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3.6. Discussion
How can a scenario practitioner ease bureaucrats’ psychological barriers? We know
that the time horizon for politicians is rather short, while the policy execution needs to
play out over a much longer period. This means that the environment around the
policy execution, that is the task of bureaucrats, is ever more vulnerable to change
with time. Hence, the methodological risk assessment of the implementation of the
current plan must be in bureaucrats’ interest. How to convince them?
The scale of uncertainty itself can be useful in making the case. As seen in “Energy
2030”, in the year 2004/05 the issue of climate change loomed large on the agenda
and Japanese civil society noticed that this was an issue not easily dismissed – but
countermeasures to the issue were not at all fixed. This condition called for a
scenario-style study, which could invite a variety of opinions and proposed solutions.
Bureaucrats conceded that they couldn’t control this new issue and appealed to the
public: “let’s think together.” Then, gradually climate change became a matter of
political and administrative negotiations, international and domestic; the technocrats
became ready to construct their masterly regulatory actions. With this new phase, the
role of scenario practitioners ended.
Another possible legitimisation for inviting scenario planning in Japanese officialdom
might be to boldly demonstrate the unavoidable uncertain nature of future horizon.
Scenario study will report the crude fact that any development of policy environment
toward future contains some uncertainty. A well-argued scenario framework could
convince audiences to accept the need of exploratory mind set and of being ready for
future surprises. This means that by offering a thinking framework in scenario style,
public servants can establish its independency from political decision process. Here,
choice will be made by politicians for his/her preferred policies and their plausible
outcomes. In return bureaucrats can claim with pride that their role is only to offer
several equally possible policy choices. They are now living in the realm of
professionalism; however, can they ever restrict their born ambition of being in part
of important political decisions?
In this regard there was unique and appreciable event that may have affected the mind
set of senior bureaucrats, who are specialised in the energy policies. This event may
have told them that in some cases the political decision process offers no room for
public servants to play.
The recent political turmoil in Japan has been teaching bureaucrats that the governing
practices of the ruling party may not always work. In 2011/12, after the great earth
quake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accidents, Democratic Party, then ruling party,
strived hard and fixed the national energy plan with a package of numerical targets.
Bureaucrats specialised in energy policies were mobilised heavily and with the help
of outside energy experts crafted piles of supporting calculation and documents.
Furthermore, Democratic Party introduced a novel process of ‘deliberative poll’ in
order for the lay citizens to discuss and come to an ideological consensus around the
future of nuclear energy and its industry. The conclusion was to disestablish nuclear
acknowledge that he cannot always clarify what works. Expressing uncertainty is seen to be politically
the weak and administratively untidy. In response to such lack of certainty, the hard-writing of British
public policy making becomes apparent. ”
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power soonest possible. But, when in 2012 Liberal Democratic Party came back to
power, the Democratic Party’s energy plan was instantly abandoned. Prime minister
decided to scrap the plan with a brief word of “it is not based on the reality, and need
a full revision.”
A gross humiliation for bureaucrats. And this is a crisis for Japanese bureaucracy
because by force of habit, bureaucrats have been fixated on the high profile examples
and the well-understood procedures of the past. As Cerase discussed [Cerase, 2002],
this kind of administrative skill has been regarded as an important asset in order to
handle critical situation with a sense of stability. The above case betrayed, and hence
undermined the authority of officialdom. By drawing profound lessons, would the
officials cautiously retreat to their proud professionalism?
My account is that senior public servants won’t abandon their ambition to get
involved in the high level political decision process, which may eventually take them
to possible careers in politics. In Japan senior public servants are regarded by
political parties as the reservoir of candidates for general election. Politicians and
senior bureaucrats are both statists and reliant on each other. For them the boundary
between political and administrative world is blurred. The senior public servants
want to claim themselves, hardheaded, earnest and reliable personalities, and hence
they are most hesitant to fiddle any hypothetical issues and questions, which the
scenario planning is very much good at.
Let us be back on the track.
There is another idea for easing bureaucrats’ psychological barriers. This idea is
more practical and operational. Providing a venue for unfettered conversation often
works fairly positive on bureaucrats’ mind. This paper earlier pointed that
government bureaucrats prefer the normative approach, which will arrive at one
single better future. The truth is that, bureaucrats are not philosophically normative
but are, once functioning in the officialdom, destined to behave normative. Therefore,
for them there is a need of venue outside the officialdom.
This desire of Japanese bureaucrats to have a free space for freer discussion seems
demonstrating in an interestingly subtle manner; weak governance on government
sponsored scenario projects.
