Formal and Informal Politics in Macau Special Administrative Region Elections

The 2005 Legislative Assembly Indirect Elections

Similar to its Hong Kong counterpart, the Macao Legislative Assembly elections consist of two elements, namely direct and indirect elections. In Macao, the direct and indirect elections appeared differently. The latter is similar to the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive that uncontested or non-competitive election was emphasized while the former possessed fierce competition. Nevertheless, the direct and indirect elections in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections extensively involved informal politics that turned out to the marketization of informal politics and resulted in money politics in the elections.

The 2005 Legislative Assembly indirect elections were uncontested. The indirect elections consisted of ten seats which were divided into four constituents: 1) Employees Interests Constituency, 2) Business Interests Constituency, 3) Professional Interests Constituency, 4) Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency. Same as the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive, social organizations were the dominants in the indirect elections for the Legislative Assembly that they nominated candidates and their representatives voted on behalf of the organizations. The qualification for social organizations participating in the indirect elections was the same as the Election Committee for the Chief Executive that they had been established for three years and were classified to the corresponding constituencies by the Society Coordination Standing Committee.⁵⁶ Individuals who would like to be candidates in particular constituencies had to receive twenty-five percent of social groups and organizations in the corresponding sectors.⁵⁷ Each organization would have eleven representatives voting in the corresponding constituencies. It is noted that elections was still be held even it was uncontested. The Proportional Representative (PR) system with new d’Hondt formula was adopted in Macao Legislative Assembly elections.⁵⁸ Under this system, candidates formed their own group and voters cast their ballots to particular candidate lists. Seats would be distributed to candidates in various lists with the new d’Hondt formula. Basically, the political setting in the indirect elections of the Legislative Assembly was similar to the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive that resulted in the domination of social organizations in the indirect elections.
Table 4: Result of the 2005 Legislative Assembly Indirect Elections

Constituents	Candidate Lists and Candidates	Number of Vote Received
Business Interests Constituency	Macao Business Interests Union: Susana Chou* Kou Hoi-in* Cheang Chi-keong* Ho Teng-iat*	462
Employees Interests Constituency	Employees Association Joint Candidates Commission: Lau Chok-va* Lee Chong-cheng*	419
Profession Interests Constituency	Macao Professional Interests Union: Chiu Sai-cheong* Leonel Alberto Alves*	247
Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency	Excellent Cultural and Sports Union Association: Vitor Cheung Lup-kwan* Chan Chak-mo*	1,449

Note: “*” Candidate was elected

Source: MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly election homepage which is available at “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.”

Non-competitive indirect elections was the result for the consensus politics among social groups and organizations. Elite would like to set up and sponsor various organizations. In return, they would get their support in the indirect elections of the Legislative Assembly. Besides, potential candidates would coordinate among themselves to avoid competition that they sought for as much support from groups and organizations so that other would not receive sufficient number of organizations’ nomination. According to Jeremy Lei Man-chow, who is a pro-democracy labour unionist and ran in the direct elections, the traditional pro-Beijing organizations dominated the Business Interests and Employees Interests Constituencies.⁵⁹ For instance, the pro-Beijing Macao Chamber of Commerce (MCC) was the dominant in the Business Interests Constituency that a lot of social organizations in the constituency affiliated with the MCC. The MCC made compromise with its affiliated organizations for the nomination of candidates in the Business Interests Constituency and avoid competition in election.⁶⁰ Similarly, a lot of labour unions associated to the pro-Beijing labour union Federation of Trade Union (FTU). The FTU coordinated with other labour organizations for the nomination of candidates in the indirect election in the Employees Interests Constituency and rejected any competition in that constituent.⁶¹ Jeremy Lei indicated that the leaders of the FTU decided to nominate a young elite Lee Chong-cheng to replace Tong Chi-kin, who ran the indirect election in 2001 but did not participate in 2005.⁶² Although there were some senior unionists opposing the arrangement, the FTU leaders would like encourage younger generation to participate in Macao politics, and hence, nominating Lee disregarding opposition from some labour groups. It was noted that the MCC and FTU dominated in the Business Interests and Employees Interests Constituencies respectively. Individuals could not receive sufficient support for nomination in the sectors.⁶³

