Searching for appropriate fatalism candidate of Lazy argument

Logic of the argument

The simplest logical form of the argument is given by Bozien [1998: 184, 186] and, at first glance, it seems uncontroversial and conclusive. It is given in the form of a complex constructive dilemma, an argument form familiar to the Stoics’ favorable logical style.

a) If A, then Β.

b) If C, then D.

c) Either A or C.

d) Therefore, either Β or D

The conclusion seems not to completely correspond to what Cicero said. The conclusion here has the disjunctive form “either it is fated that p or it is fated that not p” with the distribution of the predicate ‘fated’ taken from premises a) and b); it does not correspond with the proposed conclusion of LA in Cicero’s text, reflecting idleness – (in A-version) that “there is no point in calling in a doctor” or (in B-version) “all activity will be removed from life”. We can only agree with Bobzien [1998:184] that it is necessary to add a bridge premise that relates futility in the conclusion with some of the premises if the argument, in its original form, is based on some non-explicit premise (or premises). Hence, we can conclude that either the argument is not complete or that the suggested inference form is not proper since, at this stage, it does not look like a validly inferred conclusion. If some bridge premise is missing, then we have to change strategy and analyze the argument as an enthymeme.

We don’t know a principal logical structure of the argument that would correspond to the intention of its founder. Chrysippus could try to capture the argument by tools that were at the Stoics’ disposal and similar to the preferred style of the Stoics. This is probably what Bobzien had in mind. However, corrected and reformulated according to her conjecture, the argument still remains obviously defective.

Another remark on the form of inference proposed by Bobzien is that the form of the first two premises corresponds neither to the source text nor to the conclusion. According to the form of inference proposed by Bobzien, the conclusion would be: ‘you will recover, whether you call in a doctor or not’ or ‘you will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not’. However, it does not cover the intended futility.

Third premise in Cicero’s explicit A-version is also problematic. “One or the other is fated” could be read in two senses – either ‘it is fated that Pv~P’ or ‘it is fated that P or it is fated that ~P’, but it should be borne in mind that none of them have a strictly bivalent form as the Stoics accept, since variables A and C are taken not as an exclusively complementary atomic proposition, but as different and unfamiliar propositions ready to be used in a classic constructive dilemmatic argument.

Atomic propositions or rather sub-forms B and D of the first and second premises are taken without explicitly distinguishing the exclusive disjunction inserted and common to both of the sentences (‘whether you call in a doctor or not’). Here also sub-forms B and D are taken as unfamiliar different expressions even though they contain mutually opposed same variables (‘to be recovered’ and ‘to not be recovered’).

The argument at first glance looks as if it is intended for the Stoics’ complex constructive dilemma form of inference and it could, partly, be read Bobzien’s way. However, if we more closely inspect Chrysippus’ remarks about the argument given in Cicero and if we respect the context of the lines of the debate concerning the argument in de fato, this opinion seems to be less probable.

Let us go back to Chrysippus’ comment. He criticizes sub-forms B and D of premises a) and b) as not valid since their antecedents have to represent adequate conditions corresponding with their consequents. Co-fated (or con-joined) things differ from simple fated things. A simple fated thing is also necessary but it represents the internal dispositions of a concrete being. For example, ‘Socrates will die’ is true because of Socrates’ ‘internal’ dispositions, since he is human being and human beings are mortal. But in the sentence ‘Socrates will die in the sea’, to die in the sea is not an internal disposition of Socrates. He could potentially die in many ways. For this sentence to be true, Socrates has to be joined with or connected to some external and also necessary antecedent circumstances, which make it possible for Socrates to die in the sea. The conditional sentence has to be formed with an antecedent condition that either recalls an internal or external necessary condition. Chrysippus’ comment here is not against causal determination originally proposed by the argument but, as it seems, against futility. It is also in accordance with Origen’s observation, though Diogenianus wishes to emphasize rather his alleged agent-determinism option [apud. Euseb. Praep. ev. 6.8.34-5].

