The southern caucasus: a struggle for

Volume 12  Issue 1  2011

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

58

Finally, in the following years, the West was able to significantly increase its presence in the

Southern Caucasus. Moreover, Georgia directly and Azerbaijan indirectly began to speculate about

joining NATO. It was a time of hope for the local states to resolve their security issues.

So during the years after the Contract of the Century, Russia was forced to gradually retreat from

the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. And Moscow reacted very sensitively to the West’s and Asia’s

advances into these regions. Some experts emphasize that “...to counter this development, one of

Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances...”

24

 So, in our opinion, the Russo-Georgian war

possibly originated from this strategy. And Moscow’s strategic goals were clear: to stop Russia’s re-

treat, resume the strategic initiative, and ensure Russia’s interests. Unfortunately, Georgian President

Saakashvili’s miscalculations provided an opportunity to shift the balance of power and strengthen

Moscow’s security position in the region.

Finally, there is the second significant shift and the emergence of the region’s new or current

security pattern as a result of the Russo-Georgian war. The war enabled Russia to significantly strengthen

its position and influence. Moreover, Russia showed the global and regional powers that the Southern

Caucasus (like the whole of the CIS) is Russia’s Near Abroad and Moscow has the exclusive right to

use force and manage the situation in accordance with Russia’s interests. The war provided Russia

with a brilliant opportunity to resume the strategic initiative and enforce Moscow’s strategic position

in its immediate neighborhood. And now, Georgia’s and Ukraine’s advances toward NATO member-

ship have been removed from the agenda. Some scholars directly emphasize: “Western actors have in

practice been forced to recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and act only in areas

approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia.”

25

As a logical continuation of the current strategic opportunity, Russia (two years later) extended

the lease of its military base in Armenia until 2044.

26

 This was Russia’s next significant step to utilize

its advantage after the war with Georgia and thus strengthen its position in the region.

Iran, which is against any Western military presence in the region, did not make any state-

ments against Russia extending lease of its base. So Tehran’s silence means approval of such devel-

opments.

Meanwhile, Russia is accelerating its role in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

27

Obviously Russia is capitalizing on the advantages it gained as the result of the Russo-Georgian war

and is trying to establish its own security order. Finally, we can say that now the pendulum has swung

toward the Tehran-Moscow axis.

However, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s

latest visits to the Southern Caucasus have ensured the United States’ engagement in the ongoing tough

rivalry in this strategic part of the world.

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Undoubtedly, Russia’s strong position means that neither the U.S. nor NATO will able to de-

ploy military bases close to the Iranian border. The continuation of Russian dominance, therefore,

24

 M. de Haas, “Current Geostrategy in the Southern Caucasus,” Eurasianet.org, 6 January, 2007, available at [http://

www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml].

25

 K. Strachota, cooperation with W. Górecki, “The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the Russian-Georgian

War—The Geopolitical Consequences,” Center for Eastern Studies, Poland, 24 September, 2008, available at

[www.osw.waw.pl].

26

 See: “Russia Extends Lease on Military Base in Armenia through 2044,” RIA Novosti, 20 August, 2010, availa-

ble at [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html].

27

 See: “Leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement in Russia,” RT-Russia Today TV

Channel, 27 October, 2010, available at [http://rt.com/Politics/2010-10-27/azerbaijan-armenia-russia-karabakh.html].

28

 See: “Clinton’s Caucasus Campaign Gains Tepid Results,” Eurasianet.org, 5 July, 2010, available at [http://www.

eurasianet.org/node/61464]; J. Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S.

Interests,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), 16 September, 2010, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/

RL33453.pdf].

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