Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

 

In the epoch of openness the military will be subject to groundless criticism for not having been firm in 

asserting their views and preventing the introduction of troops on Afghani territory. The initiative of the USSR KGB 

[in this matter] will gradually be forgotten. None of the higher party or government officials will deign to assume 

responsibility for the consequences of the political decision to introduce troops into Afghanistan and none of them will 

face any punishment. 

The CC CPSU Politburo had embarked on such a difficult step although its members had not analyzed it 

themselves until the end: what revolution had they gathered to defend? In the estimation of the former chief of the 

KGB First Main Directorate Leonid Shebarshin: “The entire undertaking was prepared in a situation of such secrecy 

that there was simply no critical data analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, not only from the point of view of the 

factional intra-Party fighting or the fighting with the government, but also from the historic, national, religious, and 

ethnic points of view.” In my view, this decision was the result of opportunistic approaches to the situation in 

Afghanistan, mistakes, failures, and the fatal miscalculations of our special services and missions in Kabul, and also a 

superficial analysis of the situation and insufficient forecasting of the development of the situation in and around 

Afghanistan by analysts in Moscow, although it was based on the highest interests of the country. 

 

 

If we assess the situation from today’s perspective a conclusion can be drawn: the transfer of power from the 

“Khalq” to “Parcham” did not substantially change the situation since both PDPA factions were not fundamentally 

distinct from one another at the theoretical level and neither had influence among or the support of the majority of the 

people. Objectively, the most suitable candidate for us capable of providing some stability in the country without 

bringing it to the point of civil war would possibly have been an influential, authoritative figure in Afghanistan not 

connected with the PDPA. But at that time such an alternative was not even considered; this would have been a 

seditious thought – a betrayal of the ideals of socialism… 

 

 

Cables which later arrived from the DRA seemingly confirmed the correctness of the steps taken by the 

Soviet leadership regarding Afghanistan. According to a report of the KGB representative, during meetings with him 

on 12 and 17 December, Amin said that the Afghan leadership would welcome the presence of Soviet Armed Forces 

in a number of strategically important locations in the northern provinces. The forms and methods of extending 

military aid should be determined by the Soviet side. The USSR can have military garrisons in the locations it wishes, 

e.g., take under guard all facilities where there is Soviet-Afghan collaboration and protect DRA lines of 

communications. 

 

REPORT FROM KABUL 

 

(Secret)

11

(Urgent) 

 

 

…On 12 and 17 December 1979 the KGB representative met with H. Amin. The following 

statements of Amin deserve attention.  

Amin insistently adhered to the idea of the need for the direct participation of the Soviet Union in 

deterring the combat operations of the rebel groups in the northern regions of the DRA. His 

reasoning boiled down to the following: 

 

 

- the present Afghan leadership will greet the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces at a 

number of strategically important points in the northern regions of the DRA… 

 

 

Amin said that the forms and methods of extending military aid should be determined by 

the Soviet side; 

 

 

- the USSR can have military garrisons wherever they want; 

 

 

- the USSR can take under guard all facilities where there is Soviet-Afghan collaboration; 

 

 

- the Soviet troops could take DRA lines of communications under guard… 

                                            

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 [Translator’s note: Previously published in Lyakhovskiy’s “Tragediya I Doblest’ Afgana’, previously translated] 

 

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 17.12.1979 

   the 

USSR 

KGB 

representative 

 

 

 

There was no decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet or other similar document adopted 

regarding the issue of the deployment of troops. All orders were issued verbally in order to preserve secrecy and 

mislead Amin. The implementation of such actions was possible due to the existing practice of making important 

political decisions: in practice, after the approval at the CC CPSU Politburo (the highest body of the ruling party), they 

were basically only formally “approved” and explained to the people. This was the era of “groupthink” – a precise 

system of subordination created by the Party nomenklatura was in effect which did not allow a single departure from 

the line worked out by the CC CPSU Politburo. People who occupied key posts in the government were under the total 

control of this system. 

 

 

Gromyko later wrote that he believed the introduction of troops to be legitimate: 

 

On December 5, 1978 the Soviet-Afghan Agreement of Friendship was signed. 

 

In accordance with this the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan turned 

to the Soviet Union with a request to provide military aid to the Afghan National Army. This request 

was weighed by the Soviet Union thoroughly and at length. In the end the Politburo of the CC CPSU 

unanimously decided to provide such aid… 

 

The situation was made more acute by the tragic murder of the General Secretary of the CC 

PDPA Taraki whose representatives had requested aid. This bloody act shook the Soviet leadership. 

L.I. Brezhnev in particular took his death very hard. 

 

Ultimately it was in this environment that the decision to introduce a limited contingent was 

made. The decision was taken collectively, by the entire Politburo, and I took part in it. Even now I 

don’t consider this a mistake…First of all we were afraid of a regime appearing in Kabul which 

would be antagonistic towards the USSR. Likewise, we considered it our obligation to help the 

National Democratic Party of Afghanistan in defending the gains of the April revolution. The leaders 

of the PDPA had asked us to introduce troops fifteen times. 

 

After this decision was taken by the Politburo, I went into Brezhnev’s office and said 

“Shouldn’t we frame the decision to introduce troops along government lines?” Brezhnev did not 

respond right away. He picked up the phone. 

 

“Mikhail Andreevich, won’t you come in here? It is necessary to discuss something.” 

 

Suslov appeared. Brezhnev informed him of our conversation. Then he added: 

 

“In the situation that has unfolded, it seems necessary to make a decision immediately: 

either we ignore Afghanistan’s request for aid or we save the people’s power and act in accordance 

with the Soviet-Afghan agreement.” 

 

Suslov said: “We have an agreement with Afghanistan and we need to fulfill our 

obligations quickly since we have made the decision. We’ll discuss it at the CC later.”  

 

The plenum of the CC CPSU that took place in June of 1980 completely and unanimously 

approved the decision of the Politburo. 

 

Even during the working conferences before the final decision was made regarding the 

introduction of troops the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Marshall 

N.G. Ogarkov voiced his opinion that individual parts of the Afghan army might resist.  

 

At first it was assumed that our troops would only help the local inhabitants defend 

themselves from outside bands…We never wanted to increase the numbers of our continent nor to 

be pulled in to serious military activity. Most of our troops were stationed in urban garrisons.

12

 

 

 

 

The CPSU leadership did not consider it necessary to submit this issue to the USSR Supreme Soviet for 

discussion. They declared: “international aid” – and everything ended with that. And those people are clever (even at a 

high level) who state in their justification that they knew nothing about the intention to deploy troops to Afghanistan 

and took no part in it. When did they find out and start to protest or express their disagreement? No, they approved. 

                                            

12

 Gromyko, Afghanistan in Our Fate (Moscow: APN, 1989), p. 97. 

 

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