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places a premium on quick-fire news, personalisation and exclusivity , which ruptures
distinctions between: ‘mainstream’ and ‘tabloid’; ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ news; ‘news’ and
‘entertainment; and can disrupt the traditional news media orientation toward the
established ‘hierarchies of credibility’.
Second, the pluralisation and professionalisation of possible sources of ‘policing
news’ has created a multiplicity of alternative ‘knowledge workers’ (Ericson and
Haggerty, 1997: 19) with access to potentially ‘newsworthy’ information that may or
may not correspond with the official police perspective. The diversification of ‘police
voices’ makes the communication of an authoritative police viewpoint – and
therefore the establishing of a dominant ‘inferential structure’ in the news media –
difficult.
Third, whilst news commentaries on the police historically came from a small group
of specialist journalists (Chibnall, 1977; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994; Reiner, 2000),
today political editors, features writers, columnists and social commentators – the
new commentariat – are all enthusiastic in venturing their opinions. This expansion
and diversification can partly be explained by the slashing of news budgets and the
requirement for senior staff and lead commentators to develop their portfolios
across a broader range of topics (Mawby, 2010). But it is also, we would suggest,
connected with wider cultural change.
The widely cited decline in confidence and trust in institutional authority (Beck,
2006; Fukuyama, 2000; Dogan and Seid, 2005) is manifested in the emergence of
what we term a cynical ‘politics of outrage’. This ‘politics of outrage’ is
simultaneously expressed and amplified in an increasingly adversarial news media.
Market-driven newspapers, particularly in the UK, are inclined to initiate and support
anti-establishment campaigns and protests, and can draw from an unprecedented
array of both professional and amateur news sources to do so. Adherence to a
deferential ‘inferential structure’, reinforcing established ‘hierarchies of credibility’,
does not boost readership sales. The promotion of adversarial ‘inferential structures’
and the manufacture of dissent does (Milne, 2005; Protess et al, 1991; Sabato, 1993;
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Sabato et al, 2000; Lloyd, 2004; Barnett, 2002). When news media adversarialism
and the ‘politics of outrage’ coalesce in a sufficiently coherent and collective
manner, routine ‘attack journalism’ can evolve into full-blown ‘trial by media’.
Trial by Media
The notion of ‘trial by media’ has featured only sporadically in journalistic and
academic debate, so there is limited theoretical or empirical work to draw from here
(Greer and McLaughlin, 2007; Hastings, 2007; Hutton, 2000; Jenkins, 2006; Linklater,
2007; Williams and Delli Carpini, 2000; Grochowski, 2002). For the purposes of this
article, we define ‘trial by media’ as a dynamic, impact-driven, news media-led
process by which individuals – who may or may not be publicly known – are tried
and sentenced in the ‘court of public opinion’. The targets and processes of ‘trial by
media’ can be diverse, and may range from pre-judging the outcome of formal
criminal proceedings against ‘unknowns’ to the relentless pursuit of high-profile
celebrity personalities and public figures deemed to have offended in some way
against an assumed common morality. Two decades ago, Katz (1987: 68)
conceptualised crime news as a symbolic resource that ‘speaks dramatically to issues
that are of direct relevance to readers’ existential challenges’, allowing them to
engage in ‘daily ritual moral workouts’ as they seek to negotiate their own moral
fortitude. Today, as the news media commentariat cast themselves as moral arbiters
of the ‘public interest’ in a climate of ambiguity and uncertainty, news consumers’
same moral muscles are exercised as ‘trial by media’ spotlights a diversity of ‘suitable
enemies’ (Christie, 1986) for public scrutiny and judgement.
We would suggest, however, that despite their diversity, such ‘trials’ share certain
core characteristics. It is in identifying these core characteristics that we seek to
differentiate ‘trial by media’ from other conceptualisations of news media reaction,
such as ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 2002; Garland, 2008; Young, 2009). In each case, the
news media behave as a proxy for ‘public opinion’ and seek to exercise parallel
functions of ‘justice’ to fulfil a role perceived to lie beyond the interests or
capabilities of formal institutional authority (see also Machado and Santos, 2009).
Due process and journalistic objectivity can give way to sensationalist, moralising
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speculation about the actions and motives of those who stand accused in the news
media spotlight. Judicial scrutiny of ‘hard evidence’ yields ground to ‘real time’
dissemination of disclosures from paid informants and hearsay and conjecture from
‘well placed sources’. Since the news media substitute for the prosecution, judge and
jury, the target may find themselves rendered defenceless. The default ‘inferential
structure’ is ‘guilty until proven innocent’. Once crystallised, this inferential structure
ensures that the ‘guilty’ will be subjected to righteous ‘naming and shaming’
followed by carnivalesque condemnation and ridicule (cf Bahktin, 1968). The result,
as we shall see, can be deep and lasting reputational damage. This form of
mediatised punishment is characterised by ‘grotesque realism’ and ‘relentless
savagery’ (Hutton, 2000: 30). It amounts to a public execution in the ‘society of the
spectacle’ (Debord, 1970). The public appeal of ‘trial by media’ is evidenced by
increased circulation and web traffic (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). Our central
argument, then, is that the transformations outlined above have coalesced to create
a highly adversarial, volatile and interactive news mediasphere within which
authorities and elites must increasingly struggle against the flow of news media
opinion to maintain a positive public profile.
In this climate, the ‘elite police voice’ must continually compete to be heard above
the clamour of myriad other ‘credible’ voices, each vying to assert their own versions
of reality or positions on crime, justice and policing issues. Past research indicated
that, because of their privileged position in the ‘hierarchy of credibility’, the police
were advantaged in establishing the dominant ‘inferential structure’ in crime and
justice reporting: in short, the police routinely set the crime news agenda. Today, we
would suggest that the official police position is often one of reaction, attempting to
regain the initiative and respond to information flows that are simply beyond their
control. Where once the police were crime news ‘gatekeepers’ (Ericson et al, 1991),
‘patrolling the facts’, they are now ‘crime news stakeholders’, just one group among
many – and a fragmented one at that – involved in an ongoing and uncertain process
of ‘negotiating the facts’. Where once the police were the key players in a process of
‘agenda setting’, they are now part players in an altogether more complex and
unpredictable process of ‘agenda building’ (Lang and Lang, 1983). In the following
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