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Social action follows this teleological paradigm as well but is more complex. If
the agent‟s calculation of success takes into account a second agent‟s
decisions, Habermas speaks of „strategic action‟ (1984: 85, 87f). This mode of
action is still purposive-rational by aiming to influence the other and follows
the speaker‟s perlocutionary intentions with regards to an objective world.
That is, the propositional part of the utterance can be true or false and the
agent‟s goal-directed action might succeed or fail.
However, strategic action can also take the form of „constative speech acts‟ if
not oriented to purposive activity but conversation as an end in itself, e.g.
„chatting, conversing, and arguing‟ (1984: 327). In contrast to instrumental
and strategic action, constative and the following two types of action are not
orientated to success but consensus. They are orientated towards
understanding and go thus beyond the purpose-rational model. Action which
is not only orientated towards the objective- but also the social world is
formed through common values of a group. Here, the speaker becomes a
bearer of the group‟s culture, interprets and reproduces it. This kind of
interaction is „norm-regulated‟ (1984: 85, 88ff). It is related to an established
world of norms and values wherein action can be right or wrong, e.g.
promises are expected to be kept but can be broken. Social action can also be
orientated towards the subjective world. Referring to Erving Goffman (1971),
Habermas speaks of „dramaturgical action‟ as soon as we present ourselves in
front of an audience (1984: 85f, 90ff). Dramaturgical action concerns the way
we perform our subjectivity. Such action can only convince the audience if it
seems authentic. For example: if X praises Y, this has to seem authentic –
otherwise Y might feel offended. More generally speaking, X is successful if
the audience accepts that X means what X says. Consequently, dramaturgical
action has latent strategic features. However, it is different from strategic
action as its expressions towards an audience have to claim truthfulness
(sincerity) in order to succeed. It becomes strategic action only if the
audience expects and anticipates purposive-rational action.
Constative, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action only reflect three
isolated relationships to three different worlds which refer to three different
validity claims: truth, rightness or truthfulness. It is only in Habermas‟ final
category, „communicative action‟, that language in use is no longer orientated
towards one isolated world but forms a threefold, reflective relation to the
world (1984: 86, 94ff). For Habermas, this kind of action is rational because
speakers coordinate their interaction by raising claims of truth, rightness and
truthfulness which can be criticised and justified, refuted or accepted. Seen as
isolated modes, they are
limit cases of communicative action (…). In each case only one function of
language is thematised: the release of perlocutionary effects, the establishment
of interpersonal relations, and the expression of subjective experience. By
contrast, the communicative model of action (…) takes all the functions of
language equally into consideration. (1984: 95)
Only if a speaker raises all three validity claims together in one speech-act do
we speak of communicative action. Communicative action does not dispense
goal orientated action but is dominated by an egalitarian and cooperative
attitude (1984: 94) which makes it rational. In consequence, rationality, for
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Habermas, is not linked to a particular content but rather to an egalitarian
and cooperative form of the argument. Thus, communicative action has to be
separated from communication. In order to avoid misunderstandings,
Habermas insists
that the communicative model of action does not equate action with
communication. Language is a medium of communication that serves
understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with one another
so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular aims. (1984: 101)
3.3 Speech Act Theory and the Binding Force of Validity Claims
Due to the developmental process through which humans achieve a reflective
stance towards the objective, the social and the subjective world, three types of
action emerge. Habermas links these types of action to criticisable validity
claims with a potential for rational action on which grounded critique
becomes possible.
In order to understand the ability of these three claims to create social bonds,
Habermas turns to John Austin‟s speech-act theory.
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Following Austin (1975),
Habermas assigns a binding force to what he calls
propositionally
differentiated speech. Propositionally differentiated speech is constituted by a
double structure of natural language, being both „a performative clause and a
dependent clause with propositional content‟. While the performative clause,
being the illocutionary element, establishes an intersubjective relationship
between speakers, e.g. „I hereby assure you…‟, the propositional clause relates
to objects (or states of affairs) about which they communicate, e.g. „…that this
decision is dangerous‟ (1971: 74).
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In contrast to Austin, Habermas does not focus on constative (true:false)
speech-acts alone. Rather, the binding force of performative clauses can rest
on three different validity claims: (a) a truth claim (Austin‟s constative
element), (b) a rightness claim (normative utterances have a force too, they
can be right or wrong) and (c) a truthfulness claim (referring to the degree of
honesty in our daily self-representation). Communicative action implies a mix
of these three validity claims whereby normally one aspect stands out (1976b:
66f). Whenever we raise a claim, e.g. „I hereby say that he is there‟ (truth), „I
hereby claim that killing is bad‟ (rightness) or „I hereby promise to come back‟
(truthfulness), we might get caught in an argument, have to justify and debate
the claim and, thereby, accept the „peculiar constraint-free force of the better
argument‟ (1984: 28) in order to coordinate our action. Only results of such
processes can be called rational. Due to the fact that validity claims are rooted
in communication itself, the emancipatory idea of flourishing and undamaged
intersubjectivity, provides a foundation from which we can criticise damaged
intersubjectivity and distorted communication.
Raising such criticisable claims is based on „the intuitive knowledge of
competent subjects‟ (1976b: 9). The fact that competent speakers switch
intuitively between the performative and the propositional levels of language
creates the „generative power of speech acts‟ (1976b: 34f). It establishes a
(vulnerable) social bond which provides more than the transmission of
information. It is of crucial importance to understand that through the