Formal and Informal Politics in Macau Special Administrative Region Elections
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- Types of Politics: Formal Vs Informal
- Election System for MSAR Chief Executive
- Elections for the Chief Executive and Election Committee
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Formal and Informal Politics in Macao Special Administrative Region Elections Politics, marked by Haruhiro Fukui, can be categorized to formal and informal types. The former is defined as the political participation under the “rules and institutions” while the latter is a kind of “conventions and codes behaviour”, such as cronyism and gunxi network, in the political sphere.1 According to Fukui, formal politics is regarded as “the normal and orthodox form of politics,”2 which is governed by various political institutions. Institution is defined as “an internally coherent set of rules applicable to a large but specific and bounded functional area.”3 Politics involves different kind of political institutions “such as constitutional, legislative, administrative, judicial, electoral, party, interest groups, and so on.”4 The interactions between the various political institutions, which are bounded and guided by rules and regulations, construct the formal pattern of politics. However, politics per se should not merely embrace formal type. Political interactions between institutions and social groups should not only be characterized by rules and regulations. It is a kind of human behaviour that personal interaction is indispensable and inevitable. The scope of political institutions is not large enough and sufficiently controlling all personal relations in political process. Political institutions should not be “the perimeter of an intrinsic entity” for politics.5 Instead, it is the boundary dividing formal and informal politics. The latter is beyond political institutions and involves personal interactions which, sometimes, are “condemned as arbitrary, unfair or corrupt.”6 In a simple sense, formal politics equates with the concept “rule of law” while the informal pattern is a reflection of “rule of man”.7 Distinguishing formal and informal politics, Lowell Dittmer develops a typology embracing the means and the ends in the political process. According to Dittmer, political means can be divided into legitimate and illegitimate kinds while the ends of political process will result in either public or private benefits/interests.8 Formal and informal politics aim to achieving legitimate public ends—power or policy—but they are through various means. The former consists of the use of legitimate means while the latter is through illegitimate one. Illegitimate means may imply “either expedients, ranging from the merely shady to the downright nefarious, or relationships, which also vary from mere unofficial channels to criminal connections.”9 It should be noted that illegitimate means may not necessarily be illegal but immoral. Politics, which pursues for private and individual interests and which is, no matter, through legitimate or illegitimate means, is either partisanship or corruption (see Table 1). Table 1: A Typology for Formal and Informal Politics
Source: Lowell Dittmer, “Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 293. In the expense of the concept of formal and informal politics, this paper explores the dynamics between political elite and social groups in Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR). According to Herbert Yee, Macao’s political system is characterized as “social group politics” that social groups are the major entity for political participation.10 This paper aims at understanding the dynamics between social groups and government institutions through investigating the influence and role of social groups in the 2004 Chief Executive (CE) election and 2005 Legislative Assembly elections. Yet, it explores how social groups participate in politics formally and informally. It will argue that the formal and informal interactions between social groups and government institutions are beneficial to the development as well as the reinforcement of the domination of social groups for being the major entity for political participation in Macao polity. It will further argue that formal politics possesses more than window-dressing function to reveal the “normal and orthodox form of politics” while the informal type is the real process for decision making. However, the formal and informal dynamics generated irregularities triggering to money politics. Finally, it will conclude that the dynamics of formal and informal politics did not possess enhancement but corruption of the governability of Macao authorities as well as in forging a democratic MSAR regime. This paper will first discuss the relationships between formal and informal politics in a political system. Second, it will introduce the CE election system in the MSAR and discuss its encouragement to informal politics in election. Third, it will explore how political elite and social groups participated in the 2004 CE election formally and informally. Fourth, the informal politics in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections would be discussed. Finally, this paper will explain the implication of informal politics on Macao’s democratization and the governability of the MSAR government. Types of Politics: Formal Vs Informal Informal politics holds complementary function to formal politics. As mentioned above, politics should not merely embrace the formal type that concerning the use of rules and regulations.11 Political disputes may not be simply resolved in the political institutions. Particularly, the scope and authority of formal rules and procedures are not sufficient to manage and resolve conflicts in the polity. Informal rules and practices may