In the Professional Interests, and Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituencies, there was informal competition before and during the nomination period and political elite avoid to have contested elections. Indicated by Jeremy Lei, there was no dominant organization in these constituents.⁶⁴ In order to receive sufficient number of organizations for their nominations, individuals would like to “buy” the support of organizations. For instance, David Chow Kam-fai, who is boss of some casinos, would like to run indirect elections in either Professional Interests or Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituencies at the very beginning.⁶⁵ According to Jeremy Lei, Chow did not have sufficient money to “buy” support of organizations and he finally decided to run the direct election. It is noted that David Chow ran direct election in 2001 and received 10,016 votes. However, in 2005, he only grasped 6,081 votes although he was elected.⁶⁶

In another case, Vitor Cheung Lup-kwan ran direct election in 2001 and participated in indirect election in 2005. Cheung’s migration to the indirect election was because he received support from the Macao Football Association (MFA).⁶⁷ There were many sports organizations affiliating with the MFA. Individual who gained support from the MFA would have more chance for their victories in the Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency. It is noted that there was dispute for the election of MFA Executive Committee in 2004. Originally, the pervious leaders were re-elected. However, some affiliated organizations opposed them and raised serious dispute inside the MFA. As a result, the government involved in the dispute and refused to provide facilitates as well as financial support to the MAC activities.⁶⁸ Finally, another Executive Committee was selected and Vitor Cheung became the Chairman of the MAC General Meeting.⁶⁹ Jeremy Lei marked that Cheung “subverted” the MFA and mobilize many affiliated organizations against the newly elected leadership so as to build up his power base in the MFA.⁷⁰ There was commentary in newspaper questioning the change of stance of most affiliated organizations.⁷¹ At the beginning, there were 42 out of the 63 affiliated organizations supporting the pervious leaders. But after few months, 55 affiliated organizations voted to a new leadership.⁷² The media predicted that Vitor Cheung participated in the MFA symbolized his intention on the indirect election in 2005.⁷³ Interesting, Fong Chi-keong, who ran indirect election in the Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency in 2001, participated in the direct election in 2005. Fong’s maneuver might reflect his failure seeking support in the constituency.

Similar to the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive, the electoral system for the Legislative Assembly indirect elections facilitated space for the informal negotiation among groups and organizations. Political elite sought for endorsement from social organizations through financial and political support to the latter. As a result, there was non-competitive indirect elections that only single candidate list was in each constituency. The legislature’s indirect elections nourished the growth of social groups and consolidated their significance as a major entity of political participation in Macao.

The 2005 Legislative Assembly Direct Elections

Different to indirect elections, the 2005 direct election of Legislative Assembly marked with fierce competition. Electoral competition resulted in enormous mass participation. There were 220,653 eligible voters cast their ballots and the turnout rate was 58.39 percent.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, electoral competition in direct elections heavily involved informal politics with participation of social groups and organizations that resulting in the marketization to money politics in electoral campaign.

