The southern caucasus: a struggle for

Volume 12  Issue 1  2011

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

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some European scholars argue that Azerbaijan should be considered the key country in the region and

call for focusing or redirecting EU policy toward Azerbaijan instead of Georgia.

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Undoubtedly, Iran clearly understands Azerbaijan’s strategic importance and is trying to keep

the dialog with Baku on track. Tehran is significantly intensifying its high-level contacts, and Ira-

nian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has paid several official visits to Baku to discuss the region’s

agenda.

Azerbaijan’s rising power and its long-term cooperation with the U.S./EU and Israel greatly

concern Iran. Some experts argue that Iran prefers to see Azerbaijan remain involved in the conflict

with Armenia. In this case, as scholars believe, Azerbaijan will be “unattractive for Iran’s Azerbai-

janis and unable to allocate resources to stir up South Azerbaijan.”

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 Iran supports Azerbaijan’s ter-

ritorial integrity, but it is rendering large-scale economic assistance to Armenia. Interestingly, Iran, as

a Shi‘a state, is carrying out a so-called “double track” policy toward the Azerbaijan Republic (87%

are Shi‘a Moslems). Tehran possibly considers the “double track” policy to be an effective approach

toward containing the Azerbaijan Republic , which is becoming a new regional power. Moreover, Iran’s

decision-makers think that Azerbaijan’s involvement in the conflict with Armenia is helping to con-

tain Turkey and the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic alliance, which covers energy, transportation, eco-

nomic, political, and military issues.

Meanwhile, prolongation of the Turkish-Armenian hostility is an important element in Tehran’s

calculations to keep Ankara under pressure and limit the projection of Turkish power onto the South-

ern Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand, Turkish-Armenian hostility is increasing Tehran’s

strategic significance for Armenia and Russia.

Finally, Iran is capitalizing on the political and economic advantages gained from the current

deadlock situation in relations between the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance and Armenia.

The main economic benefits are to retain Iran as a valuable exporter for the Armenian market

and a vital transportation route that links Armenia with Iran’s Persian Gulf ports. Meanwhile, the

political advantages are enormous: to counterbalance Azerbaijan’s alliance with Turkey; to reshape

Tehran’s image; and to facilitate U.S.-Iran rapprochement with assistance from the Armenian diaspo-

ra. And this point is a key strategic element in Tehran’s efforts to keep its relations with Erevan on

track.

It should be noted that Iran kept silent about the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Some scholars

think that “behind Iran’s official silence is a combination of factors. These range from Iran’s common

cause with Moscow against expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), interpret-

ing this crisis as a major setback for NATO’s ‘eastward expansion’ in light of the unabashed pro-West

predilections of Tbilisi’s government, to Iran’s sensitivity to Russia’s national security concerns.”

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Iran’s position in the Georgian crisis notwithstanding, Iranian-Georgian relations are now rapidly

developing. So, according to Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze: “Our relations have

entered a new phase.” And at a joint news conference in Tbilisi on 27 May, 2010, Iranian Foreign

Affairs Ministry’s Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast (who is a deputy minister) added that Georgia

and Iran intend to resume direct air flights, cancel visa requirements for travelers, and open an Iranian

consulate in Batumi. Moreover, as he has mentioned, the Iranian side “unconditionally supports Geor-

gia’s territorial integrity.”

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 See: S. Meister, op. cit.

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 B. Shaffer, “Iran’s Role in the Southern Caucasus and Caspian Basin: Diverging Views of the U.S. and Europe,”

Belfer Center, Harvard University, July 2003, available at [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/].

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 K. Afrasiabi, “Iran Gambles over Georgia’s Crisis,” Asia Times, 16 August, 2010, available at [http://www.

atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JH16Ak01.html].

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 Quoted from: V. Socor, “Georgia Develops Functional Relations With Iran,” Georgian Daily, 27 May, 2010, avail-

able at [http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18724&Itemid=132].

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