be essential for resolution so that they “fill in lacunae in the reach of formal politics.”12 At the same time, formal politics is a “temple” for the practice and development of informal politics.13 Formal institutions facilitate office, status and power for which political actors are seeking. Inside political institutions, elite can develop their personal networks as well factional groups through their political authority. These networks and groupings are operating informally and tend to influence the formal institutions for legitimate public policy.14 Although political institutions are governed by legitimate rules and regulations, the dynamics between political elite and their factional networks are being operated informally with less restriction from the institutions. Therefore, the former be regarded as temple which facilitate large space for informal political activities, but in which does not have partition guiding the latter performance. Nevertheless, formal and informal politics can be mutually exclusive.15 When formal leadership exerts heavy hand on the informal politics that extending the scope and authority of political institutions, the political activities of factional networks and social groups will be restricted and even suppressed.16 Contrary, informal political activity intensify when the formal institutions are disrupted.17 Dittmer further argues that informal politics would develop into two different directions in response to the change of formal institutions: suppression and marketization.18 In the perspective of suppression, political leaders, who may be under strong public pressure, would impose new rules and regulations to restrict informal networks and groups. As a result, informal politics would be forced to “go underground and operate more discreetly.”19 Under marketization, informal politics transforms to money politics. Political supports to elite and policies would be in terms of money.
According to the Basic Law of MSAR, the Chief Executive is selected by a 300-member Election Committee.20 The election collage should consist of representatives from the following sectors: 1) 100 members from the industrial, commercial and financial sectors; 2) 80 members from cultural and educational sectors and other professions; 3) 80 members labour, social services, religious and other sectors; 4) 40 members from the Legislative Assembly, Macao deputies of National People’s Congress (NPC) and Macao representatives of National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (NCCPPCC). The Chief Executive Election Law, which was passed by the Legislative Assembly of MSAR, defines the four sectors in details and divided these sectors into various subsectors as well as their composition (see Table 2). Table 2: Composition of Election Committee for the Selection of Chief Executive
Note: “*” The seats in religion subsector were distributed to four religions: a) Catholicism (two seats), b) Buddhism (two seats), 3) Christianity (1 seat); 4) Taoism (1 seat). Source: Chief Executive Election Law (Law no: 3/2004), Annex I, which is available at MSAR government web site: “http: Members of Election Committee should be elected by groups and organizations from the corresponding sectors.21 Social groups and organizations, which had been established for three years,22 had legal rights to nominate and vote for Election Committee members in sectors corresponding with the aim and nature of the organizations. Those who would like to be candidates for the Election Committee should be aged twenty-one year or above, and had to receive nomination with over twenty percent of organizations in the subsectors. As the First Sector was not divided into subsectors, candidates are required for getting the support from over twenty percent of groups and organizations in the whole sector.23 Besides, The Chief Executive Election Law also states that in the religion subsector of the third sector, four religions—Catholicism, Buddhism, Christianity and Taoism—would select their own representatives into the Election Committee without following the rules and procedures imposed in other sectors. Similarly, the Legislative Assembly of MSAR and the Macao members of the NCCPPCC would also select their representatives into the Election Committee themselves.24 Elections would be held for Election Committee members if the number of candidates was greater than the number of representatives in particular sectors/subsectors. Disregarding to the size of organizations, each social groups would have eleven representatives voting for Election Committee members.25 No election would be conducted when the number of candidates was equal to the number of seats in the sectors/subsectors; and all candidates would autonomically be Election Committee members.26 The 300-member Election Committee is responsible for the selection of the Chief Executive of MSAR. Those who would like to be candidates for the Chief Executive election had to be received nomination by at least fifty Election Committee members.27 According to Chief Executive Election Law, a qualified candidate for Chief Executive election should be:28
