Introduction to Behavioral



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n heuristic 239, 491 



See also diversifi cation bias

A

Abstention 78–79, 105–9, 319 

Adaptation 16–17, 91, 136, 165, 478–9 

Adaptation theory 91–2 

Addiction 78–9, 104–5, 105–9, 322, 489 

Agency problem



See Principal-agent theory

Aggregate risk 152–3

Aggregate uncertainty 314

Ainslie, G.W. 274, 291, 293–5, 307, 316 

Akerlof, G. 444

Allais, M. 14, 153, 161, 178, 

Allais paradox 153–4, 189, 192

Allostasis 165, 477–8 

Altruism 26–28, 395, 421–22, 442, 446

Impure 395, 422

Psychological 422 

Pure 395, 422

Ambiguity aversion 148, 160

Amygdala 95, 101, 160, 174, 314

Anchoring effect 79–80, 85, 98–99, 269, 

276, 463, 481 

Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 169, 184, 

314, 439, 440

Anterior insular cortex (AI) 440

Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) 

444 

Anti-social punishment



See punishment

Appraisal-Tendency-Framework (ATF) 

85

Arationality 9



Arbitrary coherence 80

Ariely, D. 5, 77, 80, 102, 300, 317, 480, 

482, 483–4

‘Asian disease’ problem 196–7, 199–200, 

473

‘as-if’ models 30, 160, 201, 205, 417



Aspiration effect 91

Asset integration 151

Assumptions, role of 466–7

Asymmetric information 372–377 



See also imperfect information

Asymmetric price elasticities 169

Attention 83–4

Attitude 70, 74

Attraction, in learning 377–8 

Attraction effect 81, 101

Auctions 361, 363–4, 489–90 

Availability heuristic 119

Availability theory 450–1 

Axelrod, R. 406 

Axioms 68

EUT 149–52 

SEM 68–69 

See also independence, invariance,

monotonicity, transitivity



B

Babcock, L. 360, 377–8 

Back-loaded fees 321 

Backward induction 345, 361–2, 371



See also foldback method

‘Bads’ 70

Banerjee, A. 241 

Bargaining 358–63, 491, 500 

Structured 360–4 

Unstructured 359–60 

‘Base rate’ bias 120, 472–3

Baseline fi ring rate 96

Battigalli, P. 418–20, 429, 430

Baumeister, R.F. 8, 74, 132–3, 136

Bayesian Nash equilibrium 361, 364

Bayesian learning 380 

Bayesian probability estimation 6, 10–11, 

117–8, 120, 122, 148

Bayesian updating 11, 376, 463

Bechara, A. 50, 314

Index



560

Becker, G.S. 157, 302

Becker-Degroot-Marschand mechanism 

194


Behavioural game theory (BGT) 340–1, 

395–6


See also games

Bem, D.J. 481 

Benartzi, S. 123, 238, 244–6, 247–8, 

251–3, 471 

Bentham, J. 13, 86

Berg, J. 402, 410 

Bernheim, D. 43, 51

Bernouilli, D. 13

Berridge, K.C. 7, 309 

Best response function 346–7 

‘Better-than-average’ effect 8, 125, 139

Betweenness models 156

Between-subjects studies 36

Biases 117



See also individual biases

Bilateral call market



See sealed-bid mechanism

Bilgin, B. 273–4

Binary lottery 359

Binmore, K. 32, 41, 194, 361–3, 371, 415, 

430–1, 435, 474, 475, 490

Bioeconomics 499–502 

Biological fi tness 71, 137–40

See also natural selection

Biological plausibility 50

Birnbaum, M.H. 188–192, 195, 201, 206, 

212–13


‘Black box’ 43

‘Blind watchmaker’ 138

Blood donation 442–3 

Blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 

signal 96 

Bloom, P. 132, 144

Blount, S. 410, 412 

Bó, P.D. 434–5

Bodner, R. 105–8, 

Böhm-Bawerk, E.v. 263 

Bohnet, I. 408, 412, 413 

Bolton, G.E. 362, 407, 412, 424–5 

Bolton-Ockenfels (BO) model 424–5, 430 

Bonus contract 444–5, 455–6, 487

Bonus packs 97

Bonus schemes



