V o L u m e I : a d

The period of greatest danger, therefore, coincided almost exactly with the

presidency of Eisenhower.

A word of explanation is in order for my contention that the 1950s were

the most dangerous years. Those were the years in which the two blocs—

East and West—were developing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruc-

tion, but strategists on both sides were considering the possibility of winning

a war using a first strike by aircraft and missiles armed with nuclear war-

heads. Winning, however, meant completely destroying the enemy while at

the same time having a part of one’s own country survive. That hope, ridicu-

lous as it was, was held by some people, and that is what made the 1950s

such a dangerous period.

The immediate danger was drastically reduced, however, not by a reduc-

tion of terror but by the invention of a new weapon, the virtue of which elim-

inated any hope of survival of an atomic exchange, even by the aggressor. By

1960, the United States had developed an operational submarine-launched

atomic missile that was capable of being deployed anywhere on the seven

seas and firing missiles to hit targets thousands of miles inland while at the

same time remaining virtually invisible under water. Thus, any unrealistic

dreams that a preemptive strike could leave an attacker with “acceptable”

losses disappeared. A new term, “mutual assured destruction,” eventually

grew from this new development.

Fortunately, during this period of greatest danger, the leaders of both the

Eastern and Western blocs were sane men, and mutual assured destruction

as well as mutually assured unacceptable losses had been quietly recognized

early. But the danger arose from the combination of conventional and atomic

wars. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a war that

was initially confined to conventional weaponry, the eventual use of nuclear

weapons seemed inevitable. If the survival of one or the other nation was

deemed to be doomed in a conventional war, that nation might use the

nuclear weapon as a last resort. For that reason, the Western nations and

the Soviets never fought directly throughout the entire Cold War. Surro-

gates such as Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan did fight, however.

President Eisenhower attempted to deal with the Cold War in two ways.

The first was his sincere effort to develop understanding between the two

nations by means of cultural exchanges. The other was to keep America (and

the Western Allies) protected against a surprise Soviet attack. (It would also

protect the Soviets from surprise attack from the West.) With the death of

Stalin in early 1953, Eisenhower held hopes that Stalin’s successor—whoever

he might turn out to be—might feel a little less hostile to the West and be

willing to find a reasonable way of approaching the problem. In one respect,

Eisenhower was right: the Soviets desired a conference as well. Therefore, as

a token of mutual trust, the four powers occupying Austria—the United

States, the USSR, Britain, and France—agreed to neutralize the country by

withdrawing all their military forces from it. With that visible evidence of

mutual goodwill, the four powers met at Geneva, Switzerland, in the sum-

mer of 1955.

A Personal Perspective

9

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The Geneva Conference produced much rhetoric, but Eisenhower put

forth one concrete and dramatic suggestion commonly called the Open Skies

Proposal. Both East and West, according to this scheme, would exchange

blueprints of their armed forces. In addition, both sides would be cleared to

make extensive aerial reconnaissance over the other’s territory. In that man-

ner, surprise attack would be at least deterred.

Three of the four members of the Soviet delegation stalled briefly,

expressing interest. One man, Nikita Khrushchev, did not. Although theo-

retically only one of the four so-called equals—the Soviets were supposedly

being governed by Khrushchev, Zhukov, Nikolai Bulganan (nominal chief),

and Vyacheslav Molotov—Khrushchev refused outright, almost angrily. Eisen-

hower was not overly surprised. Much of what would be disclosed on the

Western side was already easily available to anyone; the Soviets were un-

willing to give up their secret society. But at least the West had found out

who was in charge of the Soviet government—Khrushchev.

After his Open Skies Proposal had died at Geneva, Eisenhower resorted

to unilateral action. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) completed devel-

opment of a high-altitude reconnaissance plane called the U-2. A remarkable

aircraft, it flew at such a high altitude that for a time, at least, it was deemed

safe from known Soviet antiaircraft missiles. During the years it operated,

the U-2 Program carried out overflights of Russia and provided much valu-

able intelligence. In so doing, it enabled Eisenhower to conduct foreign

affairs in a more daring manner than would have been the case had he not

possessed that intelligence.

The U-2 Program was illegal from the viewpoint of international law.

President Eisenhower, however, deemed it essential. Furthermore, Secre-

tary of State John Foster Dulles had always insisted that even if a U-2 were

to be shot down, Khrushchev would never admit that flights had been going

on for some time over Soviet airspace.

Those years were fraught with secondary confrontations and scares. The

crisis over the Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, just off the coast of

the mainland but occupied by Jiang’s Republic of China (Taiwan) seemed

touch-and-go. Of more public notice was the Soviet launching of the first

Earth satellite, Sputnik, in late 1957. That feat, which proved that the Soviets

had developed missiles of greater thrust than any developed by the United

States, caused a near panic in the public. Eisenhower assured the public that

the satellites bore no relationship to our national defense, which was based on

smaller missiles posted in European locations. Before the furor had calmed

down, Eisenhower had organized NASA, the Marshall Space Center at

Huntsville, and the Science Advisory Council in the White House.

The greatest East-West crisis of the 1950s, however, was the confronta-

tion over the status of West Berlin, an issue then more than ten years old. At

Thanksgiving 1948, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum for the withdrawal of

Western troops from the city of Berlin; the consequence for failure to do so

could mean war. He gave a deadline of six months.

Here Eisenhower realized that the West could never win a conventional

war in Europe against the gigantic Soviet force deployed there. The Soviets

10

A Personal Perspective

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