Different to the selection of Election Committee, election had to be held no matter there would be only one candidate or more. If there was only one candidate, he/she had to receive the absolute majority support in the election. When there were two or more candidates, the victor had also to receive absolute majority vote. If there were no candidates grasping over fifty percent of vote, there would be another election in which the top two candidates receiving highest share of vote would run and those who gained majority vote would win.29 The Chief Executive election system is favourable for the development of social groups politics. First, the Election Committee for the selection of Chief Executive is mainly composed by social groups and organizations which selected their representatives in it. Ordinary citizens could not participate in the election. Social groups and organizations become the sole channel for Macao citizens taking part in the election of their Chief Executive. These constitutional rights underpinned the domination of social groups for political participation in the MSAR. Second, there are very few restrictions for the formation of social groups and organizations in Macao. The most important criteria for a social organization are patriotism and the support to “One Country Two Systems”. Indeed, these statements have to be listed in organization’s charter.30 The size as well as nature of organizations is not a big deal. The minimum size of a social organization is three.31 In other words, three citizens can register for an organization to the government. Besides, the nature of organization is arbitrary. The organizers could draft the aims and objectives themselves. At the same time, the government decided organizations to various sectors/subsectors. For example, the Journalist Association belonged to the culture subsector of the second sector in the 2004 Chief Executive election while it was in the labour subsector of the third second sector in the 2001 Legislative Assembly indirect election.32 It has to note that the division of social groups for the Election Committee basically followed the categorization of social organization in the 2001 Legislative Assembly indirect election in which social groups were arranged to different sectors/subsectors for selecting their representatives. Besides, the Macao government would like to shape the law in order to grant voting rights in the selection of Election Committee members to particular organizations. For instance, according to Voter Registration Law, the Macao Law Society did not have the rights participation in the Election Committee election at the beginning because it was mainly funded by the government.33 Therefore, the government revised the Chief Executive Election Law that the provision would not be effective in the specialty subsector. Then the Law Society could join the Election Committee through that subsector. Third, every groups and organizations have equal influence in the Election Committee election. As mentioned above, each social organization in particular sector/subsector had eleven votes, regardless of their sizes. Therefore, those, who would like to strengthen their influence in the Election Committee, could set up and sponsor more social groups so that they would have more votes in the election. According Leong Kam-chun, an Election Committee member from the specialty subsector of the third sector, three people could set up three organizations that they could share the chairpersonship of their organizations alternatively. Besides, someone could sponsor other to form organizations which would be under the former control.34 The Macao Daily also reported a case that one citizens set up over ten organizations at once time.35 In fact, the number of social groups has been increasing drastically since the handover of Macao. According to the Macao government, there was about three-time growth for the number of social groups, which had been established for over three and had electoral capability in the Legislative Assembly indirect election as well as the Election Committee for the Chief Executive, from 1999 to 2004 (see Table 3). According informal statistics, the total number of social groups (including those with and without electoral capability in elections) was about six hundreds in 1999 but rose to over two thousands and two hundreds in early 2004.36 At the end of 2004, there were over two thousands and six hundreds. Leong Kam-chun marked that more and more social organizations were formed for their participation in elections.37 Clearly, the electoral system in Macao encouraged the formation and development of social groups which are regarded as the main entity for the political participation. Table 3: Numbers of Social Groups having Electoral Capability
Source: Overseas Chinese Daily, 20 April 2004, p. 4. Elections for the Chief Executive and Election Committee The 2004 Chief Executive election could be marked as an uncontestable game. There was only one candidate Edmund Ho Hau-wah running the election. Ho received 296 out of 300 Election Committee members’ support and was re-elected.38 In fact, it widely perceived in the Macao society that Edmund Ho could also be re-elected even there would be universal suffrage election because of his prominent performance in his first term. The uncontestable Chief Executive election was also characterized by the consensus politics for the formation of Election Committee. It is noteworthy that none sectors/subsectors held elections for selecting representatives in the Election Committee, except the specialty subsetor of the third sector. Most social groups tended to avoid having elections for the Election Committee.39 There was consensus that groups and organizations cooperated in various sectors/subsectors and worked out the candidates lists in which the number of candidates was equal to the number of seats.40 It was because they would like to maintain the political harmony in Macao society and they could not control the election result.41 Electoral competition was perceived to harm the cooperation among social groups and bring political instability in the polity.42 Yet, those who received sufficient nomination from social groups would automatically be members of Election Committee. There was comment that the candidate lists made among groups was based on the seniority of political actors in the society. Elite who were relative young for their participation in grassroots activities had less possibility for being nominated and hence becoming