The southern caucasus: a struggle for

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Volume 12  Issue 1  2011

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Iran expressed the same position on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Baku and Erevan feel some

mistrust toward Tehran because Iran has a huge Azeri population but supports Armenia. However,

Tehran tried to mediate a peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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 Finally, Iran is playing its own

game in the classic Persian style among the rivals and securing its own interests.

C o n c l u s i o n s

As the world’s oil and gas dependence rises, safe and regular energy supplies will continue to be

a high priority on the world powers’ strategic agenda. In this light, the export of Caspian energy is an

alternative to Persian Gulf energy resources. Within the last 15 years, the West has invested billions

of dollars in the survey, development, and transportation of Caspian energy resources bypassing Rus-

sia, which is trying to gain a monopoly on the delivery of oil and gas from the post-Soviet area to the

world market.

The Clinton administration and the George W. Bush administration launched several strategic

programs and initiatives aimed at promoting and securing the West’s presence and thus ensuring sta-

ble energy deliveries from the Southern Caucasus. Unfortunately, the Obama administration is not

paying significant attention to the Southern Caucasus. This lack of attention from Washington is ben-

eficial to Iran and Russia but detrimental to America’s stakes in the region. The decline of Washing-

ton’s strategic attention creates an opportunity for the Tehran-Moscow axis to gradually push the U.S.

out of the region and regain full control over Caspian resources.

On the one hand, the continuation of U.S.-Iran tension means that Iran will continue to be ori-

ented toward Russia. And Iran will support Russia’s strategy to keep the region’s “frozen conflicts”

alive, because it is better for the local conflicts to remain unresolved and wait for a further opportunity

to establish pro-Russian-Iranian order than to allow the United States to solve the conflicts and create

pro-Western security order.

On the other hand, Tehran’s decision-makers clearly understand that insecurity in the South-

ern Caucasus threatens Iran. So Iran will try to avoid any involvement in the “frozen conflicts” and

minimize or eliminate any threat of other conflicts in the Central Asia. The continuation of insecu-

rity in the Southern Caucasus could directly affect Iran’s domestic policy. Moreover, the military

operations close to the Iranian borders represent a serious threat to Iran’s security. If a new war

between Azerbaijan and Armenia breaks out, the behavior of Iran’s huge Azeri population will be

unpredictable. In addition, it will not be clear how Iran’s Azeris might react to the current Tehran’s

regime, which could fall.

“We are very concerned about security in the Caucasus region, it is a rather sensitive topic for

Tehran, so we are ready to take part in solving the problematic issues in the region,” said Iranian Foreign

Minister Monouchehr Mottaki in Tbilisi at a joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Georgia

Grigol Vashadze.

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However, we can see that Iran’s foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus poses a strategic

dilemma: either to maintain the status quo and thus counter Western influence, or to facilitate the

settlement of conflicts and secure peace and stability along Iran’s borders.

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 See: A. Ramezanzadeh, op. cit.; M. Muradova, “Iran Seeks Role in Karabakh Settlement,” Johns Hopkins Univer-

sity, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Analyst, 18 March, 2010, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5291].

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 See: “FM: Iran Stands Ready to Play ‘Significant Role’ in Resolving Conflicts in Caucasus,” Trend News Agen-

cy, 11 November, 2010, available at [http://en.trend.az/print/1776791.html].

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