Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

4. Emerging mechanisms

As mentioned earlier, the overall disappointment with respect to the West that seemed to prevail in Russian thinking by the end of 1990s could have affected attitudes towards the EU—indeed, making some Russians believe that it was only using supportive language to engage in a rhetorical exercises with no substance. That's why it was important that the practical developments would not give grounds for such a kind of assessments. By and large, Russians do seem to appreciate that in recent years the EU and Russia have made important steps towards each other on the political level and, even more importantly, have consolidated this movement institutionally.

Indeed, until recently, the political interaction of the EU and Russia has been practically non-existent. The last several years, however, have considerably changed this situation. Moreover, various forms of this interaction have appeared, and this variety in itself represents a formidable phenomenon in relations between Russia and the EU.

Political dialogue

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1997 created a solid legal basis for relationship between the EU and Russia. Although this document may be vulnerable for criticism in terms of its practical importance as well as in terms of the readiness of both sides to implement its provisions, the PCA did design some new prospects in relations between the EU and Russia. This concerns, in particular, the EU—Russia political dialogue that was introduced by the PCA.

The political dialogue, as it was envisaged by the PCA, had to be developed as a four-layers structure of cooperation: semi-annual Russia—EU summits, annual sessions of the Cooperation Council at the level of ministers of foreign affairs, sessions of the Cooperation Committee (at the level of senior officials) and subcommittees on various issues, and sessions of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee with participation of members from the State Duma and the European Parliament. In practice, even a broader framework started to take shape.

This includes, in particular, consultations between lower level officials, as well as contacts between Russian governmental officials and representatives of the EU 'troika'. Noteworthy, both sides seem to consider positively the prospects of further 'deepening' and 'widening' of political interactions at a working level—that is, with the intention to provide them a business-like character. This concerns, for instance, ideas of involving Russian diplomats in activities of the EU Council's working groups (which was initiated by the EU side), as well as 'updating' the political dialogue in the light of the Amsterdam treaty (by promoting Russia's interaction with new CFSP-related institutions).

Furthermore, alongside the developments of the CESDP, the political dialogue was officially broadened to include security matters²⁷. A special declaration 'on strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe' was adopted by the EU Russia summit in October 2000 in Paris. In particular, it was envisaged to:

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  institute specific consultations on security and defence matters at the appropriate level and in the appropriate format;
  
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  develop strategic dialogue on matters, particularly in regard to security, which have implications for the Russian Federation and the European Union;
  
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  extend the scope of regular consultations at expert level on the issues of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation;
  
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  promote cooperation in operational crisis management.
  

One year later, it was decided to introduce an additional channel of operational interaction between the Russian Foreign Minister and the EU High Representative for CFSP by carrying out regular meeting on the level Political and Security Committee (COPS) and Russian representatives. Also, the parties set consultations on crisis-management and crisis prevention to be held every month between COPS 'troika' and Russia. The first two meetings within this unprecedented pattern were carried out in November and December 2001.

By and large, the dialogue between Russia and the EU has already become a routine—which, in a sense, testifies to its consolidation. As many other aspects of cooperation between the EU and Russia, it could be criticized for failing to achieve any significant results or turning into a decoration deprived of serious substance; indeed, some Russian analysts believe that both sides appreciate the form of the dialogue rather than its content²⁸. However, the very fact of establishing a political infrastructure between the EU and Russia seems meaningful. Besides setting up channels of communication, this infrastructure is turning the exchange of views into a 'normal' practice. If successful, this development might also be instrumental in promoting a certain 'instinct of coordination', even if this takes time and does not promise quick results.

In this case, a parallel might be drawn with the European Political Cooperation in the period of its shaping, in early 1970s. Indeed, the EPC was also criticized for modest results (if not their absence) and formalistic character, but in retrospect there are all grounds to believe that this was a necessary preliminary step towards the future CFSP.

If the political dialogue is not evaluated by unrealistic criteria and is not expected to bring about the results that it cannot generate in principle, this pattern is generally assessed by Russian analysts as a significant success in the EU—Russia relationship²⁹. In a sense, this pattern has a unique character, at least as far as Russia is concerned; indeed, there is no other multilateral structure with which Moscow would have such kind of institutionalized political relationship or even anything approaching to it. Even within the CIS that is officially considered Russia's main priority in the field of foreign policy, similar patterns are still to be built. One might argue that this means a kind of 'special relationship' and even 'privileged partnership' between Russia and the EU—an exaggeration that however has not emerged on an empty ground.

One peculiar characteristic of the political dialogue between Russia and the EU should be underlined—namely, that it fits in a non-traditional way into both Russia's external interactions and those of the EU.

On the EU side, the very fact that the political dialogue was introduced by the PCA means that in principle it is to be governed by regulations, norms and institutions of 'standard' patterns of external policies of the EU. However, the agenda of the political dialogue goes far beyond the traditional scope of problems that are being dealt with by the EU Commission. In fact, the mechanism of the political dialogue on the EU side is composed by elements from both the first and the second 'pillars' of the Union, and allows the involvement of the third one as well. Furthermore, this promotes their cooperation, but also creates some problems regarding their respective competences and responsibilities. From this point of view, the EU-Russia political dialogue has certain implications for the EU internal developments, however limited the influence of this factor might be.

On Russia's side, similar 'traditionalist' logic implied that the responsibility for dealing with the EU should be entrusted, within the governmental mechanism, to the functional divisions dealing with external economic relations. Indeed, on the level of the Government, the deputy prime minister³⁰ dealing with economics supervises Russia's overall relations with the EU, including political dialogue. However, within the Ministry of foreign affairs, 'the EU folder' is in the Department for all-European cooperation (DOS)—the one that is focused upon political rather than economic issues.

In other words, both sides seem to proceed from the assumption that bureaucratic 'compartmentalization' should not undermine the very idea of political dialogue as it was designed. In practice, its agenda goes much further than 'low politics' presume and is to a very considerable extent devoted to the CFSP matters.

In fact, this ingredient of the PCA, from its very beginning, looked as an instrument of initiating, maintaining and promoting Russia's interaction with the CFSP rather than with the 'traditional' segment of the EU mechanism. At the same time, the political dialogue seems to reflect the long-standing (since the Maastricht Treaty) and still continuing problem—that of the appropriate positioning and combination of three EU pillars. It fits into the intention to integrate various parts of the EU mechanism and make them more interrelated, which is manifested, in particular, by the parallel involvement of the EU Commission and the Council in the development of the political dialogue.

It is true that this parallelism may be accompanied by a legitimate question: whether the political dialogue only looks cooperative and substantive while in fact only incarnating certain symbolism. However, in external policy interactions symbolism does matter. Indeed, Russia interacts with the EU as such on traditional foreign policy matters and across the whole spectrum of the foreign policy making process. For instance, Russia's Ministry of foreign affairs considers the embassy of the country holding the 6-months presidency in the EU council as representing in Moscow the interests of the whole Union—which is manifested even in day-to-day interactions, bureaucratic practices and diplomatic protocol. This in itself becomes a kind of external legitimization for the CFSP.

Finally, one more dimension of political interaction between Russia and the EU should be mentioned as representing significant potential, the one that involves the parliamentary structures of both sides. Russia's Federal Assembly regards this development positively—first, as a means of increasing its own importance within the political space in Russia, and secondly, in the light of the growing role of the European Parliament within the EU political system.