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INTRODUCTION: SECTION ONE
This was at first confusing, because to the rationalists, empiricism
meant sense perception — the ability of the senses to react to stimuli
in the external world and deliver a signal to the brain where it is
perceived and where the faculty of reason would do its work naming
and categorizing the event. To this definition of empiricism James
said, well, yes and no. Yes, this was the way empiricism had been
defined, but no, that was not exactly the sense in which he meant
it. By empiricism he meant experience. The clue to the difference
was his use of the term radical. By radical empiricism he meant not
sense perception alone but the full spectrum of human experiences
in all their vagaries and unkemptness. This includes the clean and
clear sensations and the fuzzy and oftentimes unidentifiable ones, as
well as our responses to them, because feeling and perception can
never be separated from the object.
From the positivist’s viewpoint, in The Principles of Psychology
consciousness had meant that the thinker was the thought. Psy-
chology as a science could only focus on the rational ordering of
sense impressions, which meant analyzing only what was at the
center of cognitive attention in the field of waking awareness —
the object of consciousness and our thoughts and feelings about the
object. This was the stream of thought and feeling that James
collectively referred to in Psychology: Briefer course (1892) as “the
stream of consciousness.” In The Principles, however, he had postu-
lated the stream of consciousness within the individual as separate
from a world of objects. Curiously, in Psychology: Briefer course, this
is the very characteristic of personal consciousness that he left out.
Transcendence of the subject-object dichotomy would turn out
to be a primary characteristic of the mystical experience in The
Varieties.
But that was still eight years away. In 1894 James was only will-
ing to postulate that if we actually experience more than one state of
consciousness this would significantly change the equation, not only
of what, but how science studies the mind, because it meant that
the context in which the object was perceived was not consistent if
one’s immediate state of consciousness is not taken into account at
the same time. This led James to surmise that scientific psychology
might be restricting itself to nothing more than a colossal elabora-
tion on the ego. Intrigued by this possibility, through the influence
of the American and British Societies for Psychical Research and
INTRODUCTION: SECTION ONE
xxxi
new experimental evidence pouring in from the so-called French
Experimental Psychology of the Subconscious, after 1890 James began
to focus more on the penumbra or margin of the normal everyday
waking state. He reviewed Pierre Janet and Alfred Binet for the
latest on experimental studies of dissociation. He introduced the
work of Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud to the American Psycholog-
ical public for the first time. He taught a pioneering graduate level
course in experimental psychopathology at Harvard from 1893 to
1898; he experimented extensively with automatic writing and hyp-
nosis, he wrote on multiple personality, he continued to experiment
personally with mind-expanding drugs, and became a prime mover
in launching the so-called Boston School of Abnormal psychology.
38
Human personality was made up of an ultimate plurality of states,
he had said in his article on “The Hidden Self ” in 1890, and con-
sciousness, he declared in his 1896 Lowell Lectures on Exceptional
Mental States, was more than merely a field with a focus and a
margin.
39
While the object of consciousness dominated our atten-
tion, it was the margin that controlled meaning, since every thought
is warmed by an emotion that makes it our own. Our emotional
life, in turn, points to the reality of an underground reservoir of
memories, instincts, and attitude structures which James came to
postulate, following F. W. H. Myers and Pierre Janet, as a vast sub-
liminal or subconscious region of our psychic life — innumerable
states of consciousness that may have never before been in the field
of conscious awareness but which nevertheless exist within us, both
as dissolutive states of psychopathology as well as evolutive states
of a transcendent nature.
James also first blossomed as a philosopher during this period.
His enunciation of the “will to believe” in 1896 had established
that both the good and the bad live in potentia within each one of
us, and that our choices make the one or the other come into being
by the energy we invest in them. For moral and aesthetic purposes,
progress is defined by our continued struggle to choose the good,
38
Taylor, E. I., The Boston School of Psychotherapy: Science, Healing, and Consciousness in
19th Century New England. Eight Lowell Lectures for the Massachusetts Medical Society.
Delivered at the Boston Public Library, March–April, 1982.
39
Taylor, E. I., William James on Exceptional Mental States: Reconstruction of the 1896
Lowell Lectures. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982; reproduced in paperback by the
University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1984.