There is a growing demand from Japanese governmental organisation on scenario
planning type project however; I, a practitioner, have been observing that when a
project starts, the governance on the process is very often left weak and unclear. The
client leaves the objectives of the project loosely defined at the initial stage, which
would gradually be found and formulated through the course of the scenario type
brainstorming. For the practitioner he/she will have to accept the shifting and even
floating objectives that the client and the practitioner originally contracted. In these
circumstances, the evaluation of success/failure of the project might be difficult if one
wishes to employ the criteria of target-result axis.
The reason for this seems simple. The client and the sponsor see the project as one-
off event and expect something novel would happen through the discussion process.
In Japanese public sector, doing scenario type project is yet an isolated event
compared to the day-to-day policy making and execution, therefore loose governance
over scenario type project is understandable.
21
The clients of scenario planning in public sectors wish to have a learning experience,
refreshment, breeze, wonder and intellectual adventure. Scenario practitioners
working for them accept to undertake this allocated role modestly. I see participants
are constructing individual meaning, taking in new information, accommodating them
and changing their mental models. This is an individual learning, not an
organisational one. And this is the niche for the scenario projects in Japanese public
organisation.
4. Conclusion
Reflecting Ringland’s proposal of two categories; ‘scenarios in public policy’ and
‘scenarios in the public sector’, in Japan, the former type of scenario projects can
count numerous. Also in other part of the world. Future scanning projects and
scenario projects have been developing in much more institutionalised and regularised
manner in such as UK, Sweden, Norway, Singapore and notably EU. There, ‘future
scanning industry’ has become popular and flourishing.
However, seeing the long history of R. D. Shell scenario planning, I may be able to
point out that excess institutionalisation of these activity could bring about the loss of
momentum both in client side and in scenario practitioners.
Above concern seems well noticed in Japan, especially in the public sector. I see that,
the loose governance of the scenario project and the isolation from the policy making
process might be intentional. Public officers hate to add administrative work for
doing scenario project. Bureaucrats live the world where neat, evidence-based
documents and proper administrative process are required, whereas a scenario project
is in general very time consuming, and only yields stories of the several plausible
futures! This may look awkward and disappointing outcome. The outcome can never
ever translate into concrete actions. However, public officers have known the best
cream of the project. The end result of the scenario project is not about a more
accurate picture of tomorrow, nor producing an attractive report.
Since 2008, I have been working for the GraSPP (Graduate School for Public Policy)
in The University of Tokyo, Japan, where I have been introducing academics and
students to the methodology and practices of scenario planning. In 2012, a scenario
planning course has established mainly for the graduate students who hope to make
their career in the public sector.
I hope that in future I could establish another scenario planning course in GraSPP
with the attendees of a mixture of Japanese bureaucrats, business people, students and
academics. The bureaucrats will preferably not be freshmen, but instead with five to
ten years of working experience behind them: they will have somehow experienced
difficulty and disappointment in their tasks and assignments. Business people will
come to the course to learn about the policy making and administrative process in
practice. Studying with them, bureaucrats can touch the real world in which business
people habitually claim they work.
Just alike “China Scenario 2007”, Japanese officials look for a proper venue,
politically safe, analytical but light hearted, to expose themselves onto outsiders’ open
criticism. In the course I could run in GraSPP, younger bureaucrats will be able to
enjoy adventures in scenario planning, with classmates who want to trust the
22
government. For bureaucrats, open and frank talks about government dysfunction
and mistakes, with people outside homogenous officialdom, are a tremendous
opportunity, and even holding such talks will be a crucial concession by them. Plus,
some of them will instantly recognise that scenario planning is an effective tool for
communication and engagement with society.
For me this seems enough. I share the view of As Arie de Geus, who claims;
Perception, to a human being, is an active engagement with the world
11
. [de Geus,
1997]
In reflecting on my years working with the Japanese government, I have noticed that
young bureaucrats are more and more conscious of the institutional barriers in
government against scenario-type studies, as well as the psychological barriers within
individuals. With recognition will come change: that is my hope. Scenario planning
is a theory and practice to make public servants think exploratively, by making them
‘derails' their expected future.
References
Cerase, Francesco Paolo (2002), Japanese Bureaucracy in Transition: Regulating
Deregulation, International Review of Administrative Sciences 2002 68: 629
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scenario planning, Futures 35 (2003) 445-460
de Geus, Arie (1997), The Living Company, Harvard Business School Press
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Development, Routledge, London
Howlett and Ramesh (2005), Studying public policy, Politcy Cycles and Policy
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Godet, Michel (2004), Manuel de prospective stratégique T1 et T2, Donod
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11
de Geus writes in The Living Company p.36, “We will not perceive a signal from the outside world
unless it is relevant to an opinion for the future that we have already worked out in our imaginations.
The more “memories of the future” we develop, the more open and receptive we will be to signals from
the outside world.”
23
Morita, Akira (2006), Politics of Government Councils, Jigaku Sensho, 森田朗『会
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