V o L u m e I : a d

survival against Germany without harboring some ulterior motives of their

own. Yet the Allies, and certainly the Americans, were sincerely doing every-

thing in their power to come to the aid of their beleaguered ally. Even while

the Americans and British were undergoing costly and humiliating defeats

at the hands of the Japanese in early 1942, General George C. Marshall, U.S.

Army chief of staff, was advocating an Anglo-American invasion of France

with the object of forcing Hitler to withdraw vital divisions from the Eastern

Front. Although that operation was never executed, the Allies sent supplies

to Archangel and Murmansk in dangerous and costly convoys. We managed

to deliver a great deal—for example, a half million General Motors 2

1

⁄

2

-ton

trucks. The Lend-Lease supplies we sent may not in themselves have saved

the Soviet Union from defeat, but they went a long way to help.

Throughout the time they fought as allies, the United States, Britain,

and the USSR attempted to coordinate their war efforts. The relationship

between the United States and Britain was extremely close, and the Soviets

cooperated as best they could within the restrictions imposed by their secret

society. It is important to note that American political policy, laid down by

President Roosevelt, was one of complete friendship with the Soviets in

their joint war against Germany. That policy explains many actions the Allies

later took that appeared naive once the spirit of wartime cooperation ended.

It is interesting to note Roosevelt’s exaggerated confidence in what he

was sure would be his ability to contend with the Soviets after the shooting

stopped. “Don’t worry,” he promised, “I’ll take care of Uncle Joe.” That bit

of hubris has usually been quoted in a humorous context. And yet it is

intriguing to conjecture whether the Cold War might have been averted had

Roosevelt survived. As it was, he died at Warm Springs on 12 April 1945, just

a month short of victory in Europe.

The Honeymoon

The end of the war in Europe witnessed a strong but brief era of goodwill

among the three principal victors. I personally was a witness, both at the

working level and in the halls of the powerful.

My personal exposure to the Soviets started out on a rather frightening

note. As a lieutenant in the 1st Infantry Division in Czechoslovakia, I joined

four other officers a few days after the end of the war for a joyride to Carls-

bad, behind Soviet lines. As we drove into the town and turned a corner, we

encountered a handsome but very dirty young Russian soldier, who although

drunk was sober enough to recognize our party as Americans. Exuberantly,

he tried to kiss all five of us. I was spared because of my position in the jeep.

But we were careful. He was brandishing a Luger, and a dead German civil-

ian was lying in a pool of blood beside us.

Later exposures were more pleasant. In August, three months after V-E

Day, my father, General Eisenhower, was invited to visit Moscow in his capac-

ity as supreme commander for the Western powers in the war just finished.

He sent for me to accompany him as his aide.

The striking aspect of the visit was the lavish reception the Russians

gave the commander of a foreign nation’s army. Georgi Zhukov, General

A Personal Perspective

5

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Eisenhower’s Soviet counterpart in Berlin, met us at Tempelhof Airport for

the flight to Moscow in Ike’s C-54 (DC-4) four-engine aircraft. Zhukov, as

the official host, was the soul of hospitality and congeniality. By this time

the two commanders, Eisenhower and Zhukov, had been representing their

countries in the four-power government of Germany, and they had become

friends—as close of friends as public life permits.

In Moscow the party first attended a parade. Significantly, my father

was invited to undergo a four-hour ordeal atop Vladimir Lenin’s tomb with

Zhukov and Stalin. He was, I later learned, the first foreigner ever accorded

that honor. One evening, the entire party was entertained at dinner, with

Stalin himself officiating, acting friendly enough but mysterious as always.

During the following three days, there were tours of collective farms, aircraft

factories, and even the Moscow subway. Together at the American embassy

during the evening of 15 August (V-J Day), Soviets and Americans celebrated

the news of Japan’s surrender. In Leningrad the ceremonies drew to a close.

As a final gesture, my father invited Zhukov to pay a return visit to the

United States. Ike could not accompany the marshal, he said with regret, but

he would provide his personal airplane and send me along as Zhukov’s aide.

Zhukov was delighted. “If Lieutenant Eisenhower goes along with me,” he

said, “then I know the plane will not go down in the Atlantic.”

It was not to be. In mid-September 1945, almost the day of the sched-

uled departure, word came from the Soviets that Marshal Zhukov had become

sick and could not make the trip to the United States. To my mind, although

the term “Cold War” had not yet been invented, this represented the end of

the honeymoon.

The Early Days of the Cold War

With the cancellation of Zhukov’s trip to the United States, we in Europe

were concerned, but we could not foresee how serious the rift between East

and West was to become. Before my father left Germany to become army chief

of staff in late 1945, we mused together over the new developments and

expected only a reasonably short period of tension. We were, of course, wor-

ried about the fate of Zhukov and conjectured that he had overplayed his

hand. His popularity perhaps had gone to his head, and Stalin, who brooked

no competition, had put his foot down.

Early 1946 saw the forces in Europe preoccupied with the trials and exe-

cution of the top Nazis in Nuremberg. In the United States, however, the big

news was Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton. The United

States continued to enjoy a monopoly on the atomic weapon, and we unreal-

istically hoped we could keep that monopoly indefinitely. In fact, the Soviets

had begun working on the project and tested their first weapon in 1949.

The year 1946 also witnessed another event: the formulation of Ameri-

can policy for dealing with the Soviets during the years ahead. Based on a

telegram by George Kennan from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, it visualized

simply holding the communist world within the borders it then occupied.

The West would not attempt to take aggressive action against the Soviet

6

A Personal Perspective

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