INTRODUCTION: SECTION ONE
xxiii
but presented it in disguised form, claiming only that it was from a
French correspondent.
21
James’s recovery could be seen as a compromise between the
extreme religious position of his father and the extreme scientific
position of Wright. William James used Wright to escape his father’s
smothering metaphysics, but it took a near-suicidal episode for James
to get free of Wright’s hypnotic ideas about reductionistic science.
The payoff for William came at a painfully high personal price in
the form of recurring bouts of anxiety and depression. The prize,
however, was that for the rest of his career as a philosopher and
psychologist, he felt he could effectively draw on both epistemolo-
gical domains and, in fact, bridge them with his own final tripartite
metaphysics of pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism.
James nursed his depression back to health over a several year
period under his father’s protective roof in a house centrally located
near his friends in the heart of the Harvard College campus — the
site where the present Harvard Faculty Club now stands. By having
a personal chat with William’s old chemistry Professor, the newly
elected President of Harvard, Charles William Eliot, William’s
mother helped him land his first teaching assignment at Harvard,
anatomy and physiology, in 1872. At the same time, his father
found him a suitable wife among the Swedenborgians, Alice Howe
Gibbens, whom William married in 1878.
James went on to teach the first course in the United States on
physiological psychology; he opened the first experimental labor-
atories in psychology to undergraduates to study the new science,
gave the first graduate PhD in the subject (to G. Stanley Hall),
and he went on to write a definitive text book in psychology, and
to become a pioneer in both academic and medical psychology,
as well as philosophy, and religious studies. He had at last found a
vocation.
22
21
Anderson, James William, “The worst kind of melancholy”: William James in 1869.
Harvard Library Bulletin, 30:4, 1982, 369–386. See also, p. 60 of
The Varieties.
22
Taylor, E. I., New Light on the Origins of William James’s Experimental Psychology.
In T. Henley and M. Johnson (eds),
Reflections on The Principles of Psychology: William
James after a Century. New York: Earlbaum, 1990, 33–62. Also, Taylor, E. I., The case for a
uniquely American Jamesian tradition in psychology. In Margaret Donnelly (ed). Reinter-
preting the Legacy of William James. (APA Centennial William James Lectures)
. (pp. 3–28)
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. 1992.
xxiv
INTRODUCTION: SECTION ONE
Peirce and James began monthly meetings in the 1870s of what
came to be called The Metaphysical Club, alternating between the
elder Peirces and the Jameses dining room.
23
The group was made up
of a few lawyers and local philosophers, among them Peirce, James,
and Wright, whom Peirce and James considered their “intellectual
boxing master.” The discussions tended toward the philosophy of
science, utilitarianism, the practical application of ideals, and the
consequences of belief, culminating in 1878 in Peirce’s first formal
enunciation of pragmatism. It was an article entitled “How to Make
Our Ideas Clear” that appeared in Popular Science Monthly.
24
Peirce’s point was that in order for a rational thought to be com-
plete, one should consider its consequences. This is tantamount to
Swedenborg’s definition of rationality, although both Swedenborg
and Emerson took reason to be derived from intuition and con-
firmed by acts. Peirce considered the role of intuition in his theory
of abduction, but gave it no exalted place. The Swedenborgian
definition of the rational was also not the general definition of
the Kantian philosophers or the rational scientific reductionist,
who demanded that reality be defined only in terms of the logical
ordering of sense perceptions.
25
William James, however, took pragmatism to mean that beliefs
are tested by their consequences. What one truly believes is meas-
ured by acts and their effects, not merely by professed ideals. As we
have said, this is essentially a restatement of the Swedenborgian
Doctrine of Use — that God expresses himself in common terms
through the use to which each person puts their special gifts to
enrich the lives of others. It is an extension of the Doctrine of the
Rational, which refers to the development of the capacities love
and wisdom confirmed through uses.
26
Peirce imbibed these ideas
in long conversations with Henry James, Sr. while William was in
23
Fisch, M., Was there a Cambridge metaphysical Club? In FC Moore & RS Robin, Studies
in the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964, 3–32.
24
Peirce, C. S. How to make our ideas clear. Popular Science Monthly, 1878.
25
Florschutz, Gottlieb. Swedenborg and Kant: Emanuel Swedenborg’s mystical view of
humankind, and the dual nature of humankind in Immanuel Kant. Translated by George F. Dole.
West Chester, PA: Swedenborg Foundation, 1993.
26
Swedenborg, Emanuel, Sapienta angelica de divino amore et de divina sapientia [Angelic
wisdom concerning the divine love and the divine wisdom].
The Latin edited from the author’s
original edition published at Amsterdam 1763. New York: American Swedenborg printing
and publishing society, 1890.