468
AARMS (13) 3 (2014)
TOMOLYA János: Crisis in the Central African Republic
On December 5, 2013 the UN Security Council voted to authorize the deployment of an African–led peacekeeping
force that would incorporate ECCAS troops already in the coun- try, as well as the deployment of additional French
troops to augment the country’s existing military presence there, in an effort to protect the civilian population. Still, the
humanitarian situation at the end of 2013 was bleak, with more than 800,000 people displaced and almost half of the
country’s population in need of aid. In January 2014, ECCAS held a summit to address the worsening situation in the
country. At the end of the summit, on January 10, both Djotodia and Tiangaye announced their resignations. Later that
month the transitional coun- cil elected Catherine Samba–Panza, the mayor of Bangui, to be the new interim president.
She was inaugurated on 23 of January 2014.
Parties involved in the armed conflict
There are at least five main armed groups/parties involving to the conflict in CAR:
1. SELEKA (sometimes written as SÉLÉKA) ― the rebels
Seleka is a reference to fighters from next groups ― Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Union of
Republican Forces (UFR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) ― coming together to launch
the rebellion. They are called Seleka from
2012 which in the local Sango language means alliance. Currently Seleka consist of follow- ing groups:
• Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC);
• Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP);
• Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR);
• Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding (A2R);
• Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK).
There are many foreign mercenaries among the predominantly Muslim group, mostly from Chad and Sudan
(Darfur). [32] They have been responsible for many human rights abuses and extra judicial killings since last
December. The leader of the rebels, Mr Michel Djotodia proclaimed himself transitional president of the Central African
Republic on March
25, 2013. Seleka fighters are mostly northerners and they were in power from March 2013 to January 2014. The
number of fighters in Seleka is estimated to be around 5,000 troops however according to The International Federation
for Human Rights (FIDH)
2
the correct number is between 15,000 and 20,000. [33]
2. Armed forces of CAR
The Central African Armed Forces [French: Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA)] are the armed forces of the Central
African Republic, established after independence in 1960. To- day they are a rather weak institution, dependent on
international support to hold back the enemies in the current civil war. [34] Its disloyalty to the president came to the
fore during
2
Note from the author: The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) is a non-governmental federation for human rights
organizations. Founded in 1922, FIDH is the oldest international human rights organization worldwide and today brings together 178 member
organizations in over 100 countries.
AARMS (13) 3 (2014)
469
TOMOLYA János: Crisis in the Central African Republic
the mutinies in 1996–1997, but ever since then it has faced internal problems. It has been strongly criticized by human
rights organizations due to its terror, including killings, torture and sexual violence. When General Kolingba became
president in 1981, he implemented an ethnicity–based recruitment policy for the administration. Kolingba was a
member of the Yakoma people from the south of the country, which made up approximately 5% of the total population.
During his rule, members of Yakoma were granted all key positions in the admin- istration and made up a majority of the
military. This later had disastrous consequences, when Kolingba was replaced by a member of a northerner tribe, Ange–
Félix Patassé. The army has hence been considered disloyal by the two northerner presidents Patassé and Bozizé, both of
whom have equipped and run their own militias outside FACA. The military also proved its disloyalty during the
mutinies in 1996–1997. [35]
The forces assisting Bozizé in seizing power in 2003 were not paid what they were prom- ised and started looting,
terrorizing and killing ordinary citizens. Summary executions took place with the implicit approval of the government.
The situation has deteriorated since early
2006 and the regular army and the presidential guard regularly execute extortion, torture, kill and commit other
human rights violations. At the end of 2006, there were an estimated
150,000 internally displaced people. During a UN mission in the northern part of the coun- try in November 2006, the
mission had a meeting with a prefect who said that he could not maintain law and order or control over the military and
the presidential guards. The FACA conducts summary executions and burn houses. This Army cannot be seen as count as
a well- equipped, trained and paid armed forces; consequently the loyalty to a new President is very questionable.
Currently the Central African Army has 4,500 troops, mainly equipped with light weapons.
3. Anti–balaka militia (anti–Séléka rebels)
A new rebel group/militia, whose name means “anti–machete” in local Sango and Mandja languages, has been created
in response to the Seleka terror against Christians. After Sele- ka’s overthrow of Bozizé earlier this year, the group
looted and attacked many communities. Thousands fled their homes and the humanitarian crisis deepened. At the same
time, a motley crew of local self–defence militias and anti–Séléka armed groups, which have come to be known
collectively as the anti–balaka, emerged. In retaliation to Seleka’s rampages, these local vigilante peasants, armed with
machetes, rifles and other weapons, waged an armed resistance in the north.
The group is predominantly Christian and increasingly involved in atrocities targeting the Muslim community. As
Seleka torched villages and massacred entire populations, the “anti–machete”, or “anti–balaka” ― initially local
militias paid to defend crops and cattle against robbers and highwaymen due to the absence of state security ― began
seeking re- venge. It became a catch–all for local vigilantes armed with bows and arrows. Most of them have home–
made rifles, some have machetes, knives, and clubs. (See Figure 5.) Today’s anti–balaka also includes the
Association of Central African Farmers (ACP), an anti–Séléka peasant movement, as well as the Front for the Return to
the Constitutional Order in Central Africa (FROCCA). [37]
FROCCA is a militia made up of ex–army officers loyal to the former president as well as
local vigilantes fed up with the Seleka’s continued violence; the group was formed in Paris