Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

from Rosen 

 

 

The same day this information arrived the CC CPSU Politburo – rather its elite, Andropov, Ustinov, and 

Gromyko – unanimously made the final decision about the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. In their belief, after 

the NATO decision to station medium-range missiles in Europe aimed at the USSR there was nothing to lose… 

 

 

There was a record of this meeting stored in a special folder of the CC CPSU written very allegorically in the 

handwriting of CC CPSU Secretary Konstantin Chernenko. In the document Afghanistan was designated by the letter 

“A” and the word “measures” meant the deployment of Soviet troops to the DRA and the removal of Hafizullah Amin 

from power. For a long time the record was supersecret and was kept in a special safe and only several in the highest 

leadership of the country were familiar with it. It clears up much about who was the initiator and the executor of the 

“measures”. 

                                         

Top Secret

10

                                         

SPECIAL FOLDER 

 

 

Chaired by Cde. L. I. Brezhnev 

 

Present: Suslov M. A., Grishin V. V., Kirilenko A. P., Pel'she A. Ya., Ustinov D. F., Chernenko K. 

U., Andropov Yu. V., Gromyko A. A., Tikhonov N. A., Ponomarev B. N. 

 

CC CPSU Decree Nº 176/125 of 12 December  

concerning the situation in "A" 

 

 

1. Approve the ideas and measures set forth by Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D.F., and 

Gromyko A. A. Authorize them to introduce amendments of non-essential nature in the course of the 

execution of these measures. 

Questions requiring the decision of the CC should be expeditiously submitted to the Politburo. The 

implementation of all these measures is to be entrusted to Cdes. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D. F., 

and Gromyko A. A. 

 

 

2. Charge Cdes. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D. F., and Gromyko A. A. to keep the CC 

Politburo informed on the status of the execution of the outlined measures. 

 

   CC 

Secretary 

 

  L. 

Brezhnev 

 

Nº 997 (1 page)   

 

 

 

 

It is believed that this document is the CC CPSU Politburo resolution to introduce troops into the 

DRA. However, anyone who is remotely familiar with the process of preparing documents and their evaluation at CC 

CPSU Politburo meetings knows that there should also be a note with the suggestions of Andropov, Ustinov, and 

Gromyko. In fact, such a note does not exist. Is it possible that the resulting letter from Andropov or these suggestions 

were discussed orally by the Politburo? Judging by the fact that his name is first on the list [of speakers], it was 

Andropov who was the initiator of the discussion regarding the planned action in Afghanistan.  

 

On the basis of these facts and the development of the situation in Afghanistan I will take a risk and offer 

another version: at this meeting the Politburo discussed questions raised in Andropov’s letter regarding the conduct of 

the operation to remove Amin using forces already in Afghanistan. If the operation had been conducted successfully it 

would not have been necessary to introduce Soviet troops into the DRA. However, the goals of the operation were not 

met. A telegram from Soviet representatives in Kabul stated that that it had not been possible to remove Amin using 

forces already in Afghanistan. It seems that after this the necessary corrections were made [to the plan] providing for 

the introduction of troops into Afghanistan to carry out a coup. It is possible that CC CPSU resolution No 176/125 

                                            

10

 [Translator’s note: an image of this decree with translation and source information can be found in CWHIP Bulletin, 

Fall 1994 p. 46] 

 

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(dated December 12, 1979) was considered the basis for the realization of such a difficult step, and the order to 

introduce troops into the DRA was later given orally.  

 

The record was signed by all CC CPSU Politburo members present at the meeting. No one then voted 

“against”. There was still a Stalinist syndrome in effect, the principle of mutual protection. Everyone wanted to keep 

his post and dissent or disagreement with the opinion of the General Secretary automatically expelled him from the CC 

CPSU. 

 

 

One man has always ruled in Russia, as opposed to the US where the system ruled. As one Russian writer 

correctly noted, Russia is a country of masters and slaves because each master is in turn another’s slave according to 

an established hierarchy. For centuries regimes, rulers, dynasties, and ideologies changed but the principle of slaves 

and masters remained unchanged. In general it needs to be said that for all its long history, Russia was very rarely 

fortunate to have worthy rulers. Only a handful of them can be recalled with bowed head. Little changed in Soviet 

times. The CC CPSU General Secretary had authority and power of which even the czars did not dream. Everyone and 

everything was dependent on him. For example, at Stalin’s order the wives of several high Party functionaries (such as 

Molotov) were imprisoned and their husbands could not even say a word in defense of them. None of the services to 

the Fatherland of the outstanding military leader Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgiy Zhukov could save him from 

retirement when CC CPSU General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev desired it. 

 

Kosygin, whose position regarding the deployment of troops to Afghanistan was negative, did not attend the 

decisive CC CPSU Politburo meeting. His signature is missing from the document. Soon he was sent into retirement. 

(He died in 1980.) This eliminates some of the interpretations regarding who made the decision. There is evidence, 

however, that the meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo never actually took place. When the decision had been made by a 

smaller group (Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Suslov, Chernenko) the other members were “asked” to sign 

it. That is, they found about [the decision] after the fact. According to Ponomarev, who was supposedly “present” at 

the CC CPSU Politburo meeting,  

Gromyko later admitted that the decision had been made behind the scenes (kuluarno). How did they 

manage to do this without me when I was in charge of the International Department of the CC? No 

one asked my advice... Andropov played a big part. His people found Babrak Karmal in 

Czechoslovakia and prepared him to be the leader. Brezhnev had great trust in Andropov. 

  

Thus many false rumors and different interpretations about who was responsible for this decision are 

eliminated. Although there is information that a CC CPSU Politburo meeting was generally not held, yet when the 

decision was made by a narrow body (Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Suslov, Chernenko), the remaining 

members of the Politburo were “asked” to sign it. The dates around the signatures of several Politburo members could 

be indirect evidence of this. And no one refused – they were afraid. But this is only one version. 

 

 

The account of CC CPSU Secretary Leonid Zamyatin could serve as confirmation of this:  

The four were convened. Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, and Gromyko, with Chernenko as secretary. 

The decision was made there about the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. The materials of Yuriy 

Vladimirovich Andropov were used. How did the discussion go? I cannot say. There is nothing 

except the record which was handwritten by Chernenko…This is the first time in the history of the 

Politburo that a decision was handwritten and not typed. 

 

 

This is what it was called – on the issue about “A”. [Translator’s note: In fact, the text 

reads: “K polozheniyu v ‘A’ (“Concerning the situation in ‘A’) not, as Zamyatin quotes, “K voprosu 

ob ‘A’.] The letter A in quotes. There were four points, one of them concerning the deployment of 

troops. Well, the formulation there was about the implementation of international aid, a limited 

contingent, and so forth. There were assurances from Ustinov that this was a temporary deployment 

of troops, for a maximum of three or four months, then we would withdraw them… 

 

 

…There was a note of Andropov, very detailed, since there was a KGB group in 

Afghanistan headed by Boris Semenovich Ivanov, a special adviser and consultant to Andropov. His 

telegram was, so to say, one of the first calls [that] other methods of solving the Afghan problem 

were needed, for this letter said: if we don’t support Taraki right now with the use of force then we 

might lose Afghanistan; that is, Brzezinski’s theory – create a “green” underbelly below our Central 

Asian republics – would be realized. 

 

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