Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

In search for points of reference

The initial euphoria with respect to anticipated 'entente cordiale' with the West did not last long. Explanations differ as to what extent this was due to the very fact of having a simplified approach towards the international life and excessive optimism of the post-cold war over-excitement—or, alternatively, to the mishandling of the emerging issues by various involved countries, including (or even beginning with) Russia itself. But one thing is obvious: very soon Russia started to reflect on its own international interests in a more specific way, rather than proceeding from the assumption that they are fully identical to those of major western international actors.

This was a painful process, since in many respects Moscow's foreign policy found itself disoriented and deprived of clear points of reference. However, it would be unfair to reproach Russian foreign policy makers and thinkers for the frustration that reflected the fundamental changes being experienced by the country. Indeed, it had entered a phase of profound transition: the highly centralized economy based on the overwhelming predominance of state ownership was to give way to a market economy; the totalitarian political system was to be transformed into a democracy; and what used to be a single country—the USSR—had been replaced by 15 new independent states, with the patterns of relations among them still to be crystallized.

None of these processes was complete or produced any relatively stable pattern which certainly created a highly volatile situation. Previous values, beliefs, structures, institutions, links, economic mechanisms and behavioural patterns had been either destroyed or discredited, while new ones were either non-existent or just beginning to emerge. In these circumstances, uncertainty and inconsistency in external policy were inevitable opening up the way for different scenarios of relations between Russia and the outside world.

Replacing the political terminology of the communist period with a thin layer of democratic rhetoric was certainly not sufficient for creating a solid conceptual basis on which to build an effective foreign policy. At the same time, the legacy of the past could not disappear instantaneously; inertia persisted on various levels and in various spheres: perceptions and norms, enduring empire/superpower mentality, a clear sympathy of powerful interest groups for isolationist protectionism or even confrontational assertiveness rather than for openness, adaptation and cooperation.

With respect to Europe, gradually getting rid of the old obsessions, suspicions and fears with regard to the West was certainly essential for clearing the way for a pan-European pattern which could include Russia among the international actors operating on the continent. However, although the collapse of the old regime made Russia ideologically closer to Europe, it was not necessarily making the two more compatible. Ironically, even the contrary may prove true: it had been sufficient for the former Soviet Union simply to proclaim its 'Europeanism' to gain a sympathetic reaction from Europe, but this was no longer the case for post-Soviet Russia. Since it pretended to operate as a 'normal' member of the international community, the quality of the factors certifying its participation in the family of 'civilized' countries (democracy, human rights, market economy and so on) was becoming a critical test—the test that the country experienced serious difficulties to pass.

Geopolitically, with the end of the bipolar division of Europe, Russia has unexpectedly found itself pushed to the periphery of the European space. What used to be the immediate neighbourhood for the state which controlled half of Europe turned out separated from Russia by two territorial belts comprising the former socialist countries and the former western republics of the USSR. Having suddenly become the most remote territory of Europe, Russia lost some of the options that had been available to the former Soviet Union, and its ability to affect developments in Europe significantly decreased.

This was the background of formative period of the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era. Earlier illusions and perceptions began to give way to calculations, statements and actions aimed at promoting Russia as an influential international actor. By the mid-1990s, deliberations on Russia's 'great powerness', 'special responsibilities' and 'sphere of national interest' have become a new obsession—sometimes evolving into arrogance, assertiveness and what was perceived by other international actors as neo-imperial inclinations.

There were two alternative readings of this phenomenon.

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  On the one hand, it was ascribed to legitimate—or at least understandable—attempts to overcome post-imperial frustration, to compensate for the mistakes committed in the initial period of the new Russian statehood and to develop an adequate understanding of the country's national interests in the international arena.
  
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  On the other hand, there was a more worrying, even alarmist, interpretation—that Russia opted to aim to re-establish the legacy of the past (associated with the USSR, or the tsarist empire, or with both) and to consolidate its international status as an expansionist, militaristic and confrontational power.
  

Paradoxically, in any case attitudes towards the EU were to change from neglect and disregards towards attempts to develop a more specific understanding of what advantages (or disadvantages) it could provide in terms of the task of positioning Russia in the international arena. It is worth recalling in this respect how the EU was treated in the first 'Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation' adopted in 1993³. In a sense, this document reflected the on-going trends in Russian foreign policy thinking—both the above-mentioned initial syndromes and the emerging search for changes.

Interestingly, the section on Europe is listed in this document only on the fifth place, giving way to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), arms control, the promotion of economic reforms and the USA. This is telling: Russia assessed itself first of all in terms of dissolved USSR legacy (other post-Soviet states as the major focus of attention, arms control as an attribute of superpower's policy, the USA as the main external interlocutor). As far as the EU is concerned, it appears only within one of regional dimensions of Russia's would be foreign policy.

Altogether the EU (EC) is mentioned six times (if the WEU is counted as well), but in four of them it is enumerated together with other multilateral structures, such as the UN, the OSCE, the OECD and G7. Specific issues are addressed only once: 'finalizing the negotiation with the European Community on the development and conclusion of a treaty on promoting relations in all spheres, including the political one' and 'setting up an effective mechanism of cooperation (regular political consultations, joint commissions and working groups on the parliamentary level and so on)'.

However, this is presented as the first task in Russia's relations with Western Europe. It is also worth noting two particular emphases related to the EU. First, the prospect of developing relations in the political sphere was specifically underlined. Secondly, apart from the bureaucratic task of finalizing a treaty (which does not contain anything 'conceptual'), the idea of developing 'effective mechanism of cooperation' on various levels was promoted. These two indications pointed to the on-going re-assessment of Russia's attitudes towards the EU. The latter was gradually ceasing to be almost non-existent in the radars of Moscow's foreign policy.