Election Committee members. Nevertheless, competition still appeared informally. On the one hand, some actors would like to block the participation of senior elite who were not energetic enough in political and social activities. Iu Veng-ion, an Election Committee member from the labour subsector, indicated that some elder elite were perused to step down and leave more opportunity to younger generation who were enthusiastic to contribute to Macao society.43 The Macao Daily also reported that in order to facilitate more political room for younger generation, some traditional elite did not participate in the Election Committee election.44 On the other hand, competition between young elite seemed to be keen. They competed to pursue leaders from groups and organizations and would like to grasp their nomination. Facing keen competition, some actors were suspect to use personal networks as well as money to grasp the support from social groups and organizations.45 Besides, the political bargaining was inter-sector/subsector. Some would shift to other sectors/subsectors when they had less change for being nominated in particular constituencies. Iu Veng-ion, who was also a labour organization’s leader, noted that groups and organizations had difficulty for making consensus in the nomination process in order to accommodate the various demands from elite and organizations.46 There was comment that the selection process for Election Committee member should have legitimacy because of the competition for nomination.47 Competition was also observed in the Specialty Subsector of the Third Sector. It was the only subsector in which election was held. In this subsector, there were forty-six social groups and organizations and would have thirty representatives in the Election Committee. Thirty-two candidates got their nomination with the support of sufficient number of organizations.48 At the beginning, similar with their counterparts in other subsectors, most groups and organizations in the specialty subsector tended to avoid to election that they would like to have thirty candidates who got nomination—a number which was equal to the amount of representatives of the subsector. However, some organizations, which were from the young generation, in the subsector were unhappy and dissatisfied to the traditional dominant groups nominating candidate whom was suspect for ethical problem in his/her professional.49 Leong Kim-chun, Election Committee member from the specialty subsector, indicated that election being held in this subsector clearly reflected the dissatisfaction of particular groups and organizations toward individual candidates as well as the traditional dominant groups.50 Therefore, some organizations did not compromise with the traditional groups and successfully nominated Fong Man-tat and Lai I Sun in the subsector.51 Although Fong and Lai were defeated finally in the election,52 their success for nomination marked the possibility as well as actualization for electoral competition in Chief Executive Election. The 2004 Chief Executive election demonstrated that the formal institutions of the MSAR were, as Fukui’s mark, the “temple” for the informal politics in the system. On the one hand, the formal institutions do not suppress informal politics. The election system mainly drew the procedures for selecting the Election Committee members as well as the Chief Executive but it did not intend to restrict the informal activities between groups and organizations. The latter enjoyed political space from the formal institutions for their negotiation. On the other hand, the formal politics encourages informal political behavour. As mentioned, the election system encouraged the formation of social groups and organizations. By inaugurating more social organizations, the social and political elite would grasp more political capital in the negotiation and bargain with other. Formal institutions nourish the informal type of politics in Macao. The informal politics of MSAR, to an extent, reflects the political culture of Macao emphasizing harmony and consensus. Dittmer indicated that informal politics is a subset of political culture.53 It reflects attitude and behaviour of political actors as well as citizens in the polity. In the 2004 MSAR Chief Executive election, the political actors tended to avoid open competition in formal election; instead they would like to have negotiation among groups and organizations for mutual interests. Open competition was regarded as undermining the political harmony in Macao society. Referencing the case of Hong Kong, many Macao people considered political competition only triggered to confrontation between groups, and hence, to political instability that would finally jeopardize the economy.54 The non-competitive election reflected the political culture of Macao—political harmony and consensus of politics.55 To an extent that the political negotiation among groups in the 2004 Chief Executive election might have the problem of morality—involving money politics and personal network, the general public showed their acceptance. For instance, although the media commented that the negotiation and bargains of social groups were not transparent and were held in a black box, they balanced the interest of groups and organizations. Furthermore, the negotiation did not necessarily protest the interest of traditional mainstream organizations as well as senior elite in the system. Some senior political actors were pursued not to participate in the Election Committee. The informal politics could generate competition in it and tended to avoid political monopoly by particular groups and elite. The result deemed to be acceptable to Macao society. Yüklə 177,5 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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