See bonus contract 

Bounded rationality 8, 14, 117, 161, 188, 

357, 491

Bowles, S. 434

Brain damage 88, 111, 495–7 

Brain modularity 18, 50, 309, 313, 469

Brandstätter, E. 201

Brocas, I. 41, 50, 309, 313, 314, 323

Broseta, B. 368–9 

Brosnan, S.F. 438

Budget constraint 67

Burnham, T. 16, 316 

Buss, D.M. 16, 468

C

Camerer, C.F. 3, 33, 43–4, 54–6, 153–4, 

159, 160–161, 171, 184, 189, 202, 243, 

254–6, 297, 341, 262, 366, 368, 369, 370, 

377, 378–9, 380–1, 382, 409, 437, 462, 

464, 467, 470, 493

Cameron, L.A. 400, 407

Cancellation principle 69, 150, 161, 190, 

192, 203, 221

Caplin, A. 165–6, 169

Carrillo, J.D. 41, 50, 309, 313, 314, 319, 

323


Cartesian dualism 4

Celebrity contagion 143

Certainty equivalents 184–5

Chagnon, N.A. 183, 434, 499–500 

Chang, C.J. 197–200

Chapman, G.B. 275, 286, 289

Charness, G. 312, 407, 410, 425

Cheater detection hypothesis 450–2 

Cheating

See free riding

Cheema, A. 227–8, 234, 235, 236, 240 

Chen, K. 21, 412

Cherry, T.L. 39, 190, 400, 401, 407, 408, 470 




561

I N D E X

Chew, S.H. 156–7

Chiappori, P. 355, 385–6

Choi, S. 370

Choice avoidance 81–2

Choice bracketing 233–242, 306, 463 

Choice tasks 269 

Chong, K. 369, 381 

Cingulate 94

Clark, A.E. 422

Clithero, J.A. 41, 50

Coalescing 161, 191, 203

Coase theorem 210

Coates, J. 143, 148

Coding 161

Cognitive dissonance 127, 135

Cognitive hierarchy theory 369 

Cognitive load 311–2

Cognitive neuroscience 17–19

Coherence 74, 75

Colander, D. 55

Coller, M. 300 

Combination principle 161, 190–2, 203

Commitment 128, 134, 297–9, 308, 

316–319, 331, 332, 372, 434, 438, 485–6 

Common consequence effect 154

Common ratio effect 154

Community policing 443

Co-monotonic independence 158

Completeness 6, 68, 149, 154–5

Complexity 416

Compulsivity 290 

Concavity of utility function 152, 174–5, 

178–180, 220

Conceptual validity 37

Conditional cooperation 399, 434

Conditional probability 118

Confabulation 127

Confi gural weights models 203–5

Confi rmatory bias 127, 463 

Confounds 37, 40, 174, 215–16, 285–8 

In discounting 268, 272, 301, 311 

Conjunction error 472–3 

Consequentialistic perspective 432

Consilience 17, 45–52, 309, 313

Consistent contributors 434, 436

Consolidated price 223

Consumption independence 265–6

Consumption profi les 275, 332, 441 

Consumption reallocation 285–6 

Consumption smoothing 228–9

Contagion 130–2

Contamination 130–1

Context-dependence 98

Contingent valuation method (CVM) 

98–100, 109

Continuity axiom 150, 155

Continuous compounding 272–3 

Continuous strategies 340, 345–9

Contrast effect 90–1, 100

‘Conventional’ theories 155

Convexity 6, 70, 176, 187, 220

Cooper, D. 375, 376, 388–90 

Cooperation 338, 399

Cooperative games 339 

Correlated equilibrium 357–8, 371, 491

Cortisol 143, 148

Cosmides, L. 313, 450–2, 469, 474 

Costa-Gomes, M. 368–9 

Costly signaling 434

Counter-terrorism policy 490–1

Cournot model 345–7, 379 

Cournot-Nash equilibrium 347, 379 

Cox, J.C. 410 

Cravings


See visceral factors

Crawford, V. 243–4, 368–9, 370–2, 416 

Credibility 372, 434, 437, 485–6 

Credit card use 48, 229–30, 235–6, 240

Credit crunch 148 

Cubitt, R.C. 196, 471–2 

Cumulative probabilities 158

Cumulative prospect theory 176, 



D

Damasio, A.R. 47, 50, 88, 111, 127, 133, 

290, 314, 382, 493, 496–7 



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