The fierce competition in direct election was mainly due to the participation of candidates from the gaming industry. In the 2001 direct election, there were only ten seats and twelve candidate lists in which only two candidate lists came from the gaming industry. Same as the indirect election, the direct election adopted the PR system with new d’Hond’t formula. In 2005, there were twelve seats from the direct election and eighteen candidate lists in which five of them from the gaming industry (see Table 5). Fierce competition in the 2005 direct election was not only from the increase of number of candidate lists but also from the strong mobilization of candidates from the gaming industry. For instance, during April and May 2005 when the government conducted voter registration campaign, some casinos mobilized their employees as well as their family members registered as voters. As a result, there were over six-hundreds thousands voters increase for eligible voters—38.1 percent increase of 2001 election.⁷⁵ Furthermore, fierce competition could also be revealed from the tight campaign from the pro-Beijing United Force as well as the Development Union. They distributed leaflets that each of them might not gain two seats and would seek electorates’ support. In the past, both the United Force, which was from the Kaifong Association and Women Association of Macao, and the Development Union, which was from the FTU, enjoyed relatively strong support in elections. Each of them received two directly-elected seats. However, in 2005 elections, they were in difficult situation. In fact, Iong Weng-ian of United Force marginally defeated Chan Wai-chi from the pro-democracy New Democratic Macao Association while five candidates with gaming industry background were elected in the direct election. On the other hand, candidates from gaming industry had tense competition among themselves because they shared similar voter-base, especially those working in the casinos. Therefore, electoral competition was very hot.
Table 5: Candidate Lists in the 2005 Legislative Assembly Direct Election

Candidate List	Major Candidates	Background	Number of Vote Recieved
1. For Macao	Jose Luis Sales Marques	Macanese	892
2. Macao New Power	Fong Man-tat	Pro-democracy	448
3. New Democratic Macao Association	Ng Kuok-cheong* Au Kam-sam* Chan Wai-chi	Pro-democracy	23,489
4. Democratic Activism Association	Lee Kin-yun	Pro-democracy	655
5. Macao New Youth	U Wai-ang	Pro-Beijing	3,058
6. Workers Union	Jeremy Lei Man-chow	Pro-democracy	457
7. United Force	Leong heng-teng* Iong Weng-ian*	Pro-Beijing	11,989
8. Love Macao General Union	Fong Chi-keong*	Gaming Industry	8,529
9. Macao Development Alliance	Angela Leong On-kei* Ambrose So	Gaming Industry	11,642
10. Association for Democracy and Social Well-being for Macao	Wong Cheong-nam	Pro-democracy	4,358
11. Macao Vision Association	Lok Tak-wah	Pro-Beijing	1,974
12. Union for the General Federation of Gaming Sector Workers	Joao Bosco Hong Lok Cheang	Gaming Industry	921
13. Macao Development Convergence	David Chow Kam-fai*	Gaming Industry	6,081
14. Development Union	Kwan Tsui-hang* Leong Iok-wa*	Pro-Beijing	16,596
15. Close to the People and Community Support Association	Paul Pun Chi-meng	Pro-democracy	2,943
16. New Hope	Jose Maria Pereira Cautinho*	Civil Servant	9,974
17. Citizens Rights Association	Cheak Veng-sang	Independent	191
18. Macao United Citizens Association	Chan Meng-kam* Ung Choi-kun*	Gaming Industry	20,701

Note: “*” Candidate was elected

Source: MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly election homepage which is available at “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.”

Fierce competition in direct election encouraged informal electoral campaign. For formal activities, the Legislative Assembly Electoral System and Electoral Law defined various activities that candidates could conduct during the campaign period.⁷⁶ For instance, the government administration fixed some areas where candidates could display their posters and conduct activities promoting themselves.⁷⁷ Candidates were not allowed to have advertisement on mass media and they could not conduct any campaign activities on the election day.⁷⁸ On the other hand, the Radio of Macao and Television of Macao conducted forums that inviting candidates expressing their platform as well as questioning among candidates themselves.

Although the electoral law as well as guidelines by the government administration limited and restricted activities by candidates as well as social groups and organizations, some of them campaigned in an informal way that possessing problem of morality and violating the restrictions. First, candidates would like to use their personal networks with social organization to promote themselves. For instance, Fong Man-tat, a pro-democracy candidate, indicated that Leong Iok-wa campaigned in some social groups’ gatherings before the official period.⁷⁹ Angela Leong On Kei, who is the fourth wife of Stanley Ho, campaigned in the gathering of Socidade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDM) staff association. It is noted that the STDM was one of the major gamblers controlled by Stanley Ho. Chan Meng-kam had strong connection with the Fujian clan associations and mobilized the support of Fujianese in Macao.⁸⁰ On the election day, the Fujian clan associations provided free transportation to voters and organized them to vote.⁸¹ According to Jeremy Lei whose base was at the Northern District, Lok Tak-wah sought support of a church in the Northern District and promoted herself in the church activities.⁸² Yet, some candidates were heavily dependent on the political mobilization by groups and organizations.

