The orator

But was I even to profess (what I wish I was capable of) that I mean to give the necessary precepts, and point out the road to Eloquence to those who are desirous to qualify themselves for the Forum, what man of sense could blame me for it? For who ever doubted that in the decision of political matters, and in time of peace, Eloquence has always borne the sway in the Roman state, while Jurisprudence has possessed only the second post of honour? For whereas the former is a constant source of authority and reputation, and enables us to defend ourselves and our friends in the most effectual manner;--the other only furnishes us with formal rules for indictments, pleas, protests, &c. in conducting which she is frequently obliged to sue for the assistance of Eloquence;--but if the latter condescends to oppose her, she is scarcely able to maintain her ground, and defend her own territories. If therefore to teach the Civil Law has always been reckoned a very honourable employment, and the houses of the most eminent men of that profession, have been crowded with disciples; who can be reasonably censured for exciting our youth to the study of Eloquence, and furnishing them with all the assistance in his power? If it is a fault to speak gracefully, let Eloquence be for ever banished from the state. But if, on the contrary, it reflects an honour, not only upon the man who possesses it, but upon the country which gave him birth, how can it be a disgrace to learn, what it is so glorious to know? Or why should it not be a credit to teach what it is the highest honour to have learned?

But, in one case, they will tell me, the practice has been sanctified by custom, and in the other it has not. This I grant: but We may easily account for both. As to the gentlemen of the law, it was sufficient to hear them, when they decided upon such cases as were laid before them in the course of business;--so that when they taught, they did not set apart any particular time for that purpose, but the same answers satisfied their clients and their pupils. On the other hand, as our Speakers of eminence spent their time, while at home, in examining and digesting their causes, and while in the Forum in pleading them, and the remainder of it in a seasonable relaxation, what opportunity had they for teaching and instructing others? I might venture to add that most of our Orators have been more distinguishied by their genius, than by their learning; and for that reason were much better qualified to be Speakers than Teachers; which it is possible may be the reverse of my case.--"True," say they; "but teaching is an employment which is far from being recommended by its dignity." And so indeed it is, if we teach like mere pedagogues. But if we only direct, encourage, examine, and inform our pupils; and sometimes accompany them in reading or hearing the performances of the most eminent Speakers;--if by these means we are able to contribute to their improvement, what should hinder us from communicating a few instructions, as opportunity offers? Shall we deem it an honourable employment, as indeed with us it is, to teach the form of a legal process, or an excommunication from the rites and privileges of our religion; and shall it not be equally honourable to teach the methods by which those privileges may be defended and secured?--"Perhaps it may," they will reply; "but even those who know scarcely any thing of the law are ambitious to be thought masters of it; whereas those who are well furnished with the powers of Eloquence pretend to be wholly unacquainted with them; because they are sensible that useful knowledge is a valuable recommendation, whereas an artful tongue is suspected by every one." But is it possible, then, to exert the powers of Eloquence without discovering them? Or is an Orator really thought to be no Orator, because he disclaims the title? Or is it likely that, in a great and noble art, the world will judge it a scandal to teach what it is the greatest honour to learn? Others, indeed, may have been more reserved; but, for my part, I have always owned my profession. For how could I do otherwise, when, in my youth, I left my native land, and crossed the sea, with no other view but to improve myself in this kind of knowledge; and, when afterwards my house was crowded with the ablest professors, and my very style betrayed some traces of a liberal education? Nay, when my own writings were in every body's hands, with what face could I pretend that I had not studied? Or what excuse could I have for submitting my abilities to the judgment of the public, if I had been apprehensive that they would think I had studied to no purpose²⁴? But the points we have already discussed are susceptible of greater dignity and elevation, than those which remain to be considered. For we are next to treat of the arrangement of our words; and, indeed, I might have said, of the art of numbering and measuring our very syllables; which, though it may, in reality, be a matter of as much consequence as I judge it to be, cannot however be supposed to have such a striking appearance in precept as in practice. This, indeed, might be said of every other branch of useful knowledge; but it is more remarkably true with respect to this. For the actual growth and improving height of all the sublimer arts, like that of trees, affords a pleasing prospect; whereas the roots and stems are scarcely beheld with indifference: and yet the former cannot subsist without the latter. But whether I am restrained from dissembling the pleasure I take in the subject, by the honest advice of the Poet, who says,

