-preference rate (STPR) 323 Soman, D. 227–8, 234, 235, 236, 240, 267 Somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) 47, 88, 127, 496–7 Sophisticated discounters 296–9, 316–17, 320–1, 326–7 Sophistication, of learning 382 Spiteful behavior 395, 400, 410–11, 414, 422, 434 Stacchetti, E. 418–21, 428 Stackelberg oligopoly 345, 347–9, 379 Stahl, D.O. 368–9, 381–2 Stakes, in games 407 Stanovich. K.E. 139, 471, 473 Starmer, C. 155, 157, 158, 160, 162, 191, 196, 198–9, 202–3, 207, 271, 359, 371, 471–2 Stated Willingness To Pay (SWTP) 99, 109 Static games See games Statman, M. 169, 228–9, 229–230 Stigler, G. 31, 393 Stochastic decision models 202–3 Stochastic dominance 150–1, 191–2 Stone, A.B. 435, 457 Strategic interaction 26, 27 Strategic moves See commitment Strategic punishment See punishment Strategic response 195, 400–1 Strictly dominant strategy 342 ‘Stripped’ prospect theory 157 Strotz, R.H. 293 Subadditive discounting See discounting Subadditivity 177, 310 Subcertainty 177 Subgame 344 Subgame perfection 344–5 Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) 342, 344–5, 362–3 Subjective expected utility (SEU) 157 Subjective value 95–6 Subjective weighted utility (SWU) 157 Subjective wellbeing (SWB) 476 Subproportionality 177 Substitution axiom
Sugden, R. 156, 191, 196, 198–9, 202–3, 359, 371, 471–2 Suicide bombing 437 Sunk costs 234–5 Sunstein, C.R. 44, 80, 97–8, 246–7, 324, 332 Switched social contract 451–2 Switching costs 321 Sympathetic magic 130–1 T Tankersley, D. 41, 50 Target workers 242–5 Team reasoning 371–2, 416, 492 Teleological process 138 Temporal loss-aversion 273–4 Temptation 291–2, 296, 312, 315–19 ‘Tempting fate’ 126, 130 Terrorist attacks
Testosterone 104, 137, 143 Thaler, R.H. 14, 47, 80, 93, 186, 195, 196, 210–11, 219–23, 228–9, 236, 237, 238, 244–6, 247, 248, 251–3, 273, 274, 292, 300, 314, 324, 332, 397, 408, 413, 445, 471
573 I N D E X Theories, nature of 29–33, 461–2 Third generation prospect theory 197–9 ‘Three-act tragedy’ 75–6 Tice, D.M. 136–7 Ticket touting 397 Time budgeting 232–3 Time-inconsistent preferences 291–301, 304–5, 306–9, 311–14, 315–24, 462, 488–9 Time preference 40, 289–90 Tipping 394, 397 ‘Tit-for-tat’ strategy (TFT) 398, 406–7, 416 Titration procedures 269 TMS See transcranial magnetic stimulation Tobin, J. 23 Tom, S.M. 169 Tooby, J. 313, 450–2, 469, 474 ‘Tragedy of the commons’ 253, 324, 339, 442, 490 Transaction costs 40, 271–2, 360, 401 Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 18, 42, 56, 94 Transfer of attention exchange (TAX) models 203–5 Transitivity 6, 68, 149, 155, 162, 189, 191–2, 198–9, 202, 207 Treadmill effect 91, 477–8 ‘Trending’ regime 123 Trivers, R. 127–8 Trivializations, of violations of rationality 470–2
Trust contract 444–5, 487 Trust games See games Tversky, A. 5, 7, 14, 23, 47, 68–70, 74, 79, 87–8, 90–2, 93, 119, 123, 150, 153, 159–87, 223, 234, 471, 472, 473, 474, 477
Ultimatum bargaining games See games Uncertainty 148, 159–60, 287, 314 Uncertainty aversion principle 478–9 Underconfi dence 125–6 Unpredictability 351–356 Utility
Acquisition 93 Anticipatory 77, 92, 275, 288, 304, 465 Cardinal 87 Concave 286–7 Decision 85, 86–8, 275, 288, 485–6 Diagnostic 78, 92–3, 105–9 Experienced 86–8, 89, 105–8, 275, 288 Hedonic 86–8 Independence 265 Measurement of 95–6 Nature of 71–2, 86, 93–7 Ordinal 87 Predicted 77, 84, 465 Real-time 89, 275, 465 Remembered 89, 275, 465 Residual 92 Stationary instantaneous 266 Transaction 93 Utility functions 152, 171–6 V Value
See Utility Varian, H.R. 65, 76 Ventral striatum 90, 169, 439 Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 160, 169, 314, 439–40 Vicarious consumption effect 82, 102 ‘Vice’ goods 97, 105–9 ‘Virtuous’ goods 97 Visceral factors 83–6, 104–5, 128, 288, 304, 485, 486 Visceral fi t 128, 187 Volition
See free will von Mises, L. 7 von Neumann, J. 149, 337
574 W Wakker, P.P. 84, 157, 186, 193 Walker, M. 351, 355–6 Wang, X.T. 196–7, 223 Wansink, B. 79, 303 Warfare 499–502 ‘Warm glow’ 395 Wason, P.C. 449 Wason Test 412, 449–52, 468, 474, 493
Weber, R. 368 Wegner, D.M. 9, 483 Weighted utility theory 156 Welfare 44, 315–20, 475–84 ‘Well-behaved’ preferences 155 Well-being See welfare Wertenbroch, K. 317 West, R.F. 471, 473 Whistle blowing 444, 446 Williams, M.B. 38, 266, 271–2, 300 Willingness-to-accept (WTA) 86, 169, 194–6, 210–3 Willingness-to-pay (WTP) 86, 169, 194–6, 210–3 Wilson, E.O. 31, 46 Wilson, T.D. 135, 165, 368–9, 472, 477–9, 480
Within-subjects studies 36, 277 Wooders, J. 351, 355–6 World Values Survey 476 WTA-WTP gap See endowment effect (possession) Y Yanomamo tribe 183 Yen, S.-H. 197–200
Zahavi, A. 136, 374, 434 Zak, P. 440–1 Zeiler, K. 79, 194–6, 211–12 Zero-sum games
Zwick, R. 405, 407, 412 Document Outline
Yüklə 0,66 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|