Second, schools also involved in the electoral campaign for candidates. According to electoral law, candidates could not display their poster in public area. Some schools hanged particular candidates’ posters in the campus. Although school campus might not regarded as public area, students and their parents as well as pedestrians could easily assign the political information. For instance, the Workers’ Children Secondary School hanged the poster of pro-Beijing Development Union in the campus.⁸³ The Neighborhood School in the Northern District posted the notice by the pro-Beijing United Force. Candidates also mobilized students to campaign for them. Some students from the Hou Kong Middle School complained in discussion groups on the internet that Chan Hang, who was a candidate of the pro-Beijing Macao New Youth and a teacher of the Hou Middle School, forced them to work for the candidate list on the election day.⁸⁴ Responding the complaints, Chan Hang posted her explanation on discussion groups that she only encouraged students to participate in the elections as a mean of civic education.⁸⁵ These implied that candidates, especially from the pro-Beijing forces, would like to mobilize their support through their network with schools in Macao.

Third, some business groups campaigned for candidates, especially to those from the gaming industry. Similar to some schools, some shops posted the posters of particulars candidates so that their clients as well as pedestrians could watch the materials easily. For example, some supermarkets hanged the pro-Beijing Development Union’s posters while some property agencies displayed posters of Macao United Citizen Association, led by Chan Meng-kam from the gaming industry.

Besides, the STDM group showed its strong support to the Macao Development Alliance led by Angela Leong On-kei. It was noted that the ballot number of Macao Development Alliance was number “9” and sunflower was the campaign logo of the Alliance. On the one hand, most shops affiliated with the STDM changed their decoration with the use of sunflowers. For example, the New Yaohan Department Store as well as the lobby of Hotel Lisboa were decorated with full of sunflowers during the election period.⁸⁶ The fence of Macao Jockey Club was covered by banner full of sunflower (few hundreds meters length). These were signals reminding voters in a subtle way.

Besides, the STDM group carried out “Number 9” promotion campaign. For instance, the Mario Cake Shop provided a discount for a pound of cake with only MOP$90. The New Yaohan Department Store had the September Lucky Draw promotion from 18 to 26 September 2005. It is noted that the election day was on 25 September 2005. The campaign emphasized that there would be 999 prizes. There were two first prizes with MOP$99,999 cash dollar, 19 second prizes with MOP$9,999 cash dollar, 189 third prizes with MOP$999 cash dollar, and 789 special prices with MOP$99 consumption coupon in the Department Store. The Seng Heng Bank offered special interests rate of 3.6 a year to employees from gaming industry and medical professional for opening fix deposit account.⁸⁷ Interestingly, all posters and promotion leaflets by these companies, which have association with the STDM and Stanley Ho, highlighted the number “9” and used sunflowers in the background design. It was generally perceived that they were campaigning for Angela Leong. Ambrose So, director of Seng Heng Bank and candidate of the Macao Development Alliance, marked “Many enterprises have come up with methods to help support our cause. They are just marketing themselves. If they want to support us, there is nothing we can do.”⁸⁸ Although the electoral law prohibited campaign by commercial groups,⁸⁹ the STDM group’s maneuver took advantage in the grey area of the law and campaigned for Angela Leong in a subtle way. On the election day, the STDM organized its employees, grouping them together and transported them to polling station. Interesting, it rented over hundred taxis for the transportation.⁹⁰

