56
focus
is lifted, each participant can return to an entirely different set of
alignments based on entirely different features. Imagine, just for fun, that when
the managers in Figure 4 end their meeting and walk off, the young man in the
picture asks the blonde woman whether she would be interested in going to a
Dire Straits concert together – he can get tickets; an entirely new set of features
would become the stuff for coagulation at that point. And if they get to that
concert, entirely different features of their identities will enable them to focus on
the event, and will contribute to, again, a colossal robustness as a group. They
will cheer simultaneously with thousands of other people, and they will even
sing “Sultans of Swing” along with, and in precisely the same beat as thousands
of people otherwise entirely unknown to them. All of these features were already
present around the meeting table in Figure 4.
Contrary to Goffman, thus, we see no reason why we should consider such
focused-but-diverse groups to be fundamentally different from (or for that
matter, inferior to) “thick” (Durkheimian) communities such as, for instance,
“nations”, “ethnicities”, “religious communities” or what not. In the kind of
empirical heuristics we try to develop here, focusing around such ‘big’ and ‘thick’
identity elements is not necessarily more frequently or more intensely done than
focusing around mundane events (such as train delays or a Dire Straits concert).
We are not saying that features such as nationality or ethnicity are absent when
people start chatting on a railway platform; we say, however, that they do not
provide the triggers for focusing as a group at that moment, and that it is good to
take that empirical point de repère seriously in our analyses of contemporary
identities. Other features of identity can become relevant in the eyes of
bystanders or after the fact – imagine two young people falling in love with each
other and starting a relationship, which turns out to be solid gossip material for
others because both are active politicians attached to parties that are otherwise
each other’s ideological adversaries. As we emphasized, the diversity
characterizing the group does not disappear during moments of intense
focusing; it remains a potential for multiple readings and interpretations that can
be exploited at any point by anyone who can recognize the relevant features.
Refocusing by others – here is the crucial aspect of uptake and ratification again
– is also perpetually possible.
If we now briefly return to the consumption culture we used as our point of
departure here, we see how multiple “light” groups are continuously formed
around shared aspects of individual life projects. All BMW drivers, in spite of
enormous and fundamental differences between them, share a potential focus
with each other: the brand of their cars. If they do not do this focusing
themselves, others can (“oh hell, there’s another arrogant BMW driver!!”). People
sharing a preference for particular brands can find each other, even during very
short moments, in very focused “brand fan” groups on social media. The “like”
button on Facebook is that medium’s sublime instrument for brief moments of
focusing, in which people otherwise unrelated or unconnected can find
themselves liking, at the same time and in the same space, the latest iPhone type
or the new album of Shakira for instance.
It is not likely that we will understand, and be able to realistically generalize,
contemporary “identity” unless we take into account these complex, ephemeral,
57
layered, dynamic and unstable patterns of identity construction, identity
ratification and group formation. Even more: we risk not understanding it at all
when we fail to address patterns of identity processes that dominate enormous
segments of our lives and are, empirically, clearly objects of intense concern for
enormous numbers of people, who invest amazing amounts of resources and
energy into them. Social and cultural phenomena should not be too quickly
dismissed as irrelevant because they do not appear on our theoretical and
analytical radars at present; if they occur and prove to be of significance in the
social and cultural life of people, we at least need to examine them critically.
References
Barthes, Roland (1957) Mythologies. Paris: Seuil.
Becker, Howard (1963) Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. (New
York: The Free Press, 1963)
Blommaert, Jan & Piia Varis (2011) Enough is enough: The heuristics of
authenticity in superdiversity. Tilburg Papers in Culture Studies 2.
Blommaert, Jan & Piia Varis (2012) Culture as accent. Tilburg Papers in Culture
Studies 18.
Bourdieu, Pierre (1984) Distinction. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
Foucault, Michel (2007) Security, Territory, Population. New York: Palgrave
Goffman, Erving (1961) Encounters. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
Marcuse, Herbert (1964 [1991]) One Dimensional Man. London: Routledge
58
Chapter 5:
Conviviality and collectives on social media:
Virality, memes and new social structures
Introduction
In a very insightful and relatively early paper on the phenomenon, Vincent Miller
(2008) questions the ‘content’ of communication on social media and microblogs
(Facebook and Twitter, respectively), and concludes:
“We are seeing how in many ways the internet has become as much about
interaction with others as it has about accessing information. (…) In the
drift from blogging, to social networking, to microblogging we see a shift
from dialogue and communication between actors in a network, where
the point of the network was to facilitate an exchange of substantive
content, to a situation where the maintenance of a network itself has
become the primary focus. (…) This has resulted in a rise of what I have
called ‘phatic media’ in which communication without content has taken
precedence.” (Miller 2008: 398)
Miller sees the avalanche of ‘empty’ messages on new social media as an
illustration of the ‘postsocial’ society in which networks rather than (traditional,
organic) communities are the central fora for establishing social ties between
people. The messages are ‘empty’ in the sense that no perceptibly ‘relevant
content’ is being communicated; thus, such messages are typologically germane
to the kind of ‘small talk’ which Bronislaw Malinowski (1923 (1936)) identified
as ‘phatic communion’ and described as follows:
“’phatic communion’ serves to establish bonds of personal union between
people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not
serve any purpose of communicating ideas.” (Malinowski 1923 (1936):
316)
For Malinowski, phatic communion was a key argument for his view that
language should not just be seen as a carrier of propositional contents
(“communicating ideas” in the fragment above), but as a mode of social action the
scope of which should not be reduced to ‘meaning’ in the denotational sense of
the term. In an excellent paper on the history of the term ‘phatic communion’,
Gunter Senft notes the post-hoc reinterpretation of the term by Jakobson (1960)
as ‘channel-oriented’ interaction, and describes phatic communion as
“utterances that are said to have exclusively social, bonding functions like
establishing and maintaining a friendly and harmonious atmosphere in
interpersonal relations, especially during the opening and closing stages
of social – verbal – encounters. These utterances are understood as a
means for keeping the communication channels open.” (Senft 1995: 3)