Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Old doubts

There are certainly some reservations in Russia's perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the EU. In fact, these reservations could be formulated with respect to each of the above mentioned 'arguments' promoting Russia's increased attention to the EU.

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  Thus, Russia's economic dependence on the EU has a unilateral character, and if energy supply is put aside, Russia is a meaningless economic quantity for the EU accounting for only 4 per cent of its external trade.
  
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  Or, however significant the recent progress of CFSP and CESDP might be, the EU remains predominantly a 'civilian power', whereas Russia's international risks, challenges and opportunities are widely associated with geopolitics—the area where the EU is not yet a significant player.
  
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  Or else: Russia's calculations (or hopes) about the EU as the emerging 'pole' in the international system with increasing ability and predisposition to operate independently of Washington are more than mitigated by close partnership between the EU and the United States—partnership that in any circumstances would prevail over the EU's 'Russian connection'.
  

Therefore, drawing a picture of Russia's unrestrained enthusiasm about the EU would be certainly misleading. Also, if there is Russia's enthusiasm, it often does not look reciprocated; indeed, some analysts and observers in Russia believe that Russia's desire to promote relations with the EU is considerably higher than the readiness of the latter to promote Russia's engagement.

A simplistic and politically biased explanation of this phenomenon would reproach the EU for deliberately attempting to 'push Russia aside' and prevent it from getting into Europe. More sophisticated analyses refrain from blaming the EU directly.

According to an internal memorandum prepared by one of the influential research and lobbying structures, 'this position of the EU is caused by a combined effect of several factors rather than by the underestimation of current and potential role of Russia in the system of European security, trade and economic relations'. It is argued that Russia is no longer regarded as an inevitable and serious threat to Europe and is becoming a 'normal partner'—which in itself promotes its de-prioritization.

At the same time, the attention of the member-states is focused upon reforming the EU and protecting their own interests in this process, whereas joint positions on new structures of political cooperation with Russia and the role of the latter in the European institutions have not been yet elaborated. In addition, the enlargement of the EU accompanied by its 'sub-regionalization' promotes the desire to defer the issue of Russia, because of its extreme complexity, to a later period when the situation in East Central Europe becomes more stable and predictable. Last but not least, unclear prospects of settlement in the Balkans are also believed to play a role in making the EU less resolutely oriented in the direction of opening towards Russia.

Such assessments mitigate suspicious instincts towards the EU—but at the same time they might question the appropriateness of choosing it as a preferential partner in Europe. In addition, this brings about a broader theme—the one concerning the interrelationship of bilateral and multilateral approaches developed by Russia's policy in and towards Europe.

Bilateral or multilateral?

Through decades and until the most recent times, Moscow considered bilateral relations with West-European countries as having undoubted prominence in comparison to relations with the EU. This logic, going back to the times of the Soviet Union and to a considerable extent inherited by the post-Soviet Russia, was built upon three motivations.

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  One of them relates to the EU (EC) itself. Over a long period, its importance as an international actor and even its ability to function in this capacity were considered meaningless. Operating individually, member-states, in particular such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, were 'real actors' whereas a 'separate' presence of the EC in the international arena was hardly noticeable. Whatever goals Moscow might set for its policy in Western Europe, they were to be addressed in the interplay with 'real actors'.
  
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  Another motive proceeds from a traditional diplomatic calculation—a trivial, although not irrelevant one. Dealing with the 'integrated' international entity in the western part of the European continent was assessed as reducing the options that were presumably available to the policy of Moscow. Indeed, its diplomacy was interested in 'navigating' between individual foreign policies of its counterparts, each having specific nuances with respect to various international problems. This in itself opened some prospects for choosing better solutions, playing upon the differences between West Europeans, promoting 'privileged' relations with some of them at the expenses of others, and so on.
  
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  Finally, a specific consideration proceeded from Moscow's desire to consolidate its role as a 'heavy weight' in Europe by preventing anybody else from playing a similar role. The Soviet Union was traditionally suspicious about the political prospects of the EC as a potential challenger to Moscow's influence in Europe. In particular, this anxiety was focused upon the Soviet 'outer empire': indeed, the EC as a politically viable integrated entity could become a strong pole of attraction for Moscow's allies with their dubious loyalty towards the 'Big Brother'. Schemes of a 'united Europe from Brest to Brest' (or 'from Poland to Portugal') could not but add fuel to such concerns and by no means made Moscow enthusiastic about eventual emergence of the EC as an international actor.
  

It is true that the focus upon the bilateral approach was gradually eroded alongside the developments in the European Community and then European Union. Indeed, since as early as the beginning of 1970s, the economic parameters of bilateral relations started to be progressively determined by, and inscribed into the emerging multilateral pattern of the EC—first in the area of trade and then increasingly in other sectors. Moscow had to accept new realities: the standardization of trade agreements with its partners from the EC, the necessity to deal with their common sectoral policies (for instance, such as fishery or scientific research), the interaction with the EC as such in some multilateral structures (for instance, within GATT negotiations and various international commodity agreements).

There was another aspect of the erosion of the traditional pattern: the development of relations between the smaller CMEA countries and the EC. This line was developing on two tracks: on the one hand, their trade policies were gradually getting out of the CMEA framework, on the other hand, they came to concluding some sectoral agreements with the EC as such, even in the absence of formal relations between the two organizations. And these new developments had by no means only economic importance. Their political implication consisted in undermining the consolidation of the 'socialist commonwealth' and creating new incentives for reconsidering the character of relations with the EC.