Similar to the Macao Development Alliance, the Macao United Citizens Association, led by Chan Meng-kam, received supported from the Golden Dragon group. Chan is the boss of the Golden Dragon group. The Golden Dragon Electric Appliance campaigned for Chan by displaying the Association’s poster in the shops.⁹¹ Besides, workers wore the campaign T-shirt of the Association in the shops. On the election day, some of Golden Dragon Electric Appliance shops were closed and became a working station for the Association mobilizing and organizing voters to polling stations. Although electoral campaign was forbidden on the election day, some groups and organizations campaign for candidates, like the Macao Development Alliance and the Macao United Citizens Association, and mobilized voters in an explicative way. Besides, the Golden Dragon Hotel became a station of the Macao United Citizens Association for the mobilization of electorates on the election day. Obviously, some commercial groups heavily involved in the 2005 elections that they campaigned for particular candidate lists with the expense of their resources. Such expense might not be counted in candidate’s electoral expenditure.

Fourth, the media might have their intention on supporting particular candidates. Although the Election Commission, which was responsible for the electoral administration, issued guideline to media for fair treatment in reporting candidates’ activities, some newspapers seemed to show their favour to some candidates. For example, the Macao Daily heavily reported the activities by the FTU, the Kaifong Association and the Macao Women Association. It is noted that major candidates of Development Union were from the FTU while candidates of United Force were mainly from the Kaifong Association and the Women Association of Macao. Some of their candidates participated in the activities by the FTU, the Kaifong Association and the Women Association of Macao during the campaign period. The Macao Daily News reported these activities with coverage including these candidates. Although the Macao Daily News tended to balance the coverage of campaign activities of the eighteen candidate lists, it selectively reported candidates’ “non-campaign” activities in various social groups and organizations. In fact, there was complaint in the Macao Radio that the Macao Daily News was biased to the traditional pro-Beijing candidates.⁹² Besides, the Journal Do Cidadao seemed to have more coverage on Angela Leong’s activities. For example, when the campaign period started on 10 September 2005, the Journal Do Cidadao heavily reported the Macao Development Alliance’s activities and focused on Angela Leong.⁹³

Due to the fierce competition, the informal campaign by candidates was marketized to money politics. First, during the voter registration period in April and May 2005, some candidates paid citizens for their registration as new voters and kept their voter identity card. They would return their cards to these new voters on the election. It is note that electorates had to present their voter identity card in the polling station before collecting the ballots. The collection of voter identity cards could help candidates recording their support and avoid other candidates seeking support from them. However, it was illegal for any individual keeping others’ voter identity cards. The Commission Against Corruption (CCAC) investigated some agents working for candidates that they were suspected to pay citizens for their voter registration and kept their voter identity cards.

Second, candidates tended to mobilize voters by providing free meals and gifts. During the campaign period, different social groups and organizations held gatherings for their members that free meals and gifts were provided to participants. At the same time, some candidates would attend these activities and sought for electoral support.⁹⁴ There was report that Stanley Ho, who controlled the STDM group and husband of Angela Leong, sponsored thousands of free meals campaigning for Leong in the 2005 elections.⁹⁵ For example, some organizations distributed moon cakes to their members, such as the STDM staff association, as the Middle Autumn Festival was in the campaign period,.⁹⁶ Besides, some candidates as well as organizations provided free meal to voters on election day that they could enjoy their food before or after casting their ballots. Some restaurants were reserved by some candidates for serving their supporters on the election day.⁹⁷ Furthermore, one citizen told that some restaurants would not charge their clients, and indicated, “the waiter said that the bill had been paid and asked them to go voting.”⁹⁸ This implied that some sponsored restaurants with providing free meals for electoral mobilization.

