The southern caucasus: a struggle for

Volume 12  Issue 1  2011

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

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makers. It stands to reason that if Russia considers itself a competitor of the U.S. for global domi-

nance, Russian strategists believe that U.S.-Iranian tension, as well as America’s problems in Iraq,

the North Korean issues, and the Afghan war will weaken the United States’ global dominance and

superiority. Finally, continuation of the U.S.-Iranian hostility ensures Iran’s dependence on Mos-

cow and guarantees Tehran’s billion-dollar flow to the Kremlin, which is vital for modernizing the

old-style Russian economy.

From our perspective, the development of Iran’s foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus

demonstrates that Tehran has abandoned ideological (Islamic or Shi‘a) considerations and adopted

pragmatic (supports Russia’s policy) and regional (is developing bilateral relations) approaches to-

ward the Southern Caucasus. Iran is trying to expand its political-security and economic role in the

region. Some Iranian scholars believe that “regionalism” could be a beneficial approach in Iran’s for-

eign policy. They argue that a regional approach will strengthen Iran’s national interests at the region-

al and international levels and increase Iran’s capacity to deal with the great and regional powers.

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There can be no doubt that, by developing bilateral relations with the South Caucasian states, Iran

could significantly increase its capabilities on the international scene.

In this light, Iran considers the Southern Caucasus to be a possible and promising platform for

cooperation with the West. And this is a key strategic dimension of Iran’s foreign policy toward the

Southern Caucasus. Iran is trying to participate in large international projects (with Western partici-

pation) for producing and transporting Caspian energy resources. However, the United States strong-

ly opposes any Iranian participation, just as it opposed Iran’s involvement in Azerbaijan’s Contract of

the Century. The United States excludes any possible cooperation with Tehran due to its nuclear

ambitions and carefully monitors Iran’s behavior.

Nevertheless, Iran is establishing economic cooperation with the local countries and considers

bilateral relations to be a valuable tool for increasing political influence and strengthening strategic

positions. In this light, the cooperation between Iran and Armenia (with Russia’s blessing) is an ex-

ample of such a strategy. Undoubtedly, Iran-Armenian cooperation has key implications for the Southern

Caucasus and is an effective approach to containing Turkey’s influence, the Turkish-Azerbaijani stra-

tegic alliance,

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 and Azerbaijan’s rising economic and military power.

Obviously an improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations will decrease the role of the Tehran-

Moscow axis and weaken the axis’ significance in the region. Moreover, elimination of the Turkish-

Armenian hostility will dramatically decrease or undermine Russia’s dominance in the Southern Cau-

casus. So Turkish-Armenian reconciliation is not in keeping with Russia’s (first) or Iran’s (second)

strategic interests. And indeed, this process has already reached a deadlock.

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 Moreover, Iran is trying

to contain Turkey as a key NATO member and close U.S. ally in the Greater Middle East region,

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with respect to which Iran has its own strategic interests and political goals.

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Iran also has an extensive historical heritage for dealing with the Southern Caucasus; however,

Tehran’s capabilities are significantly limited. Iran, unlike Turkey, is not as attractive for the South

Caucasian countries because of Tehran’s tension with the U.S. This is a primary and key point. Both

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 See: K. Barzegar, “Regionalism in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” Iran Review, 8 February, 2010, available at [www.

iranreview.org/content/view/5334/37/].

17

 See: V. Masimoglu, “Turkey-Azerbaijan Strategic Alliance Treaty and Russia-Armenia Military Agreement: Sta-

tus-quo in the Southern Caucasus Remains Unchanged,”Analytics, APA News Agency, 20 August, 2010, available at [http://

en.apa.az/news.php?id=128191].

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 See: A. Grigorian, “Russian Hegemony and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution: A Quandary or an Im-

passe?” Caucasus Edition Journal, 1 October, 2010, available at [www.caucasusedition.net].

19

 See: O. Örmeci, “Caspian Weekly: Turkey’s Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference,” JDP Government

and the Greater Middle East Project, 29 May 29, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, available at [http://www.cfr.org/pub-

lication/22373/caspian_weekly.html].

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 See: K. Barzegar, op. cit.

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