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is „illegitimate‟ and what is „in the best interest of the manipulated‟? Van Dijk
has most recently addressed the issue by noting that one of the problems of
CDA
is the lack of theory about the norms and principals of its own critical activity,
that is, a detailed applied ethics that allows CDA researchers to judge whether
discourses or discourse properties, or their users, are „bad‟ because they violate
fundamental human rights. (2008: 823; cf. also 2009: 63)
Like van Dijk, Fairclough too has made his political stance transparent
throughout his career (1989: 5, 2009). He has furthermore, explicitly,
problematised a lack of operationalisation of social theories in discourse
studies (1989: 13). In an attempt to solve this problem, Chouliaraki and
Fairclough aimed to „ground the move from „is‟ to „ought‟‟ (1999: 35). Their
book on Discourse in Late Modernity is probably the most elaborated attempt
to provide CDA with a notion of critique capable of validating its own critical
standards by bringing together social scientist like Anthony Giddens, Antonio
Gramsci, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, Habermas, Karl Marx, Louis
Althusser, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu (cf. also Fairclough 1995, in
particular chapter 1, 3, and 6, for an excellent discussion). As beneficial as
such a dialog might be in order to understand particular social wrongs, it
causes substantial confusion when asked to provide a foundation for critique.
These theories are often divided by fundamentally different epistemologies.
As their disagreement therefore concerns essentials of their approaches, they
cannot be brought together without compromising on their particular
contribution to the central problem rightly raised by the authors: grounding
the move from „is‟ to „ought‟ (cf. Mouffe (2006) against Habermas or
Habermas (1990) against Foucault to name just two conflict-lines).
Like other strands, Wodak‟s DHA claims what ought and ought not to be.
However, the DHA seems to be the branch within CDA which explicitly and
coherently bases its critique on a foundational notion of emancipation. I will
call this a strong programme of critique which consists of more than
necessary self-reflexivity. In doing so, the DHA refers to the Frankfurt School
as being its theoretical antecedent (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 260ff; Reisigl
and Wodak 2001: 32ff, 2009: 88; Wodak 1996: 28-31, 2001a: 2, 9f; Wodak
and Meyer 2009: 6f). But how its notion of critique is grounded in Habermas‟
language-philosophy in particular and thus justifies its standpoint has
seemingly not yet been elaborated in detail. I claim that even the DHA as an
interdisciplinary endeavour should not simply sketchily refer to macro-
theories like Habermas‟ language-philosophy. It has to make this relation
explicit in order to
reject criticism of being unprincipled,
avoid self-righteous blaming of other approaches as being not critical
(Billig 2003), and
avoid pitfalls of any established consensus easily becoming a non-
reflective, dogmatic convention.
Finally, a detailed investigation into Habermas‟ programme and its
concepts like
social learning or
failed learning processes could enrich
the DHA‟s methodological „tool-kit‟.
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The DHA, being part of the „CDA movement‟, shares the movement‟s core
orientation towards (a) critique based on (b) a pragmatic understanding of
language, language in use.
The DHA understands critique as a demystifying force which tries to reveal
power structures from the „perspective of those who suffer‟ (Wodak 2001a: 10;
Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). It does not perceive itself as value-free but
takes an explicit standpoint against various forms of discrimination which
cause suffering. In taking such a perspective, it insists on a self-reflective
stance, distance from the data (Martin and Wodak 2003: 6) and does not
claim a self-righteous „know-that-all or know-it-better attitude‟ (Reisigl and
Wodak 2001: 265). Rather, the DHA wants to provide new perspectives in
order to make informed choices possible (Wodak 2001b: 65; Reisigl and
Wodak 2001: 265). This stance is adopted via a three dimensional concept of
critique (Wodak 2001b: 65; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32f, 268):
Immanent critique: problematises contradictions in the text-
/discourse‟ internal structure. This kind of critique can be „objective‟ as
semantic contradictions are perceivable by every competent language
user.
Sociodiagnostic critique: intents to demystify propagandist, populist,
etc. discursive practices. This kind of critique takes a normative
standpoint insofar as the critic refutes such positions.
Prognostic-/ retrospective critique: at this level, the DHA explicitly
tries to transform the current state of affairs via direct engagement by
referring to guiding principles such as human rights or the rejection of
suffering.
Such a kind of critique cannot be text-based alone but must refer to society
and its reproduction as a whole. The DHA is, thus, concerned with language
in use and perceives discourse as „a form of „social practice‟ [which] implies a
dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the
situation(s), institutions and social structures which frame it‟ (Fairclough and
Wodak 1997: 258). The pragmatic meaning of utterances, what is done with
them within particular contexts, therefore, has to be critically investigated.
In order to critically identify what can be done with words and how they
(re)produce exclusion and suffering the DHA refers to the Frankfurt School.
Its first generation tried to ground their judgements by pointing to
compassion (Horkheimer 1933), contemplative aestheticism (Adorno 1997) or
a biological foundation of reason (Marcuse 1992) but ultimately failed to
validate their critical standards (Habermas 1984: 374). However, a
convincing foundation is necessary for the DHA which explicitly links its
efforts to „prognostic critique‟ and emancipation. Thus, it carries a higher
burden of proof compared to (crypto-)normative or descriptive approaches.
In other words: as the DHA claims a particular standpoint and goal of its
criticism, it has to prove why its criticism is justified in order to make such
strong claims. Critique, therefore, has to be grounded in order to justify its
interventions.
It is Habermas who suggests a theory of communication which provides a
foundation of critique by outlining immanent standards of language in use