Third, candidates from gaming industry would like to reward their employees working in casinos with extra payment, bonus as well as salary increase if they would be elected. For instance, the day before the election, Stanley Ho, the Chairman of STDM, openly remarked that Angela Leong reminded him several time to give extra bonus to STDM employees and he would do that at the year end.⁹⁹ Besides, there was report that STDM employees would have extra pay for their participation in the election and vote to Angela Leong.¹⁰⁰ Besides, there was rumor that if David Chow Kam-fai, a casino boss, was elected, his employees would have extra year-end bonus.¹⁰¹

Fourth, vote buying was obvious in the 2005 direct election. There were a lot of rumors in the election market for the price of each vote.¹⁰² The CCAC arrested a candidate and other agents who were suspected for vote buying. According to Au Kam-sam, candidate of the pro-democracy New Democratic Macao Association, vote-buying activities were mainly from candidates with gaming industry background.¹⁰³ Jeremy Lei, candidate of the pro-democracy Workers Union, complained that he was suffered from the vote buying by other candidates.¹⁰⁴ At the beginning Lei estimated that he should receive over three thousands votes. However, his list only grasped 457 votes. Many supporters told him that their ballots were “bought” to other candidates. Lei also remarked that due to the fierce competition, some pro-Beijing candidates finally bought votes in the Northern District where was the base of Lei.

The marketization of informal politics in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections, to a great extent, was due to the deficiency of the formal political institution. The formal institution failed to avoid and suppress irregularities as well as vote buying in the elections. Although the CCAC aimed to fighting against irregularities with money politics in the elections, it was incapable to halt vote buying. The inefficient legal system was favourable to candidates who would like to buy votes. For instance, the CCAC received about 800 complaints about vote buying and other relevant irregular activities during May and September 2005 and investigated twelve cases in which some suspects (including one candidate) were arrested.¹⁰⁵ However, the inefficiency of court delayed the prosecution process that none of those charges had been managed by the court before the election. It is noteworthy that the authorities could not disclose the names and other details of suspects before the court formally managing a charge. Those suspects could continue the irregular or illegal activities during the campaign period and candidates were not threatened by the authorities.

On the other hand, the CCAC lacked of capacity striking against vote buying in elections. Au Kam-sam, a legislator, indicated that the agency was lacking of resource fighting against vote buying activities which were conducted in an organized way and in large scale.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, it could not take per-emptive action that arranging spies in groups and organizations, and collecting evidence on irregularities. It was because the court would not accept evidence collected by spies. Therefore, the CCAC found difficulties in their investigation and collecting evidence for the charge.

Furthermore, the marketization of informal politics in Macao elections, to an extent, reflected the political culture of Macao people. Although there were criticisms against vote buying in the Macao community,¹⁰⁷ some citizens were happy for these irregular and illegal activities. For example, the Macao Daily News quoted from an electorate: “There are a lot of entertainments today (the election day). I enjoyed a free meal in the morning and then traveled to the polling station by a beautiful car. I also received munificent ‘remuneration’. That would be great if there was election every month.”¹⁰⁸ Au Kam-sam interpreted why some citizens accepted to corruption in elections because the legislature could not represent electorates’ interests.¹⁰⁹ He indicated that legislators from the indirect elections and appointed by the Chief Executive¹¹⁰ did not stand for public interests but to the businessmen. To most Macao people, the legislature could not protest their interests. The election was not important to them. On the other hand, they could receive immediate benefits provided by candidates for buying vote. Citizen’s acceptance to vote buying may probably reveal their frustration toward the political institution. Like Herbert Yee’s remark, “most Macau people do not care much, or feel powerless, about politics.”¹¹¹
Informal Politics, Governance and Democratization

Informal politics, to an extent, contributed to the success of Edmund Ho’s first-term ruling in the MSAR. On one hand, Ho’s government successfully revitalized Macao’s economy which has been under recession since 1997. On other hand, Ho could maintain stable community both socially and politically. Instead of going through the formal institutions, Edmund Ho used informal channels and networks to balance the various interests in Macao. For instance, in order to have smooth transition for the liberalization of gaming industry, the MSAR authorities granted one of the three licenses to the existing monopolist STDM led by Stanley Ho. There was wide-spread rumor in the community that, at the beginning, the STDM’s tender proposal was not ranked at the top three. However, considering the transitional period, the government held informal negotiation with Stanley Ho. Finally, it raised the STDM’s ranking and granted a license to it so that the STDM would continue the gaming business in Macao when the other new licensers was planning and building their own casinos. In fact, Stanley Ho openly marked that the STDM had to be guaranteed for a license to continue its gaming business before the government formally notified the tender result.

