Searching for appropriate fatalism candidate of Lazy argument

Laziness.

The argument formed towards the laziness hypothesis would have to include a different line of reasoning, primarily one that must accept additional assumptions besides those given in the above formal skeleton suggested by known LA sources. As the first, it has to cover the transition from the free will decision ‘whatever happens’ option (W) to ‘ineffectiveness’ (I), and then, from ‘ineffectiveness’ to decision of ‘laziness’ (L). Both options are those we could find among some of the part-time fatalism options, but not in the logical fatalism which takes the form of the full-time fatalism. In part-time fatalism (not in all its forms), fated outcomes (F) would be realized regardless of our decisions. The line of reasoning that has to be incorporated in such an argument would probably be like this

├─ {[F =>(W=>I)] & [(W=>I)=>L]} => (F => L),

where the first square-bracketed pair covers the transition from fate to ineffectiveness, while the second ensures the transition from ineffectiveness to laziness. Even in such a case, when we additionally include the assumption of the disjunctive exclusive pair (‘to be recovered’ (p) and ‘to be not recovered’ (~p), predicated by ‘to be fated’), the systematic error seems further to be present.

├─ {[Fp=>(W=>I)] & [F~p=>(W=>I)] & [(W=>I)=>L)]} => [(FpvF~p)=>L]

The argument constructed in this way, although logically valid, is not based on a pure form of LEM or an exclusive disjunction but on an inclusive disjunction (since it does not claim Fpv~Fp). The same validity would be obtained by the substitution of the modal notion of necessity instead of F:

├─ {[[]P=>(W=>I)] & [[]~P=>(W=>I)] & [(W=>I)=>L)]} => [([]Pv[]~P)=>L].

Even though this reasoning gives the formula a logically valid form from the modern point of view, the last antecedent is not in the form of LEM, i.e. []pv~[]p, but is given an expression equivalent to the principle of plenitude, i.e. ([]Pv[]~P) <=> (<>P=>[]P). This certainly is not what today’s consistent logical fatalists will accept wholeheartedly since the free will form of laziness is based on two free decision moves – a free decision for ineffectiveness and also a free will decision embodied by ‘whatever happens’ (or ‘whatever we freely do’).

In LA, in the form given by the existing ancient sources, these assumptions are either tacitly presupposed (and the argument is an enthymeme) or the argument remains a logically inconclusive sophistical construction, as some of the ancient commentators of the argument believe.

Our opinion is that the argument, during its history, runs through some key transformations: from a genuine full-time fatalism form, established as criticism of free will decision against some rivals (probably soothsayers or Platonic and Socratic opponents defending conditional fate options or any other form of part-time fatalism), to its transformation into an argument defending free decision making in favor of laziness. In its genuine form, its mission was to show, by a reductio form, that our actions are necessitated. In its preserved form, the argument is blocked in some kind of interregnum: it is neither an effective argument for laziness nor for logical fatalism. The genuine effectiveness of the argument and its logical validity are, during the time, lost. The generality of its genuine applicability is reduced exclusively to some of the part-time fatalists and, what is worst of all, according to existing testimonies, it looks like an argument in favor of them.

At the end, we will summarize some of our observations. There are many interpretation of ancient fatalism. They can be presented as arguments forming valid inference schema, ie. as theorems. Chrysippus’ reaction to the argument, according to the preserved testimonies, is not as persuasive as it can seem at first sight to his commentators. The argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it seems to be proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (plus past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the non-universal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of the argument is not genuine but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine form of the argument seems to be given in different way far closer to logical fatalism and without the purpose of defending laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to a logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and additional tuning are needed. A survived forms are not enough satisfactory for this purpose.

References:⁸

Barnes, Jonathan [1985], “Cicero's de fato and a Greek source,” in: J. Brunschwig, C. Imbert, A. Roger [eds.], Histoire et structure: à la mémoire de Victor Goldschmidt, Vrin.

Berčić, Boran [2000] “Fatalizam,” Theoria, 3/4: 25-65; online English translation on www.ffri.uniri.hr/~hdaf/clanovi/bercic/IA.doc (accessed: May, 2011)

Bobzien, Sussane [1998], Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Broadie, Sarah [2007], Aristotle and Beyond - Essays on Metaphysics and Ethics, Cambridge University Press.

Buller, David [1995]. “On the ‘Standard’ Argument for Fatalism.” Philosophical Papers, 24 (2):111-125

Bunge, Mario [1959], Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science, Harvard University Press.

Dummett, Michael [1978] “Bringing About the Past,” in Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth. First published in the Philosophical Review, 73 [1964]: 338-59.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo [1860], Conduct of Life – The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson – Vol. VI.

Fitting, Melvin & Richard L. Mendelsohn (eds.) [1998], First Order Modal Logic, Springer.

Gahér, František [2006], Stoická sémantika a logika. Univerzita Komenského, Bratislava.

Grünbaum, Adolf [1953], “Causality and the Science of Human Behavior,” in: H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck [eds.], Readings in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, pp. 766–778.

Grünbaum, Adolf [1971], “Free Will and Laws of Human Behavior,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 299-317.

Haack, Susan [1974]. Deviant Logic: Some Philosophical Issues. Cambridge University Press.

Harrison, S.J. [1983], “Cicero and ‘Crurifragium’,” The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 33, No. 2: 453-55.

Jordan, Zbigniew [1963], “Logical determinism,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol. 4, No. 1: 1-38.

Langer, Susanne K. [1936], “On a Fallacy in ‘Scientific Fatalism’,” International Journal of Ethics 46 (4): 473-483.

