The southern caucasus: a struggle for

The Region’s Political Dynamics and

Iran’s Strategic Priorities

Since the Soviet Union’s breakup, we can identify two significant shifts in the geopolitical game

of the Southern Caucasus. The first is Azerbaijan’s Contract of the Century of 1995; and the second

is the Russo-Georgian war that broke out in August 2008. From our viewpoint, the first shift led to the

second, so the consequences of the event indicate that the Russo-Georgian war was unavoidable.

Azerbaijan’s Contract of the Century opened the doors to large-scale Western penetration and

investments not only in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sectors, but throughout the South Caucasian region.

And investments have brought wide and active political engagement of the West in Caucasian affairs.

The United States, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey have begun gradually fortifying their

positions and implementing several strategic programs, such as the Silk Road Strategy, Partnership

for Peace, and Eastern Partnership, as well as strengthening the Turkic identity. These programs and

sets of initiatives, such as the Caspian Guard,

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 are oriented toward establishing pro-Western security

order and ensuring Western (U.S.) interests and direct control over Caspian energy resources and energy

transportation routes.

It stands to reason that Iran regards such initiatives as a direct threat to its security. Moreover,

Iran was the first (possibly with Russia’s approval) to try and overcome the situation and stop the

West’s advance into the region, where Russia and Iran are traditional players and have common

strategic goals.

So Iran’s reaction was very clear and aggressive, as was the case in 2001 when an Iranian war-

ship forced a British Petroleum boat to return to port, or when Iranian military aircraft violated Azer-

baijan’s air borders and entered the country’s air space.

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 Moreover, only the diplomatic intervention

of Ankara and Washington prevented a full-scale war.

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 These events emphasize that Tehran was very

angry about Azerbaijan and Georgia’s pro-Western orientation, as well as about the rising influence

of the United States throughout the Caspian Basin.

It must be noted that Russia at that time was engaged in dealing with the unrest in Chechnia.

And it was possibly Chechen issues that prevented Moscow or the Tehran-Moscow axis from stop-

ping, or at least slowing down, the West’s advance.

21

 See: P. Goncharov, “U.S. in Caspian Region and Russia’s Position,” RIA Novosti, 4 May, 2005, available at [http://

en.rian.ru/analysis/20050504/39817504.html?id].

22

 See: G. Ismailova, “Azerbaijani Presidential Visit to Iran Again Postponed,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute,

Analyst, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/448].

23

 See: F. Ismailzade, “The Geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Center for World Dialogue, Global Di-

alogue, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, Summer/Autumn 2005—The Volatile Caucasus, [http://www.worlddialogue.org/

content.php?id=354].

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