Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

3. Rapprochement: rationales and limits

During almost the whole decade of the 1990s, while the EU was gradually becoming more 'visible' from Moscow, Russia's debates on Europe were nevertheless focused upon NATO. The EU was regarded as being the most powerful economic entity on the continent, but its political role seemed rather limited. Indeed, answers to a number of key questions remained unclear:

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  To what extent is the EU able to translate its economic potential into political influence?
  
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  To what extent deserves the EU attention as an integrated international actor rather than a structure for defining a common denominator of national policies that otherwise operate individually?
  
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  To what extent is the changing international landscape in Europe affected by the EU rather than by other multilateral mechanisms (among which NATO has undoubtedly the most prominent place)?
  

But at the turn of centuries, the ascendant trend in Russia's relations with the EU becomes more discernible. To a considerable extent, this trend is generated by the growing international personality of the EU and the overall CFSP problematique. On the Russian side, this was promoted by several new motives in assessing the desirability of rapprochement with the EU—in addition to more general considerations addressed in the previous chapter.

New motives

The 'Euro-enthusiasm' does not necessarily represent an exclusively intra-EU phenomenon; at times, this notion could be also appropriate for describing the views on the EU from outside. In this respect, Russia's views do not represent any exception. The EU dynamics is regarded as an impressive manifestation of its viability and sustainability. The very fact of the EU attractiveness to most of the European countries searching for a membership in this organization is perceived as a convincing proof of its promising international future. 'Schengen' and 'Maastricht', 'euro' and 'enlargement' have become symbols of the vision of the future EU incorporating most of Europe's financial, industrial, technological, demographic, political potential. In a sense, the prospects of the EU look more shiny and encouraging from outside (in this case, from Russia) than it may be the case for internal observers and analysts. However, this perception seems to become prevailing in Russia's thinking about the EU.

A new theme appears in evaluating the role of the EU as economic power—the role that is regarded as more and more meaningful. As it was said earlier, this is certainly related to Russia's considerable dependence on the EU in terms of trade, investments, credits, indebtedness and so on. But there is also growing understanding that even such a 'strictly economic' view on the EU should not be only associated with Russia's immediate interests.

Indeed, the economic dimension of the international relations is assessed as becoming increasingly important, with the emerging post-bipolar international system being strongly affected by trends in financial and technological developments rather than by the traditional 'high politics' agenda. All Russia's affection with respect to the latter notwithstanding, the need of the 'economization' of foreign policy is one of the most fashionable themes in the on-going debates in Russia on its international activities. Within this dimension, the EU is undoubtedly one of the strongest international poles, and Russia's prospects will increasingly depend on how successful it is in relations with this 'economic superpower'. Suffice it to mention once again that in deliberations on Russia's access to the WTO the EU is often viewed as much more important interlocutor than anyone else.

In addition, it has become clear during the last two to three years that the EU is expanding not only to new territories but also to new functional areas. A qualitative breakthrough in this respect is associated with post-St.Malo developments and the evolving Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP). Here again, Russian observers might both exaggerate and misinterpret the character of this new phenomenon in the framework of the EU. But what nevertheless seems to them obvious is the fact that the EU is entering an area that used to be 'prohibited' to integration policy and was the exclusive domain of either national policies or NATO. This is regarded as a serious argument for anticipating the EU to become a 'real' international actor, if not to view it as a superpower in the making.

One more incentive for promoting the salience of the EU in Russia's international perceptions has emerged from Moscow's painful concentration upon various issues associated with NATO (enlargement, military campaign in Kosovo, new strategic concept and so on). Indeed, in the second half of 1990s Russia's negativism with respect to NATO became so powerful and overwhelming that any real or imaginable alternative to it started to seem attractive and deserving support and encouragement. This, in particular, had implications for Russia's attitudes towards the EU—attitudes that became a profiteer of Russia's obsessive anti-NATO syndrome.

