559
1/
n heuristic 239, 491
See also diversifi cation bias
A
Abstention 78–79, 105–9, 319
Adaptation 16–17, 91, 136, 165, 478–9
Adaptation theory 91–2
Addiction 78–9, 104–5, 105–9, 322, 489
Agency problem
See Principal-agent theory
Aggregate risk 152–3
Aggregate uncertainty 314
Ainslie, G.W. 274, 291, 293–5, 307, 316
Akerlof, G. 444
Allais, M. 14, 153, 161, 178,
Allais paradox 153–4, 189, 192
Allostasis 165, 477–8
Altruism 26–28, 395, 421–22, 442, 446
Impure 395, 422
Psychological 422
Pure 395, 422
Ambiguity aversion 148, 160
Amygdala 95, 101, 160, 174, 314
Anchoring effect 79–80, 85, 98–99, 269,
276, 463, 481
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 169, 184,
314, 439, 440
Anterior insular cortex (AI) 440
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs)
444
Anti-social punishment
See punishment
Appraisal-Tendency-Framework (ATF)
85
Arationality 9
Arbitrary coherence 80
Ariely, D. 5, 77, 80, 102, 300, 317, 480,
482, 483–4
‘Asian disease’ problem 196–7, 199–200,
473
‘as-if’ models 30, 160, 201, 205, 417
Aspiration effect 91
Asset integration 151
Assumptions, role of 466–7
Asymmetric information 372–377
See also imperfect information
Asymmetric price elasticities 169
Attention 83–4
Attitude 70, 74
Attraction, in learning 377–8
Attraction effect 81, 101
Auctions 361, 363–4, 489–90
Availability heuristic 119
Availability theory 450–1
Axelrod, R. 406
Axioms 68
EUT 149–52
SEM 68–69
See also independence, invariance,
monotonicity, transitivity
B
Babcock, L. 360, 377–8
Back-loaded fees 321
Backward induction 345, 361–2, 371
See also foldback method
‘Bads’ 70
Banerjee, A. 241
Bargaining 358–63, 491, 500
Structured 360–4
Unstructured 359–60
‘Base rate’ bias 120, 472–3
Baseline fi ring rate 96
Battigalli, P. 418–20, 429, 430
Baumeister, R.F. 8, 74, 132–3, 136
Bayesian Nash equilibrium 361, 364
Bayesian learning 380
Bayesian probability estimation 6, 10–11,
117–8, 120, 122, 148
Bayesian updating 11, 376, 463
Bechara, A. 50, 314
Index
560
Becker, G.S. 157, 302
Becker-Degroot-Marschand mechanism
194
Behavioural game theory (BGT) 340–1,
395–6
See also games
Bem, D.J. 481
Benartzi, S. 123, 238, 244–6, 247–8,
251–3, 471
Bentham, J. 13, 86
Berg, J. 402, 410
Bernheim, D. 43, 51
Bernouilli, D. 13
Berridge, K.C. 7, 309
Best response function 346–7
‘Better-than-average’ effect 8, 125, 139
Betweenness models 156
Between-subjects studies 36
Biases 117
See also individual biases
Bilateral call market
See sealed-bid mechanism
Bilgin, B. 273–4
Binary lottery 359
Binmore, K. 32, 41, 194, 361–3, 371, 415,
430–1, 435, 474, 475, 490
Bioeconomics 499–502
Biological fi tness 71, 137–40
See also natural selection
Biological plausibility 50
Birnbaum, M.H. 188–192, 195, 201, 206,
212–13
‘Black box’ 43
‘Blind watchmaker’ 138
Blood donation 442–3
Blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
signal 96
Bloom, P. 132, 144
Blount, S. 410, 412
Bó, P.D. 434–5
Bodner, R. 105–8,
Böhm-Bawerk, E.v. 263
Bohnet, I. 408, 412, 413
Bolton, G.E. 362, 407, 412, 424–5
Bolton-Ockenfels (BO) model 424–5, 430
Bonus contract 444–5, 455–6, 487
Bonus packs 97
Bonus schemes
See bonus contract
Bounded rationality 8, 14, 117, 161, 188,
