32
SupportINg the DevelopmeNt of INStItutIoNS – formAl AND INformAl ruleS – utv WorkINg pAper 2005:3
‘the use of law by private parties… that can be established over much shorter periods’.
69
Informal rules are
often perceived to take longer to change than formal rules, but this is not always the case.
Kaspar and Streit agree that change within a hierarchy of rules is easier. They consider informal rules to
emerge and change through a decentralised process, but still taking place within cultural values and
higher-level – so-called meta rules. Meta rules keep the evolution of rules on a continuous path and so
make it reasonably predictable. Certain meta rules, as well as common meta rules within a society, facili-
tate the emergence of informal rules and may foster a more flexible, adaptive and learning society. Toler-
ance of experimentation, the use of humour as a means of easing conflicts, the rule that arguments
should be depersonalised and, in particular, commitment to free speech and expression of one’s ideas are
considered important.
0
69
Omar Azfar (2002), p. 2
0
Kaspar & Streit (1998), pp. 140–141, 390–394
SupportINg the DevelopmeNt of INStItutIoNS – formAl AND INformAl ruleS – utv WorkINg pAper 2005:3
33
3
Institutional Development and Development
Co-operation
The crucial importance of institutions for the performance and development of societies lies in its shap-
ing incentives for behaviour. Institutions thereby influence the actions of individuals and performance of
organisations, as reflected in economic, political and social development – or stagnation or even decline.
North argues that institutions ‘are the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of econo-
mies’.
1
Donors appear to have recognised this and consider the promotion of institutional development
important for sustainable development and poverty reduction.
The ways that donors support institutional development and processes of change in formal and informal
rules, as well as the effects of such support remain, largely unknown, but will be further explored within
the present evaluation theme. In principle, donors may influence the creation and change of all kinds of
institutions at all levels, at any stage in the process and through any actors. Donor support for institutional
development and processes of change may directly aim at such change, for instance through support for
capacity development and reform programmes, or less directly – or even bring it about ‘by accident’. The
effects of support will be of different kinds. Apart from the intended effects there may be unintended
effects. This means that donors may influence institutional change or delay or prevent such change from
taking place whatever their intentions.
1
North (1990), p. 107
34
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3
UTV Working Papers
2001:2
Incentives for ownership
true Schedvin, gun eriksson Skoog
2001:3
Contracted-financed technical Assistance (ktS)
true Schedvin
2001:4
the Quality of Counterpart reports: an assessment of quarterly and
annual reports from four bilateral programmes in tanzania 1997–1999
göran Schill
2001:5
evaluating external Assistance to the Western Balkans
– with Special emphasis on Bosnia and herzegovina: A preparatory study
Bo Sedin
2002:1
mainstreaming gender equality:
Sida’s support for promotion of gender equality in partner countries:
Inception report
Britha mikkelsen, team leader, ted freeman, Bonnie keller, et allis
2002:2
Approach to private Sector Development in the eeoA programme, Zambia
Stephen goss, roger Blech, guy Scott, Christopher mufwambi
2004:1
evaluation of Integrated Area programmes in Bosnia-herzegovina
– a report from an evaluation Workshop
Joakim molander, maria elena Wulff, e. Anders eriksson, Jonas Bergström,
katica hajrulahovic, tale kvalvaag
2004:2
Integrating gender equality into Development Co-operation – Drawing lessons
from the recent evaluations by Sida and the european Commission:
Joint Seminar, Brussels, November 2003
mary Braithwaite, Britha mikkelsen, et allis
2004:3
Development of Swedish general Budget Support 1990–2003
lorena Acevedo Nares, martin Christensen
2004:4
effects of Budget Support – A Discussion of early evidences
maria Nilsson
2005:1 the Impact of Aid for reconstruction of homes in Bosnia and herzegovina
Dragan Bagić, Dejan Dedić
2005:2
Značaj pomoći. Sociološko istraživanje životnih uvjeta i stavova prema obnovi u
Bosne i Hercegovine
Dragan Bagić, Dejan Dedić
SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
S-105 25
Stockholm, Sweden
Tel: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Fax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64
E-mail: sida@sida.se Homepage: http://www.sida.se
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