The overall worsening of Russian-American relations in the second half of the 1990s has generated similar effect. Moscow perceived the 'Russian' policy of the USA during the second term of President Clinton as increasingly arrogant and unfriendly. Furthermore, the access to power of Republicans with President Bush Jr. has given even more food to this feeling. The EU looks attractive in comparison to the USA; frustration and indignation towards the latter has a by-product in promoting more sympathy towards the former.

In a sense, Russia has engaged in a kind of a zero-sum-game in developing its assessments of, and attitudes towards western multilateral structures operating in Europe: 'more EU' means 'less NATO', and vice versa. This vision may proceed from sophisticated calculations or ill-grounded illusions (or, else, from their mixture)—but the result in any case supports the 'pro-EU' logic in foreign policy thinking.

At the global level, Russia's positive and even supportive attitude towards the EU fits well in the vision of a multipolar world that is so dear to many Russian analysts, observers and politicians and that was even politically upgraded to remain, for a while, a quasi-official foreign policy ideology of the country²³. This is closely related to the whole plethora of Russia's complexes with respect to the United States (the challenging unilateralism of 'the only remaining superpower', its disregard of the international law, its alleged pretensions to operate as demiurge on the international scene, and so on). The strengthening of the EU, according to this line of thinking, will make the international system more balanced and less US-centric—which could only be in the interests of Russia.

Moreover, Moscow might believe that the EU, in line with similar considerations, could find partnership with Russia appealing and responding to its own long-term interests. Western Europe will certainly need some time to understand that 'without weighty contribution of Russia, the European integration is doomed to stagnation and regress, whereas hopes for re-establishing an independent and influential Europe in the globaliazing world will only remain hopes'²⁴. It is argued, however, that the EU, while promoting its international personality, will need interaction with influential actors in the world arena in any case—which is in fact a constant theme in some publications and statements of EU officials, in particular High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana²⁵. If so, Russia might be an attractive partner, even if only due to its still non-negligible, even if declining, role in world politics.

This 'arithmetic' is reinforced by some substantive considerations on the character of the EU international horizon. The latter also is believed to be defined in terms of multipolarity (which would allow the EU to become more 'visible') and the need for reducing the predominance of the United States by promoting some counterweights. As a Russian analyst put it, 'the ambitious aspirations of the EU […] make the latter balance its relations with the USA by developing relations with Russia'²⁶. However adequate or misleading this specific assessment might be, the EU anticipated 'responsiveness' towards Moscow's expectations is a significant factor of Russian policy with respect to the EU.

Incentives for making 'pro-EU' tones stronger in Russia's motivation seemed so considerable that they even overtook the opposite logic generated by the conceptual evolution of the country's foreign policy. Indeed, while Russia's simplistic 'pro-westernism' of the early-1990s gives place to a search for a more coherent self-identification on the international scene, opposite extremes of 'anti-westernism' are often viewed as an attractive alternative to humiliating submission. In principle, this pendulum-type trajectory of Russia's foreign policy could have influenced Russia's attitudes towards the EU by making them more arrogant and suspicious-minded. What has happened in reality is just the contrary—in spite of the fact that within this 'pendulum model' Russia is nowadays in the counter-phase towards its own policy of the early-1990s.

Russia's 'opening' towards the EU has been also considerably promoted by the EU 'opening' towards Russia, its proclaimed intention to deal with Russia more consistently and cooperatively. For Russia, experiencing various complexes due to the feeling of being treated unfairly or with neglect, such manifestations of interest and attention are perceived as important political and psychological assets. This compensatory function has become particularly valuable in the early days of President Bush Jr. administration, with its proclaimed determination to downgrade Russia's role in the system of the US foreign policy priorities. Here again, the 'zero-sum' logic was developing additional incentives for rapprochement between Russia and the EU, making the former more predisposed towards upgrading its ties with the latter alongside the anticipated erosion of Russian-American relations.