Searching for appropriate fatalism candidate of Lazy argument



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Looking for The Lazy Argument Candidates


[draft]

Vladimír Marko, Comenius University, Bratislava1



Looking for The Lazy Argument Candidates 1

Introduction 1

Vladimír Marko – Looking for The Lazy Argument Candidates 2

Sources 3

Sophism and parallel argument 5

Logic of the argument 8

Many faces of fatalism 12

Ancient theories of fatalism 17

Further open questions 33

Laziness. 37





Summary: The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the non-universal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine form of the argument seems to be given in different form and far closer to logical fatalism and whose purpose is not to defend laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to the logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and its additional tuning is needed.

Key words: the Lazy Argument, logical fatalism, historical reconstruction, Cicero, Chrysippus, Diodorus, Megarians.


Introduction


There are two kinds or classes of Lazy Argument variants (LA – the argument is sometimes called the Idle Argument or the Argument from Inactivity). The first belongs to its ancient form while the second, common in modern formulations, imitates some but not all the features of the ancient one. Both kinds are similar insofar as they use apparently common logical principles and also insofar as they intend to reach the same fatalistic conclusion. But, even when presented with the same basic kernel, or almost the same, there are many differences between them. The main reason is that there are not any unique, standard or fixed sources that could serve as sufficiently solid bases for all further historical interpretations.

Many authors today defend or deny the conclusion of this historical argument without bearing in mind the substantial proprieties of the argument and its historical dimension. According to contemporary approaches, crucial to the argument is its logical schema and motivation to support outcomes of fatalism on logical grounds (some contemporary debates on modern variants are reflected in Buller [1995] and Berčić [2000]). But it is neither the case that its logical schema is convincingly transparent and could be interpreted in some unique way, nor that the conception of fatalism laid in its background is universally acceptable for all conflicting sides included in the debate. Differences in interpretations are not only in approaches to the argument and in the way of its reconstructing, but also have their source in insufficient consensus about the question of its intended purpose: what is the intended aim of argument? So, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of questions, “What is the correct solution of LA?” and “What are the proposed solutions given by those involved in the debate?”

The argument is frequently discussed as “the standard argument” for fatalism2 and also used in debates on free will and determinism (especially logical determinism), theological fatalism, etc. However, in this text we will not try to give any rival solution to LA but rather to reflect on some of the historical and philosophical kinds of fatalistic hypotheses that cannot be neglected and that could be of relevance in further approaches to LA and, moreover, that could be helpful in additional tuning of its possible solutions.

There are lots of ancient views on fatalism and not all of them are connected to idleness, which can be found in the conclusion of the argument. We think that LA had its origin in a wider cluster of ancient arguments based on the principle of bivalence. Most of these (if not all of them, as it seems) had a common source in the Megarian cuisine, probably in the circle around Diodorus. Besides the similarity in the sources, interpretations and elements of their logical structures, there are obvious differences too, since these arguments were used for different purposes in philosophical debates and in confrontations between schools.


Sources


Several historical sources of LA – and some similar arguments – are known. A pioneering form of the argument can be found in the text of Aristotle.

These and others like them are the absurdities that follow if it is necessary for every affirmation and negation (either about universals spoken of universally or about particulars) that one of the opposites be true and the other false, and that nothing of what happens is as chance has it, but everything is and happens of necessity. So there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, thinking that if we do this, this will happen, but if we do not, it will not [Arist. de int. 18b26-33]

This is the oldest form of LA. Aristotle and his commentators frequently used to say that we do not deliberate about what is necessary [cf. ib. 19a7-8; cf. Alexander, in de fato xvi.186.30 ff.; cf. Ammonius, in de int. 148,32 ff.]. In other words: if every statement is true today, it would appear that nothing anyone can do will alter this since everything is decided in advance. If fatalism is a plausible conception, there is no place for free will or for being troubled over what will be or about what we could do or could have done. The argument results in idleness or futility. Aristotle’s example shows almost the same way of reasoning and the same result of idleness as in LA. He criticizes this conception as inadequate and invalid. According to him, the argument fails because bivalence is not tenable for future tense propositions. Since (a future oriented) fatalism is ungrounded and this conception fails, we are (contrary to argument) able to make decisions and act freely and, what follows, we are able to retain a concept of responsibility.