"Blush not to own the art you love to practise."

or whether this treatise has been extorted from me by the importunity of my friend, it was proper to obviate the censures to which it will probably expose me. And yet, even supposing that I am mistaken in my sentiments, who would shew himself so much of a savage, as to refuse me his indulgence (now all my forensic employments and public business are at an end) for not resigning myself to that stupid inactivity which is contrary to my nature, or to that unavailing sorrow which I do my best to overcome, rather than devote myself to my favourite studies? These first conducted me into the Forum and the Senate-House, and they are now the chief comforts of my retirement. I have, however, applied myself not only to such speculations as form the subject of the present Essay, but to others more sublime and interesting; and if I am able to discuss them in a proper manner, my private studies will be no disparagement to my forensic employments.

But it is time to return to our subject.--Our words, then, should be so disposed that every following one may be aptly connected with the preceding, so as to make an agreeable sound;--or that the mere form and concinnity of our language may give our sentences their proper measure and dimensions;--or, lastly, that our periods may have a numerous and measured cadence.

The first thing, then, to be attended to, is the structure of our language, or the agreeable connection of one word with another; which, though it certainly requires care, ought not to be practised with a laborious nicety. For this would be an endless and puerile attempt, and is justly ridiculed by Lucilius, when he introduces Scaevola thus reflecting upon Albucius:

"As in the checquer'd pavement ev'ry square Is nicely fitted by the mason's care: So all thy words are plac'd with curious art, And ev'ry syllable performs its part."

But though we are not to be minutely exact in the structure of our language, a moderate share of practice will habituate us to every thing of this nature which is necessary. For as the eye in reading, so the mind in speaking, will readily discern what ought to follow,--that, in connecting our words, there may neither be a chasm, nor a disagreeable harshness. The most lively and interesting sentiments, if they are harshly expressed, will offend the ear, that delicate and fastidious judge of rhetorical harmony. This circumstance, therefore, is so carefully attended to in the Roman language, that there is scarcely a rustic among us who is not averse to a collision of vowels,--a defect which, in the opinion of some, was too scrupulously avoided by Theopompus, though his master Isocrates was equally cautious. But Thucydides was not so exact; nor was Plato, (though a much better writer)--not only in his Dialogues, in which it was necessary to maintain an easy negligence, to resemble the style of conversation, but in the famous Panegyric, in which (according to the custom of the Athenians) he celebrated the praises of those who fell in battle, and which was so greatly esteemed, that it is publicly repeated every year. In that Oration a collision of vowels occurs very frequently; though Demosthenes generally avoids it as a fault.

But let the Greeks determine for themselves: we Romans are not allowed to interrupt the connection of our words. Even the rude and unpolished Orations of Cato are a proof of this; as are likewise all our poets, except in particular instances, in which they were obliged to admit a few breaks, to preserve their metre. Thus we find in Naevius,

"Vos QUI ACCOLITIS histrum FLUVIUM ATQUE ALGIDUM."

And in another place,

"Quam nunquam vobis GRAII ATQUE Barbari."

But Ennius admits it only once, when he says,

"Scipio invicte;"

and likewise I myself in

"Hoc motu radiantis ETESIAE IN Vada Ponti."

This, however, would seldom be suffered among us, though the Greeks often commend it as a beauty.

But why do I speak of a collision of vowels? for, omitting this, we have frequently contracted our words for the sake of brevity; as in multi' modis, vas' argenteis, palm' et crinibus, tecti' fractis, &c. We have sometimes also contracted our proper names, to give them a smoother sound: for as we have changed Duellum into Bellum, and duis into bis, so Duellius, who defeated the Carthagenians at sea, was called Bellius, though all his ancestors were named Duellii. We likewise abbreviate our words, not only for convenience, but to please and gratify the ear. For how otherwise came axilla to be changed into ala, but by the omission of an unweildy consonant, which the elegant pronunciation of our language has likewise banished from the words maxillae, taxillae, vexillum, and paxillum?

