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in August 2013 by former president Bozizé. The number of anti–balaka have approximately
15,000 troops. [36] Another factor often cited in the violence is the issue of religion, with the conflict sometimes framed
as pitching the largely Muslim Séléka rebels against the predom- inantly Christian anti–balaka forces. [38] But while
religious tension is an important factor in some instances of violence, this framing is simplistic. For instance, along with
Muslims from CAR and abroad, the Séléka also includes many non–religious rebels, other bandits and opportunists
who have joined in the looting and vandalism since March 2013. And while the rebels have committed some religiously–
motivated atrocities against Christians, they are also driven by non–religious motivations and have attacked Muslim
communities on occa- sion. [39]
4. International military presence in CAR
France
France, practically since independence, has been present militarily in CAR. In 1997, France came to adopt new strategic
principles for its presence in Africa. [6] This included a reduced permanent presence on the continent and increased
support to multilateral interventions. In Central African Republic, the Bouar base and the Béal Camp (at that time
home to 1,400
French soldiers) in Bangui were shut down, as the French concentrated its African presence on Abidjan, Dakar, Djibouti,
Libreville and N’Djamena and the deployment of a
Force d’ac- tion rapide, based in France. (See Figure 5.)
However, due to the situation in the country, France has retained a military presence. During the mutinies, 2,400
French soldiers were patrolling the streets of Bangui. Their offi- cial task was to evacuate foreign citizens, but this did
not prevent direct confrontations with the mutineers (resulting in French and mutineer casualties). The level of French
involvement resulted in protests among the local population, since many sided with the mutineers and accused France
of defending a dictator against the people’s will. Voices were also heard in France where some blamed France for its
protection of a discredited ruler, totally incapable of exerting power and managing the country. After the mutinies in
1997, the MISAB was a multilateral force, but it was armed, equipped, trained and managed by France. The Chadian,
Gabonese and Congolese soldiers of the current Force multinationale en Centrafrique (FO- MUC) mission in the country
also enjoys logistical support from French soldiers. In response to the risk of genocide, France has increased its
military forces in CAR from November
2013. [40] Currently Franc has 1,600 troops in CAR. [41]
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Figure 5. French military in Africa. [36]
5. MISCA (Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique)
The African–led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA, French acronym for
Mission
internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite af- ricaine) is an African Union peacekeeping mission to the
Central African Republic. MIS- CA was established on December 5, 2013 by United Nations Security Council
resolution
2127 to stabilise the country as a result of the Central African Republic conflict under the Djotodia administration and
following the 2013 Central African Republic coup d’état. The mission, officially backed by France and initially led by
the African Union, was deployed on December 19, 2013. The resolution includes the option to transfer it to a larger
mission under United Nations authority with peacekeeping forces from more countries — if needed and if appropriate
local conditions are met. Troop contributing countries are: Burundi (850), Cameroon (800), Congo (850), RD Congo
(850), Gabon (500), Guinea Equatorial (200), and Chad (850).
Chad
In addition to the multilateral forces, there has been bilateral support from other African countries, such as the
Libyan and Congolese support for Patassé, mentioned above. Former president Bozizé is in many ways dependent on
Chad support. Chad has an interest in CAR, since it needs to ensure calmness close to its oil fields and the pipeline
leading to the Cam-
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eroonian coast, close to the troubled northwest CAR. Before seizing power, Bozizé built up his rebel force in Chad,
trained and augmented by the Chadian. President Déby assisted him actively in taking power in March 2003 (his rebel
forces included 100 Chadian soldiers). After the coup, another 400 soldiers were sent. Current direct support includes the
150 non– FOMUC Chadian troops that patrol the border area near Goré, the Chadian soldiers patrolling Bangui, but most
of all the Chadian soldiers within the presidential lifeguard. The CEMAC Force includes 121 Chadian soldiers. The
Chadian troops in CAR are accused of pro–Seleka bias which has led to increasing anger levelled at Chad in CAR.
They have been accused by locals of killing civilians as well. In January 2014 the Chadian peacekeepers have been
redeployed from Bangui to try to diffuse tension in the capital of CAR.
Current situation
Since the outbreak of this most recent crisis, the situation has remained extremely volatile, with a normalization of
violence, widespread human rights violations and lack of state effi- ciency, at least providing public services on a
minimum level, a collapse of state structures, including the official security providers (police, gendarmerie, armed
forces). [30: 609–610] The humanitarian situation is dire as the current crisis juxtaposes itself with a chronic under-
development persisting throughout the country. The impact on the population is severe and multiple, and includes the
lack of access to basic services, in particular to health care, lack of livelihoods and a looming food crisis. State security
forces and members of non–state armed entities, including Chadian soldiers and bandits, continue to attack cattle
herders, primarily members of the Mbororo ethnic group. Many observers believed Mbororo were targeted primarily
because of their perceived foreign origins, relative wealth, and the vulnerability of cattle to theft. French troops are trying
to disarm rival groups of vigilantes before Rwanda– style genocide can take hold. But the Central African Republic is the
size of France, and there are fewer than 2,000 of these troops currently deployed ― along with some 2,500 African
peacekeepers. The French intervention has reduced the violence in Bangui, but the long–term danger is that sectarian
brutality will perpetuate communal hatred.
While the situation in the capital, Bangui has improved slightly, the security situation out- side the capital has
continued to deteriorate, with serious human rights violations reportedly being perpetrated by different armed groups.
There are currently 4,000 MISCA troops, 1,600
French forces, and the EU announced last week an additional 500 soldiers. But it is clear that the crisis in CAR which
almost has the same territory as Texas (or France in Europe) with very poor infrastructure (roads, railway and airports) is
requires highly mobile and quite nu- merous troops. The UN Secretariat has estimated that 10,000 soldiers could be
required. [43] In January 2014, there were a number of significant CAR–related developments in Bangui, Brussels and
Geneva. The National Transitional Council elected Catherine Samba–Panza, the mayor of Bangui, as the new interim
President of CAR. Her election was welcomed by the Secretary–General and the UN Integrated Peace–building Office
in CAR (BINUCA). In Brussels, EU foreign ministers approved a peacekeeping force expected to number up to
1,000 troops, while at a conference organised by OCHA and the European Commission, donors pledged nearly $500
million in international assistance. In Geneva, the Human Rights Council (HRC) held a special session on the human
rights situation in CAR. [42]