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creation of such social bonds, via successful illocutionary acts and criticisable
and justifiable validity claims, rational behaviour is achieved.
Strategic utterances, e.g. a lie, have to be understood as a „derivative of action
orientated to reaching understanding‟ (1976b: 1). Thus, strategic action can
only work on the basis of a counterfactual deep structure which is orientated
towards mutual understanding. We have to assume that the other‟s utterance
is driven by truth, rightness and truthfulness – otherwise the social fabric
would not work and even lying would lose its sense.
6
Habermas, of course,
acknowledges the existence of a „gray area‟ (1976b: 3, cf. also 1996) between
the two extremes of communicative and strategic action. But this does not
affect the main idea of formal pragmatics: we are always already in language,
thus, operating on the normative grounds of communication. Having thereby
reconstructed universal conditions of possible understanding, Habermas
perceives validity claims and their binding force as „the point of departure for
a critical theory of society‟ (1971: 103).
3.4 The Ideal Speech Situation: An Unavoidable Idealisation
In most cases, misunderstandings and open questions can be solved on the
ground of a common lifeworld. A lifeworld forms the totality of the groups‟
knowledge and symbolic understanding in which the language users was
socialised. We always act within such a set of symbolic structures and can
never step outside. As soon as participants discuss contested issues which are
not covered by such an intuitive, common understanding, they raise validity
claims by arguing for and justifying their opinion. It is in this context that
Habermas initially presented the idea of an ideal-speech situation (ISS) –
consisting of four elements: free access, equal rights, absence of coercion, and
truthfulness on the side of the participants. In such a state of affairs pure
communication action would be realised. The ISS has evoked widespread
criticism as being idealistic and out of touch with real world conditions.
Although some of Habermas‟ earlier explanations have fuelled such
misinterpretations (cf. 1971, 1972), he has since the beginning at the 1970s
clarified that it is a misunderstanding to‟ hypostatize the normative content of
general presuppositions of rational discourse into an ideal model of purely
communicative social relations‟ (Habermas 1997: 322).
He has constantly repeated that it is not simply an idealised situation he is
striving for as social practice in day-to-day life is not going to correspond to
such a model. But he insists that we have to counterfactually assume that the
other is not manipulating us (cf. endnote 6). That is, we have to assume that
the other raises claims which are true, right and truthful and even if such
experiences are like „islands in the sea of practice‟ (1982: 235), claims of truth,
rightness and truthfulness are necessary, reciprocally anticipated conditions
of social life. And whenever we mean what we say, we raise exactly the same
claims. The necessary implicitness of these validity claims in speech acts
(section 3.3) is a condition we are not even free to reject. Communication is
obviously not always driven by communicative action and Habermas
acknowledges that. However, it is impossible to imagine a society which is not
based on validity claims. Without these, societies simply cannot exist as „the
grammatics of our language would in the end have to collapse‟ (1993: 102). It
is therefore that communicative action is neither solely an empirical
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phenomenon like Gottfried W. Hegel‟s „always already in place‟-Weltgeist nor
simply a regulative Kantian idea.
7
Therein lays Habermas‟ idea of social transformation which provides a
foundation for critique: he is not assuming an ideal state, that is, he does not
simply state how it ought to be. Rather, formal pragmatics illustrates that we
interact on the basis of a weak idealisation, that is, that we already practice
such an ideal to a limited degree. Thereby, Habermas outlines which kind of
practices are „right‟ as they are a „natural property‟ of human interaction and
are therefore justified. Thus, critique which aims to strengthen settings which
are more inclusive and egalitarian can be seen as grounded as they realise a
tendency, a weak idealisation, we cannot deny in the first place. Of course,
such a weak idealisation is often betrayed. Still, it enables an immanent
transcendence which is strong enough to ground critique. And although
settings which realise this immanent transcendence probably, e.g. deliberative
democracy (1996: 287-328; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 263-271), do not enable
pure communicative action, they certainly favour debate based on the „force of
the better argument‟ as validity claims can be raised and refuted in a rather
unrestricted manner.
3.5 Social Evolution and Moral Learning
Although we now know how critique can be grounded, let me finally outline
some of additional concepts which are of significance for the DHA. In order to
understand the development of modern societies and the freeing of
emancipatory potentials immanent in communicative practices, Habermas
reconstructs Historical Materialism as a form of social evolution. In contrast
to neo-Darwinist ideas of evolution in sociology (Schmid 1987) as well as
system-theoretical evolutionary approaches (Luhmann 1978), Habermas
points to the social character of evolution. That is: the ratio developing
between distorted and undistorted forms of communication within a group.
Hence, he provides a non-reductionist, non-biologist interpretation of human
evolution which explains why certain societies develop more rationally, i.e. in
a more egalitarian and cooperative way, than others.
Evolutionary learning leads to the adequate adaption of societal worldviews to
resolve existing problems societies face. Such problems are mostly solved by
instrumental differentiation and adoption, e.g. new technologies. These
cognitive-theoretical learning processes have to be balanced by moral-
practical learning processes based on communicative action which can only
warrant normatively successful social integration.
Moral learning processes expand and institutionalise egalitarian and universal
forms of communication. Thus, successful social integration happens at three
different levels: it is about the linguistification of traditions at the cultural
level, formal procedures at the societal level and the development of highly
abstract ego identities at the personal level. Habermas and his colleagues
have tried to prove this by pointing to the evolution of (a) religious
worldviews: from closed, mythical to more open, polytheistic worldviews and,
finally, individualistic, universally orientated monotheism (Döbert 1973), (b)
the law: the development of a positive, formal, universal, legalistic law which
materialises post-conventional structures of consciousness (Habermas 1976a)
and (c) class societies: from mythical, archaic to traditional, hierarchical to