Upon the same principle, two or more words have been contracted into one, as sodes for si audes, sis for si vis, capsis for cape si vis, ain' for aisne, nequire for non quire, malle for magis velle, and nolle for non velle; and we often say dein' and exin' for deinde and exinde. It is equally evident why we never say cum nobis, but nobiscum; though we do not scruple to say cum illis;--viz. because, in the former case, the union of the consonants m and n would produce a jarring sound: and we also say mecum and tecum, and not cum me and cum te, to correspond with nobiscum and vobiscum. But some, who would correct antiquity rather too late, object to these contractions: for, instead of prob DEÛM atque hominum fidem, they say Deorum. They are not aware, I suppose, that custom has sanctified the licence. The same Poet, therefore, who, almost without a precedent, has said patris mei MEÛM FACTÛM pudet, instead of meorum factorum,--and textitur exitiûm examen rapit for exitiorum, does not choose to say liberum, as we generally do in the expressions cupidos liberûm, and in liberûm loco, but, as the literary virtuosos above-mentioned would have it,

neque tuum unquam in gremium extollas LIBERORUM ex te genus,

and,

namque Aesculapî LIBERORUM.

But the author before quoted says in his Chryses, not only

Cives, antiqui amici majorum MEÛM,

which was common enough--, but more harshly still,

CONSILIÛM, AUGURIÛM, atque EXTÛM interpretes;

and in another place,

Postquam PRODIGIÛM HORRIFERÛM PORTENTÛM pavos.

a licence which is not customary in all neuters indifferently: for I should not be so willing to say armûm judicium, as armorum; though in the same writer we meet with nihilne ad te de judicio armûm accidit? And yet (as we find it in the public registers) I would venture to say fabrûm, and procûm, and not fabrorum and procorum. But I would never say duorum virorum judicium, or trium virorum capitalium, or decem virorum litibus judicandis. In Accius, however, we meet with

Video sepulchra duo duorum corporum;

though in another place he says,

Mulier una duum virum.

I know, indeed, which is most conformable to the rules of grammar: but yet I sometimes express myself as the freedom of our language allows me, as when I say at pleasure, either prob deum, or prob deorum;--and, at other times, as I am obliged by custom, as when I say trium virum for virorum, or sestertium nummum for nummorum: because in the latter case the mode of expression is invariable.

But what shall we say when these humourists forbid us to say nosse and judicasse for novisse and judicavisse; as if we did not know, as well as themselves, that, in these instances, the verb at full length is most agreeable to the laws of grammar, though custom has given the preference to the contracted verb? Terence, therefore, has made use of both, as when he says, eho tu cognatum tuum non norâs? and afterwards,

Stilphonem, inquam, noveras?

Thus also, fiet is a perfect verb, and fit a contracted one; and accordingly we find in the same Comedian,

Quam cara SINTQUE post carendo intelligunt,

and

Quamque attinendi magni dominatus SIENT.

In the same manner I have no objection to scripsere alii rem, though I am sensible that scripserunt is more grammatical; because I submit with pleasure to the indulgent laws of custom which delights to gratify the ear. Idem campus habet, says Ennius; and in another place, in templis îsdem; eisdem, indeed, would have been more grammatical, but not sufficiently harmonious; and iisdem would have sounded still worse.

