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which reject discrimination and suffering. In line with this, Wodak quotes
Habermas saying that „language is also a medium of domination and social
force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power (Habermas quoted
in Wodak 2001a: 2, italic by the author). Language is also a medium of
domination but Habermas does not reduce language to a tool of domination.
Rather, he grounds his critical perspective in communicative interaction as
„distorted communication is not ultimate; it has its basis in the logic of
undistorted language communication‟ (1974c: 17). In other words: the
emancipator condition Habermas (and the DHA) is striving for is that of
undamaged intersubjectivity.
Consequently, references to Habermas‟ ideal speech situation can be found
(Wodak 1996: 28-31; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 261) in order to support the
DHA‟s standpoint. However, this relation needs further explanation. It seems
to me that the DHA‟s claim that it „can contribute greatly to answering the
question of what are „good reasons‟ because (…) [it] provides criteria, which
enable one to distinguish between manipulative and suggestive procedures‟
(Reisigl/ Wodak 2001: 265) is not sufficient. Undoubtedly, the DHA‟s tool-kit
can greatly contribute to an understanding of how manipulation, exclusion,
etc. are linguistically realised. However, I cannot see how the DHA provides
criteria that enable one to distinguish between manipulative and suggestive
procedures‟ and, by implication, emancipatory criteria itself. A rigorous
reference to Habermas‟ language-philosophy may well serve as such a
foundation of the DHA‟s critique and would make its aims, e.g. deliberative
democracy, transparent and accessible. It would answer the question why
discrimination has to be rejected not only from a conventionalist point of view
but a theoretically grounded perspective as well.
3. Jürgen Habermas: Language, Critique and
Emancipation
3
3.1 The Differentiation of Language
The fact that the DHA refers to Habermas‟ programme is reasonable as his
philosophy is based on speech-act theory. Furthermore, Habermas‟ approach
can claim common ground with the DHA due to the legacy of the late
Wittgenstein and his Philosophical Investigations (1968). Habermas adopts
the concept of language games and its underlying assumption of rules we
intuitively apply (Wittgenstein 1968, e.g. § 3, 71, 75, 567), claiming that if
„Wittgenstein [had] developed a theory of language games, it would have had
to take the form of a universal pragmatics‟ (1971: 53). It is this theory of
language games – in the form of universal pragmatics – which Habermas
wants to reconstruct. He introduces a non-foundational universalism by
rejecting first principles but at the same time provides a foundation for
critique by uncovering universal rules and their emancipatory potentials
within everyday communication which connect competent speakers (1976b:
9).
In order to reconstruct these rules, Habermas re-establishes hermeneutics as
a science, providing an emancipatory, foundational, normative and cognitive
theory which „validate[s] its own critical standards‟ (1984: xxxix). As he
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intends to do so by reconstructing deep structures of language, Habermas
asks: what happens as soon as we start to communicate? Which deep patterns
underlie intersubjective processes and are they normatively welcome? Before
addressing these questions in section 3.3 and especially 3.4, let me first
introduce Habermas‟ broader research programme.
Habermas starts by observing „the linguistification
of the sacred‟ (1987: 77):
communication becomes more and more important in modern societies,
hence, traditional norms and sacred authorities like holy texts are no longer
unquestionable. As norms and authorities become evaluated in everyday talk,
modern (wo)man increasingly self-produce society discursively.
[The] authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved
consensus. This means a freeing of communicative action from sacrally
protected normative contexts. The disenchantment and disempowering of the
domain of the sacred takes place by way of a linguistification of the ritually
secured, basic normative agreement; going along with this is a release of the
rationality potential of communicative action. The aura of rapture and terror
that emanates from the sacred, the spellbinding power of the holy, is sublimated
into the binding/bonding force of criticisable validity claims and at the same
time turned into an everyday occurrence. (1987: 77)
This is part of an evolutionary process in which humans develop
communication skills by freeing „pragmatic universals‟ like personal
pronouns, deictic expressions, performative verbs, non-performative
intentional verbs and modal adverbs, etc. from bodily expressions and
gestures (1971: 77ff). Thereby, they become more and more reflexive and
aware of their own behaviour. This development leads to three kinds of
demarcation from nature:
A reflexive stance towards the objective world enables the demarcation
of the Ego from the environment, the „real‟ world of objects.
The awareness of norms as being societal products enables the
demarcation from the
social world. The subject perceives itself as
being able to make society.
The subject becomes reflexively aware of itself, the subjective world, as
they become able to see themselves from the perspective of a third
person.
3.2 Types of Action
As soon as we are able to refer to the objective, the social and the subjective
world we apply different kinds of action which are grouped in two separate
dimensions: the social and the non-social. Non-social action does not connect
individuals but refers to subjects who manipulate the objective world.
Habermas calls this kind of action „instrumental action‟, e.g. the use of
technologies in order to gain primary products. Consequently, non-social
action is teleological as it is goal-orientated: we do X in order achieve Y (1984:
85, 86f).