90
Concerns in Europe: January - June 2001
AI Index: EUR 01/003/2001
Amnesty International September 2001
particular, on the transfer of former president
Slobodan Miloševi
to its custody.
Prospects for the future stability of the Federal
government were fractured by questions relating to the
future of the Federal Republic itself, fuelled by an
increasing political rivalry between President
Koštunica and Zoran Djindjic, Serbian Prime
Minister. Combined with the increasing fragility of
the Demokratska Opozicija Srbije (DOS) coalition -
its majority in the Federal government only
maintained by support from the Montenegrin SNP
(Socialist People’s Party) - real power, and the
possibility of economic recovery was increasingly
perceived as lying with the Serbian parliament. These
political tensions took place against a background of
little progress towards economic recovery in the FRY,
still saddled with the effects of years of war and
sanctions, servicing a large foreign debt, and awaiting
foreign investment; unemployment remained high and
living standards and wages for the majority of the
population remained low.
The future of the Federation was further clouded
by developments in Montenegro, Serbia’s partner,
where the government had been pursuing a path
towards independence. However, the April elections
in Montenegro failed to provide President Djukanovi
and the Koalicije za Jugoslaviju (Together for
Yugoslavia) with the outright majority needed in order
to progress towards a referendum on independence.
Montenegro thus became more amenable to dialogue
with President Koštunica on the possibility retaining
some sort of Federation.
In Vojvodina, Serbia’s last remaining province -
with a large Hungarian minority - support grew for a
return to the autonomy enjoyed under the 1974
constitution, and promised to the governing Executive
Council by the DOS party before the 2000 elections.
On March 29, the Vojvodina Assembly passed a
measure calling for regional control of the media,
education, health and social services, security and
minority issues, which was sent to the Serbian
parliament for consideration. It seems unlikely that
this constitutional reform will be addressed outside of
the broader discussions on the future of the Federation
itself.
In southern Serbia clashes between Serbian
security forces and the armed ethnic-Albanian
opposition group, the Liberation Army of Preševo,
Medvedje and Bujanovac (UÇPMB), occurred
regularly until the end of May, despite the presence of
KFOR (Kosovo Force) troops. In February, Serbian
Deputy Prime Minister Nebošja Covi
, published a
plan for the region, aimed at ending the low-level
conflict, which was backed by NATO and the EU. The
Covi
plan called for the demilitarization of the
UCPMB, and the return of the VJ to the region,
combined with measures to improve the local
economy and minority rights, including the
establishment of a multi-ethnic police force. After
lengthy talks an agreement was made between the
FRY and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) for the phased return of the Yugoslav army
(VJ) to the 5km wide security zone, established in
1999 to protect NATO forces in Kosovo from the VJ,
and effectively held by the UÇPMB at the end of 2000.
After 14 May, when NATO authorized the return
of the VJ to the last sector of the zone, reported
incidents intensified and around 5,000 civilians
reportedly left their homes for Kosovo. At the end of
May the UÇPMB signed an agreement to disarm and
disband, and more than 400 men handed in their arms
in a KFOR (Kosovo Force) brokered amnesty; a
number of men thought to be members of the UÇPMB
were detained by KFOR (see Kosovo). By the end of
June most civilians who had fled into Kosovo were
reported to have returned to their homes, some of
which had allegedly been damaged by the VJ.
Investigations into these allegation have reportedly
been started. The situation in southern Serbia is now
relatively stable , although at the end of June, several
attacks by ethnic Albanians on police check points
near Medvedje were reported.
Impunity for war crimes
In January Carla del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor for
the Tribunal met with President Koštunica and other
members of the government in Belgrade to discuss
FRY’s cooperation with the Tribunal and to urge the
FRY authorities to transfer all indicted war criminals
- including former president Slobodan Miloševi
- to
the Tribunal. In February Mom
ilo Gruba
, Federal
Minister of Justice, started to prepare a draft law on
cooperation with the Tribunal, against the background
of increasing international pressure for the transfer of
the former president.
Mixed messages emerged from the FRY and
Serbian authorities on their position on the transfer of
the former President to the custody of the Tribunal.
President Koštunica consistently stated his opposition
to the transfer, before and after the arrest of Slobodan
Miloševi
- and following his transfer to the Tribunal
in June. Several Serbian government ministers also
indicated an intent to cooperate with the Tribunal, and
reportedly did not exclude the possibility of Slobodan
Miloševi
being surrendered to the Hague. Other
Federal and Serbian ministers took the position that
Slobodan Miloševi
could be tried for war crimes in a
trial in the FRY, perhaps in cooperation with the
Tribunal; others have suggested that he could be
transferred to the Tribunal following a domestic trial;
proposals were also made for a domestic truth and
reconciliation process.
Following financial pressure from the European
Community and the United States - including the
threatened withdrawal of US reconstruction funding
in March - one indicted suspect, Bosnian Serb Blagoje
Simi
, was transferred to the custody of the Tribunal.
On 12 March, apparently voluntarily, he announced
that he was surrendering to the Tribunal, and
requested the FRY government to make arrangements
for his transfer. In a further bid to been seen to be
cooperating with the Tribunal the Serbian Justice
Minister, Vladan Bati
, stated on 20 March that
indicted suspects resident in the FRY - who were not