But we are allowed by custom even to dispense with the rules of etymology to improve the sweetness of our language; and I would therefore rather say, pomeridianas Quadrigas, than postmeridianas; and mehercule, than mehercules. For the same reason non scire would now be deemed a barbarism, becaule nescire has a smoother sound; and we have likewise substituted meridiem for medidiem, because the latter was offensive to the ear. Even the preposition ab, which so frequently occurs in our compound verbs is preserved entire only in the formality of a Journal, and, indeed, not always there: in every other sort of language it is frequently altered. Thus we say amovit, abegit, and abstulit; so that you can scarcely determine whether the primitive preposition should be ab or abs. We have likewise rejected even abfugit, and abfer, and introduced aufugit and aufer in their stead;--thus forming a new preposition, which is to be found in no other verb but these. Noti, navi, and nari, have all been words in common use: but when they were afterwards to be compounded with the preposition in, it was thought more harmonious to say ignoti, ignavi, and ignari, than to adhere strictly to the rules of etymology. We likewise say ex usu, and e Republicâ; because, in the former case, the preposition is followed by a vowel, and, in the latter, it would have sounded harshly without omitting the consonant; as may also be observed in exegit, edixit, refecit, retulit, and reddidit. Sometimes the preposition alters or otherwise affects the first letter of the verb with which it happens to be compounded; as in subegit, summutavit, and sustutit. At other times it changes one of the subsequent letters; as when we say insipientem for insapientem, iniquum for inaequum, tricipitem for tricapitem, and concisum for concaesum: and from hence some have ventured to say pertisum for pertaesum, which custom has never warranted. But what can be more delicate than our changing even the natural quantity of our syllables to humour the ear? Thus in the adjectives inclytus, and inhumanus, the first syllable after the preposition is short, whereas insanus and infelix have it long; and, in general, those words whose first letters are the same as in sapiens and felix, have their first syllable long in composition, but all others have the same syllable short, as composuit, consuevit, concrepuit, confecit. Examine these liberties by the strict rules of etymology, and they must certainly be condemned; but refer them to the decision of the ear, and they will be instantly approved.--What is the reason? Your ear will inform you they have an easier sound; and every language must submit to gratify the ear. I myself, because our ancestors never admitted the aspirate, unless where a syllable began with a vowel, used to say pulcros, Cetegos, triumpos, and Cartaginem: but some time afterwards, though not very soon, when this grammatical accuracy was wrested from me by the censure of the ear, I resigned the mode of language to the vulgar, and reserved the theory to myself. But we still say, without any hesitation, Orcivios, Matones, Otones, coepiones, sepulcra, coronas, and lacrymas, because the ear allows it. Ennius always uses Burrum, and never Pyrrhum; and the ancient copies of the same author have

Vi patefecerunt BRUGES,

not Phryges; because the Greek vowel had not then been adopted, though we now admit both that and the aspirate:--and, in fact, when we had afterwards occasion to say Phrygum and Phrygibus, it was rather absurd to adopt the Greek letter without adopting their cases²⁵, or at least not to confine it to the nominative; and yet (in the accusative) we say Phryges, and Pyrrhum, to please the ear. Formerly it was esteemed an elegancy, though it would now be considered as a rusticism, to omit the s in all words which terminate in us, except when they were followed by a vowel; and the same elision which is so carefully avoided by the modern Poets, was very far from being reckoned a fault among the ancient: for they made no scruple to say,

Qui est OMNIBU' princeps,

not, as we do, OMNIBUS princeps; and,

Vitâ illâ DIGNU' locoque,

not dignus.

But if untaught custom has been so ingenious in the formation of agreeable sounds, what may we not expect from the improvements of art and erudition? I have, however, been much shorter upon this subject, than I should have been if I had written upon it professedly: for a comparison of the natural and customary laws of language would have opened a wide field for speculation: but I have already enlarged upon it sufficiently, and more, perhaps, than the nature of my design required.

To proceed then;--as the choice of proper matter, and of suitable words to express it, depends upon the judgment of the Speaker, but that of agreeable sounds, and harmonious numbers, upon the decision of the ear; and because the former is intended for information, and the latter for pleasure; it is evident that reason must determine the rules of art in one case, and mere sensation in the other. For we must either neglect the gratification of those by whom we wish to be approved, or apply ourselves to invent the most likely methods to promote it.