Pragmatic interaction with the EC was becoming unavoidable, although Moscow tried to keep it a low profile issue, rejecting the very idea of political interaction due to the above-mentioned considerations. However, separating this 'low politics' interface from 'high politics' was impossible. Actually, this was the same objective logic that eroded similar barriers between the EPC (European political cooperation) and the EC 'traditional' treaty-related activities. Noteworthy, it was in the 1970s that Moscow started to develop a kind of interaction with the EPC framework (for instance, in the UN and CSCE patterns)—although reluctantly, irregularly and in what could be defined as 'embryonic form'.

By the end of the XX century, the overall changes both in the western and in the eastern parts of the continent have set a new pattern for Russia's perception of, and attitudes towards the EU. With all ups and downs in Russia's interaction with the West during the 1990s, the prevailing trends consisted in overcoming its confrontational component and promoting the cooperative one, as well as in recognizing the increasing prominence of the EU's international personality.

These trends, however, have been developed gradually and without dramatic breakthroughs that might replace in a radical way Russia's long-standing unequivocal preference towards 'bilateral relations' with the EU member-states by an opposite 'multilateral' pattern. All the elements of the traditional model of policy thinking and policy making, as described above, have continued through the 1990s—both by the force of inertia and because they by no means were only incarnation of 'old thinking' totally irrelevant under new circumstances.

The balance between 'bilateral' and 'multilateral' patterns is undoubtedly changing, with the latter becoming increasingly important, especially in the last few years. At the same time it would be certainly premature to expect that the former will disappear. Moreover, with the risk of a certain simplification, one could even argue that the 'old' logic highlighting the prominence of individual relations with the EU member-states may be rationalized as a kind of compensation for the emerging new pattern with uncertain implications for Russia interests.

In the past, the preference for 'bilateralism' might be explained by expected gains from playing upon real or perceived contradictions between the EU (EC) member-states. With the development of joint and/or common policies of the EU in various areas such calculations are obviously becoming less realistic. At the same time, the 'politicization' of the EU seems to bring a kind of a 'second wind' to the bilateral patterns of their relations with Russia. Without exaggerating the importance of this phenomenon, its very existence deserves being mentioned both analytically and in terms of policy implications, however paradoxical this might seem.

Indeed, the prominence of the political dimension of the EU developments is undoubted. In particular, the CFSP and the CESDP promote the expectations with respect to the position of the EU in the international arena. Furthermore, the objective need for the EU to play a viable international role is becoming more and more significant. Meanwhile, its actual ability to operate internationally is lagging behind. The developments in and around the Balkans have dramatically shown this relative discrepancy between expectations for, and the need of the international personality of the EU, on the one hand, and its insufficient operational effectiveness, on the other hand.

Under these circumstances, in a number of non-meaningless cases the importance of the EU major member-states as international actors may look unexpectedly increased (even if only in relative terms), with the EU itself often only following suit. For instance:

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  The participation of member-states in the Gulf War was based on their individual commitments rather than proceeding from any mandate issued by the Community (that in fact failed to appear in a politically relevant form).
  
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  The decision of Germany to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia turned out crucial for the position of the EC on this issue—the position that could have been otherwise formulated quite differently.
  
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  The subsequent involvement of some member-states in former Yugoslavia was either predominantly individual, or inscribed into the NATO framework.
  

In fact, this list could be considerably longer, and Russia—all its growing interest towards the EU notwithstanding—saw it quite logical to interact with individual countries rather that with the structure where they themselves looked reluctant to operate jointly. When, for instance, Russia's diplomacy was taking part in the 'contact group', this was promoted by its desire to interact with a few leading countries of the West who put on the table their own interests and influences rather than representing the EU.

There is also another dimension in this approach. Since the CFSP is still predominantly defined on the basis of the common denominator of its member-states' foreign policies, the substance of the 'European' policy is determined by their individual contributions rather than emerging 'from nowhere'. Interacting with these approaches directly might be more efficient than awaiting for the EU's joint position. In addition, the latter has all chances to turn out less energetic, unambiguous and action-oriented in comparison with the national positions.

Not surprisingly, at times there seemed to be a growing conviction in Moscow that the bilateral track is more promising than the multilateral one, particularly when dealing with some key players in Europe. By the end of the Yeltsin period, France and Germany were considered to be the major partners on the European scene; Russia's new leadership under President Putin 'upgraded' Great Britain to this status. Each of these three is attractive for Russia on its own way: France by what is perceived as its independent policy and its reluctance to accept a submissive pattern with respect to the USA, Germany by its crucial geopolitical position in Europe and undeniable prominence in terms of its economic might, Great Britain by its role as one of the leading world political and financial centres, as well as by its expected ability to patronize re-introducing Russia, with its new leadership, into the international elite.

Some political and diplomatic missions also fit better into traditional bilateral approaches rather than into those focused upon the EU. Thus, in 1999-2000, when President Putin, as the newcomer to the world political scene, was facing a task of consolidating his personal position in the club of heads of state, early interactions with British Prime-Minister Tony Blair turned out of primary importance. In 2001, Putin's visit to Germany brought about significant political dividends due to his specific background allowing to highlight the 'personal factor' in Russia's relations with that country. In both cases, similar results that were politically rather important for Russia would be hardly conceivable on the basis of an EU-focused multilateral pattern of relations.

This all by no means testifies to 're-nationalization' or 'de-multilateralization' of Russia's policy. But the increasing focus upon relations with the EU has brought about some nuances to Russia's approach. Russia's interaction with the EU member-states does not become an alternative to relationship with the EU; rather, the former plays a role in both preparing the latter and developing its substance.