On the other hand, Edmund Ho grasped the support of social groups to stabilize the society. In 2000, there was riot in Macao by unemployed workers who fought for the government assistance to their lives. In order to please the grievance of unemployed, the MSAR government carried out re-training scheme that they would be subsidized for attending re-training courses. Besides, Edmund Ho mobilized the support of social groups and organizations to unify the society and avoided to confrontation in the community.

In his second term, Edmund Ho could still use his informal network governing Macao. For example, he successfully mobilized groups and organizations to support his education policy. In 2005, there was a split in the Macao society for whether the government should extend free education to the post-secondary level or to the kindergarten education. According to Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, who was a pro-democracy legislator and support the extension of free education to post-secondary school, all candidates in 2001 legislative Assembly elections supported free education in the post-secondary school.¹¹² However, the government tended to provide free kindergarten education. After Ho’s mobilization, most social groups and organizations supported government proposal.

Informal politics could be a remedy to the deficiency of formal institution in Macao. The Chief Executive Edmund Ho skillfully resolved the confrontation between the MSAR government and antenna companies with informal politics. In Macao society, there were six antenna companies provided local and international television signals to residents. However, these companies did not receive consent of channel owners and contravened the monopoly franchise of Macau Cable when delivering television channels to residents. In August 2005, the Office for the Development of Telecommunication and Information Technology (GDTTI) of the MSAR government received complaints from the Macau Cable for the contravention of property rights, and hence, requesting the antenna firms halting to transfer unauthorized channels to residents. Responding to the GDTTI’s decision, the antenna companies stopped their service (including free TV channels such as the Television of Macao) to Macao residents on 1 September.¹¹³ It has to note that the majority Macao residents relied on these antenna companies’ services for receiving TV channels. The monopoly franchise of Macau Cable was a colonial legacy that the Portuguese colonial government disregarded public interests and granted a single license to the Portuguese-based Macau Cable broadcasting various television channels.¹¹⁴ During the colonial era, the Macao government did not pressure on the antenna firms cutting off their illegal channels after granting the monopoly to the Macau Cable. The antenna firms’ protest shocked the Macao society that severely undermined public interests to receiving free and public channels. Ho’s administration encountered a dilemma between the law and public interests. Finally, Ho decided not to exert sanction on the antenna companies and marked that this was a complicated issue and the MSAR government would keep discussion with different parties for solution.¹¹⁵ There was no further complaint from the Macau Cable and the antenna companies. The latter continued their services to residents with the consensus of the authorities. Obviously, Ho solved the dispute in an informal “black box” so as to balance the interests of different parties. Yet, as Joseph Fewsmith marked, “informal politics is not wholly negative.”¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, informal politics in Macao is corroding the governability of the MSAR government. To the fact that informal politics helped Edmund Ho ruling the territory, his over-dependence on social groups and organizations is undermining the MSAR government’s capacity to striking against irregularities generated by social groups politics. The rampant irregularities in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections illustrated the incapability of the MSAR government in dealing with social groups and organizations. It is noteworthy that some criticized the 2005 elections were so corrupted than ever before.¹¹⁷ On one hand, the CCAC as well as the judicial branch could not effectively suppress vote buying activities. For instance, during the voter registration period in the first half year of 2005, the CCAC investigated cases in which some agents paid for voter registration. It arrested suspects for voting buying before the election. These could be perceived as an alarm to groups and organizations from the authorities against corruption in elections. However, vote buying activities were continued with greater scale than ever before.