There are two things which contribute to gratify the ear,--agreeable sounds, and harmonious numbers. We shall treat of numbers in the sequel, and at present confine ourselves to sound.--Those words, then, as we have already observed, are to have the preference which sound agreeably;--not such as are exquisitely melodious, like those of the Poets, but such as can be found to our purpose in common language.--Quà Pontus Helles is rather beyond the mark:--but in

Auratos aries Colchorum,

the verse glitters with a moderate harmony of expression; whereas the next, as ending with a letter which is remarkably flat, is unmusical,

Frugifera et ferta arva Alfiae tenet,

Let us, therefore, rather content ourselves with the agreeable mediocrity of our own language, than emulate the splendor of the Greeks; unless we are so bigotted to the latter as to hesitate to say with the poet,

Quà tempestate Paris Helenam, &c.

we might even imitate what follows, and avoid, as far as possible, the smallest asperity of sound,

habeo istam ego PERTERRICREPAM;

or say, with the same author, in another passage,

versutiloquas MALITIAS.

But our words must have a proper compass, as well as be connected together in an agreeable manner; for this, we have observed, is another circumstance which falls under the notice of the ear. They are confined to a proper compass, either by certain rules of composition, as by a kind of natural pause, or by the use of particular forms of expression, which have a peculiar concinnity in their very texture; such as a succession of several words which have the same termination, or the comparing similar, and contrasting opposite circumstances, which will always terminate in a measured cadence, though no immediate pains should be taken for that purpose. Gorgias, it is said, was the first Orator who practised this species of concinnity. The following passage in my Defence of Milo is an example.

"Est enim, Judices, haec non scripta, fed nata Lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex Naturâ ipsâ arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti, sed facti; non instituti, sed imbuti simus."

"For this, my Lords, is a law not written upon tables, but impressed upon our hearts;--a law which we have not learned, or heard, or read, but eagerly caught and imbibed from the hand of Nature;--a law to which we have not been train'd, but originally form'd; and with the principles of which we have not been furnished by education, but tinctured and impregnated from the moment of our birth."

In these forms of expression every circumstance is so aptly referred to some other circumstance, that the regular turn of them does not appear to have been studied, but to result entirely from the sense. The same effect is produced by contrasting opposite circumstances; as in the following lines, where it not only forms a measured sentence, but a verse:

Eam, quam nihil accusas, damnas,

Her, whom you ne'er accus'd, you now condemn;

(in prose we should say condemnas) and again,

Bene quam meritam esse autumas, dicis male mereri,

Her merit, once confess'd, you now deny; and,

Id quod scis, prodest nihil; id quod nescis, obest,
From what you've learnt no real good accrues,
But ev'ry ill your ignorance pursues.

Here you see the mere opposition of the terms produces a verse; but in prosaic composition, the proper form of the last line would be, quod scis nihil prodest; quod nescis multum obest. This contrasting of opposite circumstances, which the Greeks call an Antithesis, will necessarily produce what is styled rhetorical metre, even without our intending it. The ancient Orators, a considerable time before it was practised and recommended by Isocrates, were fond of using it; and particularly Gorgias, whose measured cadences are generally owing to the mere concinnity of his language. I have frequently practised it myself; as, for instance, in the following passage of my fourth Invective against Verres:

"Conferte hanc Pacem cum illo Bello;--hujus Praetoris Adventum, cum illius Imperatoris Victoriâ;--hujas Cohortem impuram, cum illius Exercitu invicto;--hujus Libidines, cum illius Continentiâ;--ab illo qui cepit conditas; ab hoc, qui constitutas accepit, captas dicetis Syracusas."

"Compare this detestable peace with that glorious war,--the arrival of this governor with the victory of that commander,--his ruffian guards, with the invincible forces of the other;--the brutal luxury of the former, with the modest temperance of the latter;--and you will say, that Syracuse was really founded by him who stormed it, and stormed by him who received it already founded to his hands."--So much, then, for that kind of measure which results from particular forms of expression, and which ought to be known by every Orator.