Chrysippus’ remark pushes us to the other side of LA arena. What is also interesting is that he neither criticizes the claim about fate or the laziness conclusion or the disjunctive antecedent in premises a) and b), nor does he criticize the disjunctive proposition in premise c). The central subject of his criticism is the nature of the conditional in premises a) and b), which he is not conceptually ready to accept. Commentators of LA agree that Chrysippus’ solution is a successful criticism of LA [quoted in certain places by Cicero, Origen, Diogenianus; Seneca, nat. quest. ii, 37-38; Nemesius, de nat. hom. XXXV, 51; Calcidius, in Tim. clxv. 203.15f.; Ammonius, in de int. 149,1-3]. The idea is that fated outcomes need the fulfillment of necessary conditions. However, what would happen if we made some appropriate corrections according to Chrysippus’ critics and use the result as a suggestion for correcting the argument? Let us try it.

Take the first premise. It would be (with or without the simple disjunctive assumption; it doesn’t matter) ‘if it is fated for you to recover from this disease, then you will recover, if you call in a doctor or if you take some medicine’. It is immediately clear that either of the co-fated conditions, even if necessary, are not strong enough to guarantee recovering in all possible cases. They could play the role of necessary conditions for recovering, but none of introduced conditions are sufficient for the recovering. In the same manner, let us bring in his other parallel example. ‘To have intercourse with a woman’ is not a sufficient condition for begetting a child. Commentators, together with Chrysippus, all of whom shared the same principles, somewhere missed this fact.

Against whom was Chrysippus’ parallel argument proposed? Who will agree with its original form? Even though there are not many candidates, we can only conjecture. Let us inspect it in more detail. If we take a closer look at the premises, all of them could be interpreted as theorems. The idea to read premises a) and b) as theorems is not new and we can find it in Dummett’s modern version of fatalism argument [1978:340]. Both of these premises have the form of an extended version of the paradox of material implication. The third premise or c) looks also like the theorem and has many features in common with the law of the excluded middle. If this is so, the intention of the argument’s originator is very close to the logical fatalism approach and to the purpose of proving fatalism on solely logical grounds. However, the conclusion of the argument has the same deficiency we mentioned above. It is not implied by the premises. These premises do not imply futility and in this form it is an obvious sophism.

If formulated in the sense of the paradox of material implication, two premises a) and b) would have approximately the following form: a) P => [(Qv~Q)=>P] and b) ~P => [(Qv~Q)=>~P]. Moreover, these premises are prefixed in Cicero’s A-version of the argument with ‘to be fated’ while in B-version ‘to be true from eternity’. In A-version we have something like a) fP => [(Qv~Q) => P] and b) f~P => [(Qv~Q) => ~P]. In Cicero’s B-version, we obtain, if we apply as an immanent principle that ‘true from eternity’ could imply or includes ‘necessity’, these expressions: a) []P => [(Qv~Q)=>P] and b) []~P => [(Qv~Q)=>~P]. The third premise is something very similar to the law of the excluded middle, but not the same, since it is prefixed with the predicate ‘to be fated’. In A-version, it could be either f(Pv~P) or fPvf~P. With the B-version of premise c), we can read by analogy either [](Pv~P) or []Pv[]~P. The dilemma surrounding the assumption of premise c) could be solved by insight into expressions a) and b) and their prefixed antecedents, and, for this reason, would be more adequate to read the disjunction in sentence c) as a disjunction similar to that between the two antecedents from a) and b).

Premises a) and b) in both Cicero’s versions have one common peculiarity. They claim that, if something is fated (or ‘true from eternity’), it is yet in our power to do one of two mutually exclusive actions before the fated event takes place. It is a peculiar understanding of fatalism and not completely corresponding to the logical form of fatalism usually ascribed to LA. Idleness and futility in the conclusion is the third of the possible options one is able to choose in fatalism understood in this way. Even if it does not correspond with logical fatalism, there are some fatalistic conceptions that will bring both sentences together with the so-called futility option.

Now we will take a tour across different conceptions of fatalism and try to indicate and understand possible candidates who would accept such an interpretation of fatalism. As regards metaphysical principles, there are some historical candidates who would agree with such a reading of sentences a) and b) and with the conclusion of LA.