On the other hand, Ho failed to use his informal network to halt or stifle these irregularities. Au Kam-sam, a pro-democracy legislator, indicated most candidates involved in irregular activities were Ho’s good friends while some were so powerful (politically and financially) that they could ignore him.¹¹⁸ Ho could not halt irregularities through informal mean. Au marked, for example, “When Ng Kuok-cheong and I met the Chief Executive and discussed about dishonest traders who indulged malpractices, and defrauded citizens and tourists, Ho said that he had talked to them but they did not listen to him.”¹¹⁹ The 2005 elections may imply that the MSAR government could not halt irregular and illegal activities through formal and informal means when the vest interests of social groups and organizations were involved.

To the fact that informal politics smooth Ho’s ruling, the formal institutions are incapable to limit social groups’ informal act so as to balance interests from different classes. Ng Kuok-cheong, a pro-democracy legislator, argued that government policies were biased to businessmen.¹²⁰ For example, he indicated that the Macao government did not conduct open bidding for selling land but granted the land-use rights to individual developers through “black box” negotiation. Jeremy Lei, a pro-democracy unionist, agreed with Ng and indicated that the labour class was dissatisfied government’s labour policy which was inclined to the businessman.¹²¹ The government allowed corporations employed imported labour when there was relatively high unemployment in the lower class. Lei interpreted government’s labour policy was biased to the businessmen that they could lower the salary of local employees through importing labour outside Macao.¹²² The labour class did not enjoy wage increase with Macao’s high-rising economic growth. He predicted that the discontent of labour class was intensifying and a large-scale confrontation would be expected sooner or later. The MSAR government’s ability and capacity on balancing interests of groups and organizations is questionable. At the very beginning of the 2005 elections, the authorities had anxiety for their ability in dealing with gamblers. The latter strongly mobilized citizens in the voter registration campaigned and spent a lot in elections. Their participation in the legislature may further curtail governments’ capacity to balance interests in the formal institutions.¹²³ It is noteworthy that the Chief Executive was selected by Election Committee while the latter was formed by social groups and organizations which were dominated by businessmen. Therefore, candidates need to seek political support from the business sector for running CE election. This probably undermined the CE’s capacity in balancing interests between the business and labour classes, to a certain extent. Although Macao’s economy enjoyed substantial growth since the handover and the MSAR government did not encounter problem of resources competition from the public, the government would face substantial pressure from groups and organizations when the economy is down turned. However, the formal and informal political dynamics limited the authorities suppressing irregularities and balancing interests of different parties. As a result, governance crisis may probably be the consequence.

Furthermore, informal politics does not enhance but corrupt the democratization of Macao. Social organizations do not possess encouragement for mass participation in regular way. They are merely the political capital of actors for their negotiation aiming at their political interests, and mobilization machinery in public elections. To the fact that more and more social organizations have being formed, this phenomenon does not imply the incline of mass participation in Macao polity. Most of these organizations were set up by actors who have already been in the political sphere. These actors paid for the inauguration and operations of organization. In return, they could have political support in the selection of Election Committee members as well as the Legislative Assembly indirect elections. Besides, social groups and organizations became agencies mobilizing public support as well as conducting vote-buying activities for these actors in the Legislative Assembly direct elections. Yet, informal politics in Macao distorted mass participation to irregularities with money politics. This phenomenon is the marketization of informal politics, as indicated by Dittmer. Social groups and organizations are agencies serving political elite who would pay for their election activities. It is noteworthy that when marketization of informal politics pinned in Macao society, democratic participation would be distorted by money politics. Iu Veng-ion, an Election Committee member for the Chief Executive, indicated his worry that further democratization of Macao would put forward vote buying in elections.¹²⁴ Therefore, the extension of social groups politics in Macao may not trigger to the incline of mass participation but the corruption of it.