Philosophical Issues in Economics

Bibliography

Rawls, J. 1975. “A Kantian Concept of Equality.” in Cambridge Review, February 1975, Vol. 96, pages 94 - 99.

Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robeyns, I. 2003. “The Capability Approach: An Interdisciplinary Introduction.”
Robeyns, I. 2000. “An unworkable idea or a promising alternative? Sen’s capability approach re-examined.” in Center for Economic Studies Discussion paper 00.30. Leuven.
Sen, A. 1980. “Equality of What?” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Stanford University May 22, 1979, pages 197 - 220.
Sen, A. 1995. Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. 1999. Development is Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. 2004. “The Human Development Index,” forthcoming, in Clark, D. (ed.).
Sugden, R. 1993. “Welfare, Resources and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality Reexamined by Amartya Sen,” in the Journal of Economic Literature, December Vol. XXXI, pages 1947-1962.
Stewart, F. 2004. “Human Development,” forthcoming, in Clark, D. (ed.).

Essay 2
ON THE GOODNESS OF DESCRIPTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

A critical examination of the evaluative framework of the capability approach
Description needs information – factual, ideal. The exercise of describing any event or thing requires an act of selection by the describer.⁴ This selection must be done from the amount of information available, which may not be – seldom is – comprehensive in scope. A larger information set helps generate new possibilities for a selection that is more accurate and/or useful.
The task of development theorists and practitioners is to recognise serious issues – issues that lead to some sort of deprivation – being faced by people in developing, and more developed, countries. Such recognition entails an act of description: description of what constitutes serious issues; and the determination of the state of deprivation itself. This description, or recognition, is a function of two things: the absolute set of information at one’s disposal, and the selection criterion – evaluation tool – used to prioritise a certain sub-set of information.
The evaluation may be better, and accurate, if the amount of information available is broad in scope. A broader information set – an appropriate informational base – Amartya Sen argues, provides a better description, and an accurate one, of the actual situations of human beings. According to him, a plural evaluation approach in development – like that of capabilities – provides good descriptions and descriptions that are good (to give).⁵ The capability approach conveys more accurate descriptions – where accuracy is determined by how the description corresponds to factual reality – and descriptions that are useful in that they help formulate effective development policies, which in turn help alleviate deprivation – of food, liberty, access to education, healthcare – prevalent among human beings.⁶
In the following hypothetical dialogue, Sen explains his position: why he thinks that his capability approach provides “the proper space” – that of substantive freedoms – for evaluation of development concerns.⁷ He explains why he thinks this approach provides more accurate, and more useful, descriptions – good descriptions and descriptions that are good to give, for development.
The dialogue takes place in Café Purgatory. Samuelson led Sen there, after a faculty meeting of the Ivy League consortium, to discuss the capability approach with Bentham, Mill, Nozick, and Rawls.

(I)

Sen’s case: capabilities provide a better informational base for evaluations

You ask why I bother with appropriate informational bases for evaluation. Because, they are critical for any evaluation; I have explained this elsewhere and provided examples of the same.⁸ But the presence of such a distinguished audience requires an original example.

Consider the following.⁹ Chang is starving because of a devastating famine. Pedro, a Jesuit priest, chooses to fast during lent as a matter of faith. George – who has an expensive taste in food – will either consume champagne and caviar like a glutton, or starve. And Nabaneeta, who is a housewife, chooses to nourish her husband, while underfeeding herself (thinking that as sole earner of income for the household he deserves complete nourishment, and the prevalent cultural norms in her society expect her to act likewise).
Our goal, as those concerned with human development – also termed human welfare, justice, happiness – is to ensure that Chang, Pedro, George and Nabaneeta maximise their well-being. The informational base of our evaluative framework, I argue, will directly influence our determination of their present well-being. And, will thereby, help ascertain what course of action we take to ensure our goal: well-being maximisation.
An accurate description of the current state of well-being can only occur in the realm of possible functionings available to these four individuals.¹⁰ That is to say, an intermediate space where we see the beings and functionings of people, not their consumption level or utilities, is the best place to determine a person’s actual well-being. The set of possible functionings is the capability set. From this set an individual can choose her final outcome, which would be the achieved functioning. This act of choice can be termed technically as the chosen functioning vector. Various conversion factors, like personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, influence the capability set, and choice of functioning vector.
This framework yields a more accurate description of the current well-being state of our four individuals than those offered by other prevalent theories. For example, on what basis can one differentiate the well-being of Pedro and Chang if only consumption counts: both are starving, so their well-being ought to be same? Or if we look at utility, does the well-being of Nabaneeta equal that of George (if his diet of caviar and champagne is available to him), when she is under-nourished but resigned herself to her situation due to social norms, while George hogs his caviar? What use is a right to food either, when one has resigned oneself to such a state, as Nabaneeta’s?
Only the by viewing their functionings can we thus evaluate their well-being. And thereby, act in ways to improve their well-being. [Bentham interrupts Sen at this point].
(II)

Café Purgatory: cross-examining Sen’s case for capabilities

Bentham: What a rigmarole of words! Why complicate the system, when we have a perfect framework for this – the principle of utility!¹¹
Sen: Well, Robert here has shown the deficiency of the utilitarian principle.¹² Also, in terms of viewing things in final states, how does one differentiate an opium smoker’s pleasures, while he consumes opium, from those of Cato’s, when he engages in oratory in front of the Roman Senate?

However, I will prove my point here using the normal utilitarian framework, and not go delve into extreme cases or examples.

	Functioning	Consequence	Welfare	Utility (mental states)
Chang	Starving (Necessity)	Hungry	Low	Low
Pedro	Fasting (Choice)	Hungry	High^13	High
George	Fasting/Eating (C/C factor)	Hungry / Nourished	Low / High	Low / High
Nabaneeta	Underfeeding (Choice)	Under-nourishment	High^14	High