7
and the continuing relevance of the central conception on which his psychology and Mill’s
own Logic was founded—the ‘association of ideas’—but would help roll back the influence of
the ‘intuitionists’, who, since the arrival in Britain of Kantian thought in the works of Samuel
Taylor Coleridge and Sir William Hamilton, had threatened to undermine the ‘Experience-
philosophy’ (Bain 1882: 82) of the British empirical tradition” (Cairns Craig 2015, p. 96).
From a basic associationist viewpoint, two kinds of “feelings” represent the two
fundamental steps preceding human action. The first is a sensation, reflecting the interaction
between our senses and our environment; the second is an idea, which is a “copy”, a “trace”,
a “representation”, or even an “image” of the sensation which remains after the sensation has
vanished (James Mill 1829, vol. 1, p. 52). It follows that a mental pleasure comes from an idea,
whereas a corporeal one, comes from a sensation. The latter is always rooted in the present;
it is experienced physically, through the working of sensations. In other words, it is always
instantaneous. But once the object of sensations stops, pleasure is gone. By contrast, an idea
exists as soon as the object of sensations is not present anymore: we can think about such an
object either forward or backwards in time. Better: not only the object of pleasure can be
contemplated in the past or in the future, but it can also, thanks to the laws of associations,
be associated with many and different things, which will render the idea of pleasure higher
than the pleasurable sensation itself. Take an example. I drink water: this is a pleasurable
sensation. If I think about such pleasure, I have a mere idea of pleasure. But this mental
pleasure tends to be naturally associated with another ideas we can have. For instance, it can
be associated with the idea of style – how I drink the water –, or the idea of solitude – if I drink
alone –, or the idea of others – if I usually drink in community or society –, or even the idea of
“beautiful” – I can imagine to drink water in an arid, silent, and magnificent desert. In that
sense, an idea is much more dynamic and perfectible than a sensation, in that it can be
associated with everything which makes sense to us. In other words, an idea has the potential
to converge toward an “infinite” configurations of associations even if human beings cannot
experience actual infinity, like in the Aristotelian and Millians senses
10
. Let us not forget that
“(t)he pleasure may be in company or connection with things infinite in variety” (Mill 1835,
pp. 389-390): mental pleasures allow the emergence of such great connections, whereas it is
not the case for the the bodily ones. If one pays attention to the idea that a difference of
degree can become a difference in kind via the laws of associations, then the idea of pleasure
is higher in kind compared to the pleasurable sensation, but the essence of all this remains
pleasure.
This is not the end of the analysis. From an associationist point of view, a pleasurable
sensation has necessarily antecedents or causes. How and why can we desire to know such
causes? The answer is that our mind is deeply interested into the causes of pleasurables
sensations than sensations themselves (James Mill 1829, vol. 2, p. 188). Provided we have a
serious belief or idea of the remote causes of pleasures, indeed, these causes become to us
pleasant in themselves, independently of their consequences. Such causes may be popular
and risked if they render ourselves blind, such as wealth and power. But they may also be our
10
It is interesting to note that Jonathan Ryan (2010) draws on the idea of infinity in John Stuart Mill, who was
very close to that of his father, but in order to claim the fundamental difference between John Stuart Mill’s
hedonism and the standard one in classical utilitarianism.
8
fellow-creatures.
11
Knowing that, like the mere instance of water, the causes may be
associated with “infinite other ideas. We can then understand why John Stuart Mill considered
his father “never varied in rating intellectual enjoyments above all others, even in their value
as pleasures” (John Stuart Mill 1873, p. 50). Drawing implicitly on his father’s and Bain’s
psychology, John Stuart provides a good synthesis of the idea according to which mental
pleasure is superior to bodily one. “(T)hose persons, things, and positions, which are the
causes or habitual concomitants of pleasurable sensations to us (...) become in themselves
pleasant to us by association; and through the multitude and variety of the pleasurable ideas
associated with them, become pleasures of greater constancy and even intensity, and
altogether more valuable to us, than any of the primitive pleasures of our constitution” (John
Stuart Mill 1861, p. 236; See also Quincy 1980, p. 469-470).
Let us come back now to the relation between calculation and pleasure. Bentham already
remarked that the fact of expecting pleasure may be pleasurable in itself, independently of
future consequences. “The pleasures of expectation”, he wrote, “are the pleasures that result
from the contemplation of any sort of pleasure, referred to time future, and accompanied
with the sentiment of belief” (Bentham 1823, pp. 36-37). In the terminology of James and John
Stuart Mill, such pleasures would correspond to the mental ones. Indeed, it is because ideas
are related to time, either backward-looking ― remembering past states ― or forward-
looking ― anticipating consequences from antecedents ―, that we can contemplate any sort
of future ― or past ― pleasures. Sensations, to the contrary, do not have such dimension in
themselves. Returning to the mere instance of water, the fact of expecting to drink water in a
desert is therefore a mental pleasure. It follows that the felicific calculus related to the mere
instance of water implies at least mental pleasure. Nowadays, and in the times of the Mills,
criticisms in the field usually neglected such a process, by rather focusing on the result of the
calculus, that is, in our case, the corporeal pleasure generated by the fact of drinking water,
provided the calculus is not misleading.
It still needs to underline a last but substantial point, that is, the fact that the calculation
ought obviously to include other-regarding aspects to be moral. James Mill provided a good
synthesis of what is a moral calculation, characterized by the following “requisite”: the agent
ought to expect beneficial consequences from his act by having “a conviction of its general
utility” (James Mill 1835, p. 321).
In a nutshell, the essential points shown in this part are the following:
1)
Morality is a matter of calculation.
2)
The role of pleasure is conclusive in their understanding of the decision process:
pleasure determines action either directly as a sensation or indirectly as an idea.
3)
There is a difference in kind, resulting from the laws of association, between a mental
pleasure and a bodily one, but the essence is still pleasure.
4)
Independently of its consequences after the intended action, the felicific calculus
implies mental pleasure.
5)
The calculation ought to incorporate other-regarding aspects to be moral.
Though it is possible that individuals remain animals, the Mills were convinced that all
human beings were potentially, in proper conditions, progressive beings seeking excellence in
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I will come back and develop this point in the second part of the paper.