On August 15, 1996,
Maruyama Masao, leading Japanese
political scientist and scholar of the history of political
thought, died at the age of eighty-two. His profound writ-
ings, extensive research, and active lecturing made him a
formidable presence not only in the sequestered halls of
academia but in the broad movement for democratization
of post-World War II Japan.
He did seminal studies on the philosophical and psy-
chological background of Japanese ultranationalism, po-
litical thought in the Edo period (1603–1868), and the
nature of government. The depth and breadth of his work
are being made clear with the on-going publication of
Maruyama Masao shû [Collected Works of Maruyama
Masao] (Iwanami Shoten), which began in 1995 and is to
be completed in 16 volumes.
Maruyama died on a day that carries special meaning
for Japanese as the anniversary of the defeat in World
War II. On August 15, 1945, the Japanese government,
which had accepted the Potsdam Declaration (the terms of
Japanese surrender as defined by the Allied Powers), in-
formed the people of the surrender through a radio mes-
sage by the Emperor himself. That day marked not just
the defeat of the nation but the failure of the moderniza-
tion drive that had started at the beginning of the Meiji era
(1868–1912). Aimed at catching up with Europe and the
United States under the slogan of “enrich the country and
strengthen the military,” that drive ultimately led to the
rise of militarism and the nation’s plunge into a senseless
war.
Maruyama’s scholarship as a whole was aimed at pro-
viding theoretical and practical prescriptions for the
proper course for postwar Japan, as well as finding out
why Japanese modernization led so inexorably to the na-
tion’s defeat. Even his major work on the transformation
of Confucianism during the Edo period,
Nihon seiji
shisôshi kenkyû (Tôkyô Daigaku Shuppankai,1952; tr.,
Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan,
1974) may be considered part of, or at least an introduc-
tion to, that endeavor.
That August 15 had symbolic meaning for Maruyama is
reflected in a lecture he gave right after the “automatical
approval” in June 1960 of new U.S.-Japanese security
treaty in the Diet despite vehement popular opposition.
The title of the lecture was “Fukusho no setsu” [A Dis-
course on the “Return to the Beginning”], deriving from a
phrase favored by ancient Chinese Confucian scholars,
fukusei fukusho (Ch. fuhsing fuch’u, or “the recovery of
[originally good] nature and the return to beginnings”).
For Maruyama, who felt that the forced passage of the
treaty meant the process of postwar democratization had
become dead letter, the “beginning” that Japan had to re-
turn to was August 1945.
It is true that after the war the institutions of democracy
were established in Japan under the new Constitution. The
prewar emperor state, placing the emperor at the summit
of politics and society, was changed to a democratic state
with sovereignty residing in the people. Even before the
war, democracy was emergent, in the early-Meiji freedom
and popular rights movement and the “Taishô democracy”
that flourished in the years immediately after World War
I. But these movements were based on the assumption
that the people were the subjects of the emperor. Only
after the end of World War II was democracy established
with sovereign power invested in the people.
That democracy, however, was not so much acquired as
a result of the desire and efforts of the people as some-
thing gratuitously bestowed on them by the Allied forces
led by the United States. Because of this, some have
dubbed postwar democracy “Occupation democracy” and
they criticize the Constitution, the basis of that system, as
a charter thrust upon the Japanese people by the United
States. This kind of criticism was often cited by oppo-
nents of postwar democracy taking advantage of the “re-
verse-course” policies adopted by the Occupation after the
start of the Cold War, and they are loudly heard today as
well.
To argue that postwar democracy should be scrapped
because it was imposed by the Occupation and that a new
Constitution must be created by Japanese themselves be-
cause the current one was forced upon them from outside
violates the normal rules of logic. The important question
is not how democracy was introduced but how Japanese
give substance to it.
Appeal to Individual Conscience
Maruyama’s self-imposed task was to inject life into the
institutions of democracy that had thus been established
and to implant a genuine spirit of democracy in people’s
minds. Not only Maruyama but Ôtsuka Hisao (1907–96),
Kawashima Takeyoshi (1909–92), and many others
poured their energies into work outside the world of
scholarship in the endeavor to build up solid bastions of
democracy from within. They claimed that having estab-
lished the apparatus of democracy marked but the halfway
point in the process of democratization, and that only after
each and every citizen grew mature enough to support
democracy would it be here to stay.
For example, Ôtsuka Hisao, scholar of Western eco-
nomic history and Weberian thought, emphasized the role
of human ethos in modernization, arguing that in order for
democracy to strike root in Japan it needed to be widely
sustained by the modern and democratic ethos (or ethics)
of the people. (Kindaika no ningenteki kiso [The Human
Basis for Modernization], Chikuma Shobô, 1968).
Kawashima Takeyoshi, authority on civil law, asserted
that democratization of Japan could not be achieved
without abolishing the family system that had supported
the prewar emperor-system state and changing the feudal-
istic family-centered consciousness of the people (Nihon
shakai no kazokuteki kôsei [The Family Structure of
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Japanese Book News
Number 17
Maruyama Masao and Democracy in Japan
Mamiya Yôsuke