3
Autobiography, there seems to me no reasons why this should be considered as an act of filial
piety; as well as when he acknowledged the importance of the principle of utility in
Utilitarianism. Second, John Stuart would misunderstand his father’s hedonism. In view of his
special Utilitarian education and the fact that he was an attentive reader and commentator of
James Mill’s major works on psychology and philosophy, such as Analysis of the Phenomena
of the Human Mind (1829) and
Fragment on Mackintosh (1835), this could seem a bit
excessive, though possible. Anyway an inquiry is needed in order to understand their
conceptions of hedonism. Some authors have put into perspective John Stuart Mill’s
heterodoxy by recalling his radical background (Keith. H. Quincy 1980; Frederick Rosen 2003;
Antis Loizides 2014). In the “continuation” of their approach ― in the sense that I focus my
speech on the intellectual relation between a father and his elder son ―, the aim of this paper
is to reconstruct their conception of hedonism in order to know whether they are compatible
or close. Drawing on their associationist background, my main result is that the three
departments of what John Stuart Mill called “the art of life” (John Stuart Mill 1843b, p. 949)
― morality, expediency, and aesthetic ― cannot bypass the part the felicific calculus plays in
the decision process.
The first section shows that morality is expressed in and by calculation. It shows that any
moral actions should presuppose an intention, which James & John Stuart Mill defined as the
process into which we anticipate the consequences of our future actions for others and
ourselves. Above all, I claim that it is the emergence of ideas, on which calculation rests upon,
that distinguishes the higher from the lower pleasures, and that this allows to reconsider the
controversy between qualitative and quantitative hedonism. The second section explains that
the calculation plays obviously an important part of the department of expediency: a good
calculation rests upon the acquisition of virtues, such as prudence. But this can lead to two
different directions. The first is a “simple expedient” action, that is, narrowed self-regarding
actions; the second is a “general expedient” one, then including other-regarding aspects, so
that they are related to the domain of morality. The third section suggests that the domain of
aesthetic ― beautiful or noble actions, or disinterested actions ― is not incompatible with the
fact of calculating by habit, without being aware of the process. As strange as it sounds, the
argument is that we can follow things for themselves, whereas it is the result of an
unconscious calculation formed by deeply rooted habits. At last, I conclude by suggesting that
the so-called orthodox definition of happiness according to which it is “intended pleasure”
(John Stuart Mill 1861, p. 210) is fully compatible with the art of life, since it includes the notion
of calculation through that of intention.
1.
Calculation and morality
Here I claim that calculation appears in the foundation of morality (§1.1.) and to some
extent in its end, the highest pleasures (§1.2.).
4
1.1.
Morality as an attribute of calculation
It is today usually agreed that Classical Utilitarianism implies a kind of consequentialism. It
is interesting to recall that in their vocabulary and systems of thought, it is the contrary: the
morality of action depends on its intention (Victor Bianchini 2016). But their understanding of
intention is quite stange for a modern reader: they reduced it to a complex process through
which we expect the pleasurable consequences of our future action. Without calculation,
therefore, we cannot talk about intention and morality. This idea appears clearly in James
Mill’s Fragment on Mackintosh (1835, p. 161), which is the result of a length critic Mill wrote
about Sir James Mackintosh’s Dissertation on the progress of Ethical Philosophy chiefly during
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (1829).
2
Some years later, by commenting his
father’s
Analysis,
John Stuart Mill will acknowledge such understanding of intention by
claiming that it is “intention, that is, the foresight of consequences, which constitutes the
moral rightness or wrongness of the act” (John Stuart Mill 1869a, p. 253).
3
He also underlined
it in the second chapter of
Utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill 1861, p. 220), though he will quote
Bentham on this matter
4
, which can explain why we also found the reference in his Essay on
Bentham, when he wrote “the morality of an action depends on its foreseeable
consequences” (John Stuart Mill 1838, p. 112). Henry Sidgwick will also adopt the same
understanding of intention in his Methods of Ethics (Henry Sidgwick 1907, p. 202), so that this
will open the path to Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe’s vehement critics on the field
in her essay entitled “Modern moral philosophy” and published in 1958.
More generally, the matter of expectation for the Mills was fundamental to psychology,
on which morality rests upon. It is a “psychological truth”, proved by experience, John Stuart
claimed in his treatise on Hamilton’s philosophy, “that the human mind is capable of
Expectation”, formed by the complex association of previous and actual sensations, which are
often learnt by experience (John Stuart Mill 1865a, p. 177). Such psychological truth founds
the domain of morality. James & John Stuart Mill could not understand that morality may be
expressed without calculated action. “When I ask myself”, James Mill wrote, “what morality
not acting is ― I cannot find an answer. Morality not acting appears to me to be the negation
of morality” (James Mill 1835, p. 3). The Mills did not believe in the “passive” morality but
rather in the “active” one; the moral individual is an active one and not a passive one. To be
moral, we ought to have an impact on the real world of events. This is why they considered
2
The critique initially took the form of “severe” letters intended for Mackintosh. But further to unexpected
Mackintosh’s death, the letters seemed to Mill “incongruous”, so that the latter decided to change the form of
the writing. This change gave birth to the Fragment ― see the preface of the Fragment (1835, pp. iii-iv); see also
Mill’s letter to Brougham, written the 27 August 1834, quoted in Bain (1882, pp. 372-374).
3
John Stuart nevertheless remained sceptikal about his father’s relation between desire and intention.
4
Recall that Bentham devoted already several passages to the question of intention in his Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation. The chapter especially and explicitly devoted to that question is the eighth
(Bentham 1781, pp. 82-88). Besides distinguishing intention with regard to the action itself from intention with
regard to its consequences, he also distinguished consequences which are “directly intended” from those which
are “obliquely” intended. Though James & John Stuart Mill quoted Bentham on the question of intention, it
seems that they had a “simpler” comprehension of the term. According to them, intention is a kind of calculation
of the pleasurable consequences of an action. This seems to me enough for the purpose of this chapter, in that
James & John Stuart Mill viewed morality as a matter of calculation. I try to deal with the more general question
of intention in Classical Utilitarianism in Bianchini (2016).