The southern caucasus: a struggle for

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Volume 12  Issue 1  2011

59

is of strategic significance for Iran’s foreign and security policy and is beneficial to both Tehran

and Moscow because of their common strategic priorities in the Southern Caucasus, which are as

follows:

— To counter and reduce U.S. influence;

— To oppose the current and long-term objectives of the U.S., NATO, and EU;

— To contain EU influence and oppose the EU’s strategic initiatives;

— To prevent the deployment of U.S. or NATO military bases;

— To oppose Israeli cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan;

— To stop a Georgian and Azerbaijani drift toward NATO/EU membership;

— To make security arrangements in accordance with Iran’s (and Russia’s) strategic interests;

— To ensure control over Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes;

— To contain the rising influence of Turkey and the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance;

— To prolong Turkish-Armenian hostility;

— To oppose long-term strategic cooperation in the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle;

— To maintain a strategic balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia and thus contain Azerbai-

jan’s rise to a regional power;

— To support Russia’s leading role in Caucasian and Caspian affairs and thus maintain the cur-

rent status-quo.

Finally, it is beneficial for Iran to maintain the status-quo and support Russian dominance. Iran,

in this case, will be able to ensure its paramount strategic goal: to limit or decrease U.S. influence and

thus prevent America’s attempts to redesign the region’s political landscape and secure Washington’s

dominance.