Łukasiewicz, Jan [1970], “On Determinism,” in Selected Works, ed. by L. Borkowski, North-Holland, Amsterdam, London, pp.110-128.

Marko, Vladimir [1999], “Some Pioneering Formal Reconstructions of Diodorus’ Master Argument,” Logica et methodologica, V: 67-111.

Marko, Vladimir [2004], Vreme, objašnenje, modalnost, Futura, Novi Sad

Øhrstrøm, Peter & Per F. V. Hasle [1995], Temporal logic: from ancient ideas to artificial intelligence, Springer

Rescher, Nicholas & Alasdair Urquhart [1971], Temporal logic, Springer-Verlag

Schlick, Moritz [1931] “Das Kausalität in den gegenwärtigen Physik,” Naturwisseschaften 19, ss. 145-162; Eng. tr. (by P. Heath), in M. Schlick, Collected papers, vol. II (1925-36), ed. H. Mulder & BBF van der Velde-Schlick, Reidel, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1979, pp. 176-209.

Schofield, Malcolm [1983], “The Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium,” Phronesis, Vol. 28, No. 1: 31-58.

Seel, Gerhard [1993], “Zur Geschichte und Logik des therizon logos,” in K. Döring and Th. Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stoiker, Stuttgart.

Turnebus, Adrianus [1556], Disputatio ad librum Ciceronis de fato..., Paris.

van Fraassen, Bas C. [1966], “Singular Terms, Truth Value Gaps and Free Logic,” Journal of Philosophy, 63: 481–95.

van Inwagen, Peter [1986], An Essay on Free Will, Oxford University Press.

Waismann, Friedrich [1956], “How I See Philosophy,” in Contemporary British Philosophy, Personal Statements, Edited by H. D. Lewis, London, Allen and Unwin, pp. 447-490.

Wilson, H. Van Rensselaer [1955], “Causal Discontinuity in Fatalism and Indeterminism,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Feb. 3, 1955): 70-72.

Woleński, Jan [1996], “An Analysis of Logical Determinism,” draft – Conference: Łukasiewicz in Dublin – University College Dublin (July, 1996).

Taylor, Richard [1962], “Fatalism”, Philosophical Review, 71: 56–66.

Department of Logic and Methodology of Sciences

Faculty of Philosophy

Comenius University

Šafárikovo nám. 6

814 99 Bratislava

Slovak Republic

marko(et)fphil.uniba.sk

1 Forthcoming in Organon F (Bratislava) vol. 18, No. 3 & 4.

2 However, it is possible to find several different formulations of the so-called ‘standard’ argument in modern literature.

3 The first conjunct (A=>B) could also be read in extended form as [(A&~C)=>B], i.e. [A=>(~C=>B)], but we omitted explicit quotation of ~C (‘to not consult a prayer’) as redundant here.

4 I am grateful to an anonymous reader of an earlier version of this essay for his remark that, as it is obvious, Servius’ last sentence (if ~A then ~B) can be logically valid outcome of previous one (if A then B) only when the previous sentence claims something biconditionally, that is (A<=>B) => (~A=>~B); i.e. if it is prefixed with ‘only if’ instead of simple ‘if’ (only if A then B). However, Servius probably has something different in mind. To read this sentence biconditionally would restrict other possibilities for Pompeius to die by a sword, in some other possible circumstances. He does not exclude that Pompeius could, in some other circumstances, dies by a sword but not of necessity, for he also, before the moment of decision, had the chance to die in many different ways including by a sword. If Pompeius should touch a bank of Egypt, he will exclusively die in such a way while if he doesn't touch a bank of Egypt such an end is no longer necessary, although it is yet possible for him to die by a sword by choosing or not, now or in the future, some other fated options that can also cover death by a sword. Some of the ancient authors were aware of the unwilling outcomes the biconditional formulation of prediction can afford. Let us take Fabius’ test example “If Fabius has been born with the Dogstar rising, Fabius will not die at sea” and apply it to the conditional fate conception. In the ‘only if’ reading of this prediction, if Fabius has not been born with the Dogstar rising then he will (inevitably) die at the sea. In this simplified form of Carneades’ (probably non-Philonian) formulation, Fabius’ death at the sea will be inevitable for the case when Fabius has not been born with the Dogstar rising, while in Servius’ formulation, in this case, for Fabius it would still be possible to die at the sea, but not necessary. For this reason, I here left these claims as two separate conditional statements linked by a conjunction and omitted the ‘only if’ reading.

5 Carneades proof is by reductio and has two parts. α) P (if all things come about through antecedent causes) → Q (then all things come about in such a way that they are joined and woven together by natural connection); Q (if that is so) → R (then all things are brought about (eficit) by necessity); R (if it is true: that all things are brought about (eficit) by necessity) → S (then nothing is in our power); ¬S (However, there is something in our power). β) F (if all things come about through fate) → P (then all things come about through antecedent causes); Carneades directly concludes that ¬F (it is not the case that whatever comes about, does so through fate). Tacit to Carneades’ assumption is the logical outcome of the first part of inference α), that ¬P (it is not case, that all things came about through antecedent causes), and only from this assumption can we obtain the conclusion of the second part of inference β), ¬F (it is not the case that whatever comes about, does so through fate).

6 To obtain []Pv[]Q from [](PvQ), at least in S4.3, it is necessary to fulfill two additional conditions, i.e. [](pv[]q) and []([]pvq); cf. Rescher & Urquhart [1971, p. 256].

7 Cf. Part 1 of this article.

8 Pagination of classical texts is quoted according to editions collected in Thesaurus Lingua Graecae and Thesaurus Lingua Latinae. Different editions are quoted inside square brackets.