Probably the most commented upon and popular form of the argument among ancient as well as contemporary philosophers is presented by Cicero [fat., xii, 28-29]. There are, for some reason, two versions of it:

A) For there is a certain argument which is called the “Lazy Argument” by the philosophers; if we obeyed this we would do nothing at all in life. For they argue as follows:


  1. “If it is fated for you to recover from this disease, then you will recover, whether you call in a doctor or not;

  2. similarly, if it is fated for you not to recover from this disease, then you will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not.

  3. But one or the other is fated;

  4. so, there is no point in calling in a doctor.”

This is Cicero’s basic form of LA (and for the first time it is named the ‘lazy’ argument, ignava ratio). According to him, the argument has the same proprieties whether we use the term “fate” or whether we invoke the terms “necessity” and “truth”.

B) This kind of argument is rightly named lazy and idle, since by the same argument all activity will be removed from life. For one can change the argument so as not to bring in the name of “fate” and still maintain the same position, as follows:



  1. ‘If this has been true from eternity, that “You will recover from this disease,” then you will recover, whether you call in a doctor or not; and similarly,

  2. if this has been false from eternity, “You will recover from this disease,” then you will not recover, whether you call in a doctor or not’; and the rest follows.

The phrase ‘the rest’ in Cicero’s text refers to sentences c) and d) from the A-version – i.e. the disjunctive proposition (‘one or the other is true from eternity)’ plus the conclusion (‘there is no point in calling in a doctor’). In the B-version of Cicero’s text, the term ‘fate’ is now omitted or substituted with the term ‘truth’, incorporated into a temporal context (‘true from eternity’).

Cicero’s formulation of both arguments, side by side, seems intended to show two things:

1) that the argument’s conclusion would be the same for events as well as for propositions, and

2) that the argument has the same outcome whether we use in its premises the term ‘fate’ or whether we have in mind simple ‘truth’ (‘truth from eternity’ or ‘necessity’).

Cicero, as our source, does not give us an explicit sense of a disjunctive sentence. The interpretation of the source can be only estimated because the ‘one or the other’ option could be read in several ways: i.e. ‘true from eternity’; simply ‘true’; ‘necessary’; ‘fated’ in advance; or ‘fated’ in respect to all antecedent activities. As it seems, the argument is never just an argument corresponding to the problems of fatalism alone but also about the wider principally logical and metaphysical questions concerning (among other things) truth, time and causality. Cicero discusses the argument in the wider debate covering Chrysippus’ answer in confrontation with the Megarians, the Academics and Epicurus. It seems that the argument is taken over from some Stoics’ source, perhaps from Chrysippus or Posidonius.

The argument at the first sight is deficient. Cicero’s exposition and conclusion is also not completely compatible with what the argument is claiming. In A) he concludes that the argument is named ignava ratio “since by the same argument all activity will be removed from life.” This conclusion does not correspond to the character of the argument, since in the argument all that is said about fate corresponds to the complementary pair ‘to be recovered / to be not-recovered’. According to this, like in Aristotle’s version, it is not fated that our side activities are governed by fate. Further, if one can choose between two excluding options, this would be in conflict with Cicero’s claim that all activity will be removed from life. In his version, just the predicted outcome is fated though not the activity to decide between two options and to do one of them. We have options to choose freely between two appropriate activities (to call in a doctor or not), even without a corresponding impact on the fated outcome.

There are more ways to interpret this argument so as to see why it is uneven. One solution is to say that the argument is simply unsuccessfully formed and thus fails. It corresponds to the opinions of both Cicero and Origen [Cels. 2. 20.] – argument is a sophism and captious. The opinion could probably be taken over from some common Stoics’ source, more precisely, as Diogenianus said, from ‘the second Chrysippus book On fate’ [apud Euseb. praep. ev. 6.8.25].


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