357, 491
Bowles, S. 434
Brain damage 88, 111, 495–7
Brain modularity 18, 50, 309, 313, 469
Brandstätter, E. 201
Brocas, I. 41, 50, 309, 313, 314, 323
Broseta, B. 368–9
Brosnan, S.F. 438
Budget constraint 67
Burnham, T. 16, 316
Buss, D.M. 16, 468
C
Camerer, C.F. 3, 33, 43–4, 54–6, 153–4,
159, 160–161, 171, 184, 189, 202, 243,
254–6, 297, 341, 262, 366, 368, 369, 370,
377, 378–9, 380–1, 382, 409, 437, 462,
464, 467, 470, 493
Cameron, L.A. 400, 407
Cancellation principle 69, 150, 161, 190,
192, 203, 221
Caplin, A. 165–6, 169
Carrillo, J.D. 41, 50, 309, 313, 314, 319,
323
Cartesian dualism 4
Celebrity contagion 143
Certainty equivalents 184–5
Chagnon, N.A. 183, 434, 499–500
Chang, C.J. 197–200
Chapman, G.B. 275, 286, 289
Charness, G. 312, 407, 410, 425
Cheater detection hypothesis 450–2
Cheating
See free riding
Cheema, A. 227–8, 234, 235, 236, 240
Chen, K. 21, 412
Cherry, T.L. 39, 190, 400, 401, 407, 408, 470
561
I N D E X
Chew, S.H. 156–7
Chiappori, P. 355, 385–6
Choi, S. 370
Choice avoidance 81–2
Choice bracketing 233–242, 306, 463
Choice tasks 269
Chong, K. 369, 381
Cingulate 94
Clark, A.E. 422
Clithero, J.A. 41, 50
Coalescing 161, 191, 203
Coase theorem 210
Coates, J. 143, 148
Coding 161
Cognitive dissonance 127, 135
Cognitive hierarchy theory 369
Cognitive load 311–2
Cognitive neuroscience 17–19
Coherence 74, 75
Colander, D. 55
Coller, M. 300
Combination principle 161, 190–2, 203
Commitment 128, 134, 297–9, 308,
316–319, 331, 332, 372, 434, 438, 485–6
Common consequence effect 154
Common ratio effect 154
Community policing 443
Co-monotonic independence 158
Completeness 6, 68, 149, 154–5
Complexity 416
Compulsivity 290
Concavity of utility function 152, 174–5,
178–180, 220
Conceptual validity 37
Conditional cooperation 399, 434
Conditional probability 118
Confabulation 127
Confi gural weights models 203–5
Confi rmatory bias 127, 463
Confounds 37, 40, 174, 215–16, 285–8
In discounting 268, 272, 301, 311
Conjunction error 472–3
Consequentialistic perspective 432
Consilience 17, 45–52, 309, 313
Consistent contributors 434, 436
Consolidated price 223
Consumption independence 265–6
Consumption profi les 275, 332, 441
Consumption reallocation 285–6
Consumption smoothing 228–9
Contagion 130–2
Contamination 130–1
Context-dependence 98
Contingent valuation method (CVM)
98–100, 109
Continuity axiom 150, 155
Continuous compounding 272–3
Continuous strategies 340, 345–9
Contrast effect 90–1, 100
‘Conventional’ theories 155
Convexity 6, 70, 176, 187, 220
Cooper, D. 375, 376, 388–90
Cooperation 338, 399
Cooperative games 339
Correlated equilibrium 357–8, 371, 491
Cortisol 143, 148
Cosmides, L. 313, 450–2, 469, 474
Costa-Gomes, M. 368–9
Costly signaling 434
Counter-terrorism policy 490–1
Cournot model 345–7, 379
Cournot-Nash equilibrium 347, 379
Cox, J.C. 410
Cravings
See visceral factors
Crawford, V. 243–4, 368–9, 370–2, 416
Credibility 372, 434, 437, 485–6
Credit card use 48, 229–30, 235–6, 240
Credit crunch 148
Cubitt, R.C. 196, 471–2
Cumulative probabilities 158
Cumulative prospect theory 176,
D
Damasio, A.R. 47, 50, 88, 111, 127, 133,
290, 314, 382, 493, 496–7
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